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 Abstract 
Using temporal expressions to indicate relations other than temporal ones is a well-
documented phenomenon. This study aims to tackle the problem from a procedural 
pragmatic perspective, an approach that considers that certain expressions – 
temporal adverbs and connectives in this case – encode instructions guiding the 
addressee to infer the relevant relations between the constituent parts of utterances 
to obtain the most appropriate interpretation. Here, a dozen English and French 
temporal expressions are described and analyzed with the aim of understanding how 
and why they could be used non-temporally, and proposing a general outline for the 
type of procedure such expressions could encode.  
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 “[Linguistic signs] occur much as do properly placed signposts on 
human paths; as long as there is only one unambiguously 
recognizable way, there is no need of signposts. But at crossings, 
where the situation becomes ambiguous, they are quite welcome.”  
- Karl Bühler  
Theory of Language: the Representational Function of Language, 
1990 
 
1. Introduction  
In all types of conversations and written texts, one can hear/read temporal 
expressions being used to do something other than give the time of the event 
described, the time of the utterance itself, or specify any temporal relations between 
one or more events. Instead, they are used for a variety of purposes: to order 
argumentative clauses, to structure discourse, they may be responsible for indirect 
speech acts, or may even be a means of explicitly marking a subjective attitude or 
point of view. Temporal expressions – be they tenses (i.e. tense morphemes), adverbs, 
adverbial phrases, or connectives – are found in practically all linguistic productions. 
Thus, the fact that they may be used to express something more than straightforward 
temporality is essential to research in temporal linguistics in particular and to the 
study of natural languages in general. Investigating this phenomenon should provide a 
better understanding of precisely how temporal adverbs, connectives and indexicals 
(or deictics) function in a given language – here, English and French – and hopefully 
grant insight into these expressions’ (basic) semantic meaning and their (actual) 
pragmatic meanings in use. The argumentative and discursive usages of temporal 
expressions are well-known phenomena acknowledged by several approaches and 
traditions as we shall see further on (chapters 2 & 3). Let us now turn to a few 
examples to help illustrate what it is we will be examining. Below, when listing 
government officials (1) is argumentative (establishing a hierarchy) but (2) is not (it is 
temporal): 
(1)  First comes the president, then the vice-president, then the secretary of state… 
(2) ?First comes the president, afterwards the vice-president, afterwards the secretary 
of state… 
Furthermore (2) is strange because of the present tense, which favors a generic 
interpretation (which is true regardless of who is president) versus a specific 
interpretation (which is true if the President is at this moment entering the room just 
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before the Vice-President). This is also the case in French, as (3) and (4) below 
illustrate, where (3) is argumentative and (4) is not: 
(3) Jean et Marie se voient souvent, maintenant, je ne sais pas s’ils sont amants. (Nef, 
1978)                         
(4) ?Jean et Marie se voient souvent, en ce moment, je ne sais pas s’ils sont amants. 
The commonly accepted “time metaphor” surrounding this type of transfer is over-
simplistic – it fails to capture the intricacies of the phenomenon; we must therefore 
reject the idea that within argumentative or discursive speech or text, the passage of 
time simply equates progression. More importantly, there is no theory on offer that 
satisfactorily handles the very specific cognitive-pragmatic enrichment of a semantic 
form denoting time to a pragmatic meaning expressing discursive, argumentative or 
other relations. Thus, I suggest that this kind of enrichment does not principally rely 
on discursive features – as the textual linguistics or discourse grammar traditions 
suppose – but is instead achieved through pragmatic processing via the 
contextualization of the linguistic form, for instance through the search for relevance 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986, 1995)1. I will show that there is much more complexity 
involved in this enrichment than is usually admitted or supposed; and I aim at 
spelling out the part of it which is determined by the procedure encoded by the 
expression itself and the part which is dealt with by contextualizing operations. 
1.1. Initial problem  
The object of this research is the description and examination of utterances and 
sentences wherein temporal expressions are used to communicate something other 
than time – in addition to, instead of, or even in spite of any extant temporal meaning. 
Our perspective will both integrate the semantics and pragmatics of such linguistic 
productions and include notions from studies on argumentation and input from 
cognitive trends in contemporary linguistics and pragmatics. In our definition of 
temporal expressions, I include tenses, temporal adverbs, connectives and indexicals. 
When I say ‘communicating something other than time’, I mean not principally 
denoting temporality; whether or not a temporal utterance can be completely devoid 
                                                 
1 No doubt other pragmatic approaches, namely Gricean or post-Gricean ones, would prove 
equally effective in this endeavor; the choice of Relevance Theory is partly one of affiliation with 
the Geneva pragma-semantic school of thought, and partly because of the direct lineage from 
Relevance Theory to the conceptual/procedural distinction. More on this in sections 2.4 and 3.1. 
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of temporality will be considered as well (though this is a secondary concern, and does 
not overly affect our principal thesis). Finally, I will argue that temporal expressions 
understood in this way are used argumentatively or discursively as defined further 
along, and have an effect on the subjectivity (or point of view) of the utterances in 
which they appear. For instance it may be that a particular perspective is made more 
salient with such usages – though we are not claiming that temporal expressions 
themselves are non-subjective2 when used temporally – indeed, temporal expressions 
are usually calculated from a particular speaker’s perspective, or index (in the sense of 
Korta & Perry 2011). This approach is by no means widespread, and I will try to 
account for such occurrences, using tools and data from several different approaches, 
such as theories or approaches whose focus is on describing and analyzing discourse 
and utterances, and Relevance Theory, which have yet to be fully corroborated.  
Past and current research on the subject has been undertaken in various fields, 
including philosophy of language, narratology, studies in rhetoric or even critical 
literary theory. For this research, I will mainly adopt Sperber & Wilson’s (1986, 1995) 
Relevance-Theoretic framework, particularly the work dealing with the 
conceptual/procedural distinction, first posited by Blakemore (1987, 1992) and 
developed by Luscher & Moeschler (1990), Luscher (1999), Moeschler (2002) and 
more recently Saussure (2003, 2011) into a procedural pragmatics. Saussure’s 
procedural pragmatics provides us with an algorithm geared for dealing specifically 
with temporal expressions used non-descriptively (though not necessarily non-
temporally, 2003: 276-284). Naturally, I will include insights and data from several 
fields but will subsume them to a predominantly procedural form of cognitive 
pragmatics in order to give as unified an account as possible. This perspective is 
hearer-oriented, specifically focused on what a hearer’s interpretation of a given 
utterance is and how they achieved this understanding (though of course utterances 
will also be considered from the speaker’s perspective). 
These principles, and the observations of these expressions so far, prompted me 
to formulate the following series of questions, which I will attempt to answer 
throughout this study:  
                                                 
2 The quality of ‘subjectivity’ can be found in both temporal expressions and certain categories, 
like indexicals or demonstratives. It may be that this ‘subjectivity’, if inherent to these types of 
expressions, is precisely what allows at least part of the non-descriptive usages.  
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1. why and how is it that temporal expressions do not necessarily yield a temporal 
interpretation? 
2. how do hearers arrive at an understanding of this sort, and be reasonably confident 
that this interpretation is what was actually intended by the speaker? 
3. what specific conditions must exist, or, in what context(s) do these temporal 
expressions function in this way? 
These questions will be looked at from several angles; as suggested above, the non-
descriptive use of temporal expressions leads one to consider their argumentative 
potential, discursive structuring and their effects on point of view. A temporal 
expression which does not denote (only) temporality will be assumed to be used non-
descriptively, that is, for the purpose of something other than describing temporality 
– be it the time of an eventuality, temporal ordering or temporal relations between 
eventualities. Consider the following: 
(5) Qu’allait-il faire maintenant? 
(6) What was he to do now?  
where in French the imparfait coupled with maintenant in (5) can express the 
perspective of a character in Free Indirect Speech (FIS). In English, this is also 
possible and hinges on the use of now in this specific (fictional narrative) context, as 
(6) illustrates. In both cases, the present time coincides with the narrative present, so 
there remains an element of temporality in these fictional contexts. I suggest that a 
perspective-shift is induced by now and maintenant, likely due to the indexical nature 
of both terms. Additionally, I hope to show that this is possible with other connectives 
– not necessarily indexical ones – because of something embedded in the expressions’ 
core meaning. I will come back to this later (cf. sct. 3.1-3). 
In (7) and (8), spoken after hearing the doorbell ring, the future tense is not used 
to describe a future moment, but a present one. Furthermore, these examples express 
a strong probability, approaching certainty (i.e. if the mailman is expected).  
(7) Sarà il postino.  [a case of epistemic future use in Italian] 
(8) That’ll be the mailman. [a case of epistemic future use in English] 
The use of temporal adverbs such as then in (1) or yet in (9) below, and tenses as in (7) 
and (8) all show examples of utterances not used descriptively; despite this fact, they 
are perfectly understood by native speakers as being regular linguistic productions. 
Indeed, there is no confusion between the intended meaning of yet in (9) and (10) and 
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the one in (11) or (12), below: 
(9) Those paintings are ugly and expensive, yet people buy them.  
(10) The sun was bright, yet cold. 
(11) John hasn’t seen Mary yet.  
(12) Are we there yet? 
These are but a few of the occurrences of temporal expressions that can be found in 
various languages that produce different effects, according to the context of course, 
but also – perhaps especially – because of procedural elements encoded within them. 
Therefore, I think an essentially procedural pragmatic model will enable us to better 
describe the way temporal expressions, and ultimately connectives, illocutionary 
adverbs, certain adverbials, and indexicals, function.  
Our goal is to present a method capable of accurately predicting how hearers 
construct relevant interpretations of utterances containing such expressions (whether 
used temporally or not). More generally, our research aims to provide some answers 
regarding the specific contributions that conceptual information can bring to 
implicatures and inferences, on the one hand, and the actual constraints that 
procedural information imposes on implicatures and inferences, on the other.  
This is not a dissertation on the meaning of Time, or a debate of its existence, but 
a study of the meaning of expressions that are used to tell time – and especially of the 
particular aspect of their meaning that allows for non-temporal interpretations. 
However, a brief discussion of what Time is and how humans perceive Time is helpful 
for considering some of the notions a language may attach to this phenomenon. Thus, 
I will touch on what Time is and how it is construed from a few different viewpoints in 
the first section. In section 2, I will address how temporal expressions have been, and 
still are, described and understood by several linguistic and philosophical schools of 
thought. The general paradigm and methodology used in subsequent sections will be 
addressed at the beginning of section 3. This will be followed by the analysis proper, in 
section 4, where we shall first look at examples of the expressions we have worked on, 
and proceed to describe and then analyze the way they function more in-depth. 
Section 5 will present the concluding arguments. 
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1.2.  Time & temporality 
In this section, we will consider a brief and approximate definition of time and 
temporality, how they can be measured, and how these notions can be represented in 
language.  Can time be regarded as a reality, or is it only an abstraction created by 
human minds? Alternatively, is temporality the same thing as Time? The goal is not to 
answer these questions thoroughly or definitively here. I do however think it necessary 
to have at least a basic understanding of time from three linked, but different, 
perspectives: Time as a physical phenomenon, Time as a psychological and biological 
phenomenon and, finally, Time as a linguistic phenomenon. Thus, this dissertation 
may appear to be of a multidisciplinary study; this is not really the case, but looking at 
Time from three vantage points will better enable us to define Time and temporality in 
language, and from there see what they are not. 
1.2.1. Physical Time3 
A detailed account of physical time goes beyond the scope of this research. Instead, I 
propose an approximate description of physical time: the physical time a non-
specialist can talk about. In other words, our notion of ‘physical time’ is a naïve or 
commonsensical one and what I mean by ‘physical time’ is ‘real time’4. Therefore, very 
simply put, Time is something external to human consciousness, which would exist 
even if we humans were not here to witness it – much like the sound the proverbial 
falling tree makes all alone in the woods.  
Physical time is, approximately, the continuous modification or transformation 
of matter. Although it exists regardless of human perception – and can thus 
reasonably be called ‘objective’ or ‘real’ for the majority of human affairs – it can be 
and is measureable through instruments, or our own perceptual systems: our senses 
and mind. The decay of matter and energy – known as entropy5 – are good indicators 
                                                 
3 “Although time may not exist at a fundamental level, it may arise at higher levels—just as a table 
feels solid even though it is a swarm of particles composed mostly of empty space. Solidity is a 
collective, or emergent, property of the particles. Time, too, could be an emergent property of 
whatever the basic ingredients of the world are.” “Is Time an Illusion?”, Callender, C. p16 in  
Special Edition: A Matter of Time, in Scientific American, vol. 21, no.1, spring 2012. 
4 “Ultimately it doesn’t matter whether it really exists. Our reverence for time rests on a deep 
psychic need to recognize meaningful milestones.”– Gary Stix (2012). “Real Time” in Special 
Edition: A Matter of Time, Scientific American, vol. 21, no.1, spring 2012, pp 6. 
5 As per the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
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of the existence and passage of Time. Causality is another good indication of the 
existence of time, when observing that eventuality A is the cause of eventuality B for 
instance; there is a lapse of time, however small, between the two. Observing natural 
objects6 in motion – from the sun and moon to a bird or cloud passing overhead – is 
also a hint that Time exists, and that it is passing7. Indeed, human observation of the 
sun’s movement across the sky or the life cycle of trees was undoubtedly one of the 
first ways of telling time humanity had. We have been organizing life around 
objectively observable phenomena – the alternating cycle of day and night, perceived 
as different from the preceding and succeeding days and nights – for many thousands 
of years. Similar observations have been and still are made using the lunar cycle 
(months) and the seasons, (years, and aging). Measuring time, by noting the length of 
shadows cast by objects, or clocks, all derive from observations such as these. This is, 
in all likelihood, the main reason we construe time as past-present-future. 
Now it seems we are enmeshed in the conception of linear time, from past to 
present to future, and this is already human consciousness coloring what Time is. That 
being said, we cannot directly perceive whether or not time is as quantum mechanics 
describes it to be (many of us don’t have access to the devices or knowledge which 
could allow one to (in)directly perceive Time). We must thus adopt a humanly 
understandable conception of time, that is, regarding how natural language encodes 
this notion of time without complex encyclopedic knowledge. Perhaps the most 
interesting point is that whether Time actually exists or not, our limited human 
perceptions of a set of physical phenomena we construe as Time play a role in how we 
represent Time in our minds and languages. Crucial for our representations of time 
and temporality are the notions of change, duration, intervals, directionality and 
causal order8 – all of which are described in commonly accepted temporal linguistics. 
                                                 
6 Fillmore (1997: 48-49) speaks of “sequentially recurring event types” provided by nature, e.g. 
changes in the moon’s appearance, alternation of light/dark, seasonal changes. 
7 “… in general relativity, time retains a distinct and important function: namely, that of locally 
distinguishing between “timelike” and “spacelike” directions. Timelike-related events are those 
that can be causally related. An object or signal can pass from one event to the other, influencing 
what happens. Spacelike-related events are causally unrelated. No object or signal can get from 
one to the other. Mathematically, a mere minus sign differentiates the two directions, yet this 
minus sign has huge effects. Observers disagree on the sequence of spacelike events, but they all 
agree on the order of timelike events. If one observer perceives that an event can cause another, all 
observers do.” (Callender, 2012: 17) 
8 Akin to Pöppel, E. (1978)’s “elementary time experiences”: (1) duration, (2) non-simultaneity, (3) 
order, (4) past and present, and (5) change.  
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1.2.2. Psychological Time9 
First, our minds, in consort with the visual and other sensual faculties, establish an 
order in things, whether the order is correct or not depends on various factors: 
whether the telltale signs of Time were correctly perceived or not, whether our brains 
are tired or altered in some way, etc. For many philosophers and cognitive scientists 
(Plato, Descartes, Newton, Kant, Schopenhauer, Fodor, Dennett, to name a few), our 
thoughts are representations of observable or imaginable objects (whether the objects 
are real or not). In other words, when I look at any present object – tree, dog or table 
– my eyes send information to my brain which forms a mental image of the perceived 
objects. Naturally, these ‘images’ are not real outside of my mind, and will not be 
‘seen’ in exactly the same way if they were conjured up by another human being. 
Nevertheless, I now possess an idea, an approximation of these objects, which 
becomes a representation if and when I consciously think of them or wish to talk 
about them with another person. Now, if we accept this conception of how our mind 
deals with objects in the world – through representations – and extend these 
representations to actions and events – i.e. not only do I see things, I can see them 
move – then how the human mind deals with time becomes clearer: through 
representations. 
Time and temporality existed biologically10 in the human brain before human 
cultures developed a metaphysics of time.  The succession of days, lunar phases and 
the seasons all existed before the first calendars, and humans were undoubtedly 
capable of reckoning by these variations since the human body is regulated according 
to such natural circadian, infradian and supradian rhythms – all of which make up our 
“biological clock”. Recent neurological research on time in the mind supports this view 
(see footnote #9). For instance, the notion of “elapsed time” has been shown to not 
only exist but to be crucial to information processing: taking action based on past 
                                                 
9 Let us add here that we consider Psychological Time to be inherently biological, since it is the 
brain that effectively handles the data pertaining to Time. A few neurological studies have 
pinpointed the basal ganglia and right parietal cortex as being responsible for managing 
timekeeping functions: see the reports by Harringon, D. et al. (1998) “Temporal processing in the 
basal ganglia”, Neuropsychology 12(1) and also Rao et al. (2001), “The evolution of brain 
activation during temporal processing”, Nature Neuroscience 4(3) to name just two. 
10 Further reading in chronobiology:  http://plato.stanford.edu “Experience and Perception of 
Time” & “Temporal Consciousness” entries. 
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experiences and/or present events, or by anticipating outcomes and consequences11 of 
future actions.  
For us there is no question that Time is a real sensation, that it is a 
physiological/biological phenomenon. Indeed, why would human cells – each and 
every living cell, no matter how basic – have a mechanism (circadian rhythms12) that 
exists to measure time, if some part of our bodies did not in fact perceive time in a 
meaningful way? Let us now turn to the linguistic representation of time, and a 
particularly useful mental faculty – the metarepresentational capacity – that is used 
for describing time and a wide array of temporal relations. 
1.2.3. Linguistic Time13 and Metarepresentation 
“…time is arbitrary. You pick your zero point anywhere you want, that way you 
can shuffle each person’s time line sideways till they all coincide.” (Thomas 
Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49, 2006[1965], p.117) 
The last point I will discuss in this section is the existence of Time in language. 
Unsurprisingly, every language has a way to express Time and temporality – typically 
lexemes, morphemes, intonations, or other markers, that allow speakers of a given 
language to temporally situate eventualities on a timeline of some sort (or perhaps 
even several overlapping timelines). Time in language is, to put it simply, the linguistic 
ordering and structuring of eventualities: if we perceive the gathering of storm clouds 
(eventuality A) and precipitation (eventuality B), we place A before B (since it cannot 
rain from clear skies, under normal conditions); already we are constrained by our 
linguistic productions to describing a certain temporality. We could of course have 
said “the rain fell shortly after the storm clouds had gathered” but the two 
eventualities still occurred in the same order, regardless of how they are indicated via 
linguistic means. Often mentioned with temporality are aspectuality and modality, 
and these two elements, complete fields in their own right, will be considered 
secondary to Time and temporality in this research. 
                                                 
11 See Wittmann (1999; 2009) and Eagleman et al. (2005) for a more thorough and nuanced 
discussion of time and temporal perception. 
12 This report is particularly interesting: Hastings M. (1998). “The brain, circadian rhythm and 
clock genes.” BMJ. 317: 1704-07.  
13 Let us point out that the notion of Time and Temporality is of course more complex than the 
picture painted here. For our present purposes we will mostly leave aside aspectuality and 
modality. For more detailed approaches to aspectuality and temporal reference see Reichenbach 
(1947), notably the R point, or Gosselin’s (2005) interval model of aspectual-temporality. See also 
Boogarts (1999) for a detailed discussion of aspectuality and its relation to temporality. 
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Aspectuality and Aktionsart are both central to a proper temporal linguistics 
theory. The intricacies of these two notions go beyond our purposes here regarding the 
non-temporal (or sometimes, non-aspectual) uses of temporal (or aspectual) 
expressions. Though it is true that some of the expressions studied here should 
perhaps more adequately be called aspectual adverbs – for instance already and déjà 
– their non-standard usages can be analyzed without using an aspectual component, 
so long as aspectuality is subsumed to temporality. This is the perspective adopted 
here; aspectuality in the present context should be viewed as a temporal component 
that concerns the temporal reference of events with respect to completion, duration or 
progression. If and when aspectual information for a given expression is particularly 
salient for, or even crucial to, interpreting said expression’s non-descriptive usage this 
will be addressed accordingly. Regarding modality14, which can be roughly described 
as the domain that deals with beliefs and attitudes, and possibility and necessity, its 
role in a linguistic representation of time can be seen as ways of presenting thoughts 
and beliefs about time. For our part here, we will not address modality directly in any 
detail for most of the expressions dealt with – the only exception being in section 4.3 
where epistemic uses of English will and the French future tense are discussed. 
Though I will not go into the particulars of McTaggart’s take on time, his famous 
essay “The Unreality of Time” (1908) addresses the problem of temporal ordering. For 
McTaggart, change is essential to Time and he further sketches out two types of 
(linguistic) temporal sets, which he calls the A-series and the B-series. It is the first 
series (the A series) that addresses change, and therefore, he reasons, it is the A-series 
which properly constitutes time. It would seem that no matter the cultural and/or 
linguistic representation of Time – linear, cyclical, quantum etc. – there is at least one 
basic observation that holds: there is a ‘now’, a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. McTaggart 
proposes two series of temporal ordering of events – the A-series and the B-series15 – 
each pointing to commonly accepted aspects of time; for the A-series it is change, and 
tensed time – past, present, future, and for the B-series it is tenseless time – before 
and after. 
                                                 
14 Jaszczolt (2009) addresses the question of how humans represent (conceptualize) time and 
temporality, and her answer is: through modality. The thesis Jaszczolt presents is that temporality 
(past, present, future) can be construed as degrees of epistemic modality.  
15 McTaggart also proposes a C-series, which is both without tense and without change, it is a 
series that describes order but not time.  
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In other words, all natural languages have a present, a past and a future, or to 
put it yet another way, a T0, T-n and T+n – despite whether a given language has 
distinct markers for these temporal categories or not, and regardless of how we 
represent time. It is not too difficult to see that there is an eventuality B which 
succeeds A, and precedes C, on a time-line, and this is also the case for a circular 
(cyclical) conception of time. Fillmore (1997) sums this up nicely:  
“The first thing to notice about time is that it is one-dimensional and unidirectional. If 
two events can be said to take place at different moments of time, it is necessarily the 
case that one of them is earlier, the other later. Since time is unidirectional, the 
relationship between that which remains the same at different times and the time 
dimension itself is frequently thought of by the human mind as movement.” (Fillmore, 
1997: 45) 
For Fillmore earlier and later are “basic temporal notions, not based on a 
movement metaphor” (46) and are in fact an example of how movement and space is 
mapped onto time, in his words understanding “the front/back axis for an object in 
motion presuppose[s] an understanding of unidirectional time” (ibid)16. Fillmore’s 
claim that earlier and later are (the) basic time expressions suggests that Fillmore 
could be seen as a B-theorist of time in McTaggart’s framing of temporality. It should 
be noted that for there to be an earlier and a later time, there must be a point in time 
from which to measure them – for instance the now or present time of speech. 
Of course, the time and temporality of languages are also representations. 
Moreover, these representations naturally depend quite strongly on our psychological 
perceptions and mental representations – thus, in this sense, linguistic time and 
temporality are mostly a matter of metarepresentation. 
Metarepresentation is a way of describing a human cognitive capacity and the 
ensuing use of this capability to understand human behavior. Some scholars claim we 
use this capacity to ascribe mental states to one another with the goal of 
(approximately) comprehending their behavior, both verbal and non-verbal (Sperber 
(ed.), 2000). Initially, our understanding of the term metarepresentation was to take 
this notion as being what Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1995) call an “interpretive usage”. 
                                                 
16 The remainder of Fillmore’s lecture on Time though insightful is not of direct use to our analysis 
of temporal expressions used non-temporally. 
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It turns out, this is much too limited a definition of metarepresentation for our 
purposes.  
Many linguists, cognitive scientists and philosophers of language and mind 
accept a common (and somewhat obvious) definition of metarepresentation, namely 
that a metarepresentation is a representation of a representation (Jacob 1998, 
Récanati 2000, Sperber 2000, Wilson 2000, Carston 2002). However, these same 
scholars also point out the need for additional criteria – they all agree on at least one: 
that a metarepresentation must have content of some sort, and also must be recursive 
and compositional (ibid.). They also agree that there is some sort of 
metarepresentational capacity in human cognition, which is necessary to attributing 
mental states to others (beliefs, desires, thoughts, and utterances)17; this faculty is 
used by both speaker and hearer in communication.  
Consider Jacob’s (1998) example of metarepresentation, which goes beyond 
quotation and embedded sentences/utterances: the following utterance, spoken by 
Mary: “It is hot in here” can lead the hearer to interpret the following conclusion:  
“[Mary intends [me to believe [that she wants [me to open the window]]]]” (1998: 
section 2.).  
Jacob points out that a hearer of the aforementioned utterance can and most likely 
will reach a conclusion that is itself a complex metarepresentation, based on the actual 
utterance, the context and the hearer’s inference of Mary’s intention in producing the 
utterance18.  
I accept here several claims surrounding metarepresentation19; namely that we 
as humans possess this cognitive faculty, that we use this capacity in our 
                                                 
17 In Wilson (2000: 411-414), we find an overview of the various perspectives of 
metarepresentations: i) Theory of Mind’s perspective – thoughts & attributed thoughts; ii) The 
Gricean perspective – attributed speaker’s meanings, from attributed utterance to attributed 
thought; iii) Perspective of the Literature on quotation – utterances & attributed utterances; iv) 
“Non-attributive” perspective – propositions, sentences & abstract representations where “the 
higher-order representation is an utterance or thought and the lower-order representation is an 
abstract representation…” (413). According to Sperber humans are capable of at least three types 
of metarepresentation: mental (or private) metarepresentations that deal with mental 
representations (i.e. thoughts), public metarepresentations dealing with public representations 
(i.e. quotes, utterances) and abstract metarepresentations that deal with hypotheses and concepts 
(2000: 127). 
18 “As Grice (…) and other pragmatists such as Sperber & Wilson (…) have observed, 
communication is at bottom a matter of determining an intention, i.e., a mental state.” (Jacob, 
1998, Proceedings of Conference on Memory, section 2).  
19 See for instance Sperber (2000), and Récanati (2000).  
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communication (verbal or no), that to be an authentic metarepresentation there must 
be content, and especially that this faculty is used by humans to ascribe mental states, 
including intentions, to other humans. Human verbal communication is inherently 
metarepresentational and that this is so both for descriptive uses and for interpretive 
uses. Obviously, this will not suffice for our purposes; I thus make the claim that our 
object of study – interpretive usages of English and French temporal expressions – is 
but one specific type of metarepresentation.  
It is possible that metarepresentations of interpretive uses of language are more 
complex than this; indeed, we could say that the more interpretive an utterance, the 
more there are levels of metarepresentation, but for now, let us keep in mind that 
language in general is a metarepresentational faculty, and that when a given 
utterances is descriptive it is representational and when it is interpretive it is 
metarepresentational (or representational at a higher level). As a final note, the 
mechanism of metarepresentation, coupled with the abstract qualities of physical, 
psychological and linguistic time and temporality are perhaps the very factors that 
allow for temporal expressions’ versatility in usage.  
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1.3. Discourse and argumentation 
Finally, as stated above, when temporal expressions such as now or since are not used 
to give temporal indications, they are understood as expressing other types of 
information, namely two that we will develop in this study: discursive and 
argumentative information. By discursive information, I mean information that 
indicates an attitudinal or subjective relationship between the speaker and the 
proposition expressed by them – clauses, utterances or discourse units. Another type 
of discursive information is intersubjective or interactional information – something 
we will not go into here, as it goes beyond the scope of this study. By argumentative 
information, I mean information that helps natural language-users establish ordered 
relations between clauses, utterances, sentences or units of discourse. This is by no 
means restricted to ‘argumentative’ usages, of course. What makes an utterance or 
discourse unit ‘argumentative’ also largely depends on the speaker’s intention – for 
instance the goal of debating a law or convincing someone to adopt a specific view. 
Thus, a speaker expresses a (or several) proposition(s) whereby they wish to bring the 
hearer to consider a specific conclusion, for instance by prompting the hearer to make 
a relevant deduction based on the arguments they express.  
There is some overlap between these two categories, and quite often, the goals of 
speakers using an expression to effectively argue a point coincide with speakers’ 
discursive intentions. All else being equal, expressions or utterances used with an 
argumentative orientation can be seen as a subset of a type of discursive information. 
Schematically discursive information can be portrayed as relational information (in 
the widest sense), which can further be divided into subtypes such as argumentative 
relations (e.g. the speaker makes it clear to the hearer that they are concluding Q from 
P), attitudinal relations (e.g. the speaker portrays  their belief(s) about a specific 
proposition or state of affairs), or interactional relations (e.g. the speaker marks the 
utterance in relation to the current exchange or a wider social context). Finally, 
discursive (and argumentative) information is what contributes to overall coherence 
and cohesion in discourse, and temporal expressions (whether used temporally or 
non-temporally) fulfill this function. 
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1.4. Hypothesis & Rationale  
We observed in examples (1-4) that temporal expressions can be, and are, used to 
express something other than time or temporal relations. In Relevance Theory (which 
will be laid out more thoroughly further along) utterances are said to be either 
descriptive or non-descriptive, and this latter category is what I claim is the case of 
temporal expressions used non-temporally. If this is so, what makes now temporal 
(descriptive) in “Get out now!” and non-temporal (non-descriptive) in “Now now”? 
For Relevance Theory it is the relevance of the appropriate usage in the appropriate 
context that allows for such usages; this seems perfectly plausible, but there must be 
something more to it than that. 
My principal hypothesis is that temporal expressions – adverbs and adverbials, 
connectives, deictics and tense morphemes – are procedural expressions; this means I 
consider that the semantics for each of these expressions contains instructions (or, in 
the terms adopted here, a procedure) that helps guide the hearer/reader to interpret 
the relevant usage. This idea underlies why and how temporal expressions may yield 
non-temporal interpretations: being procedural expressions, they encode instructions 
that are applied according to their context of use. Therefore, hearers may arrive at 
non-temporal readings of utterances containing temporal expressions where the 
context clearly calls for a reading other than the standard one(s). This can be set out in 
more detail as:  
procedural temporal expressions encode both temporal instructions and non-
temporal (i.e. argumentative or discursive) instructions – and thus, temporal 
expressions, though they may be used non-temporally (non-descriptively), are 
temporal by default, and are pragmatically modified to fit the context  
We shall return to our hypotheses after an overview of most of the major approaches 
that have touched upon the problem of linguistic expressions used non-standardly, 
especially temporal expressions. I will further discuss these hypotheses and their sub-
hypotheses in section 3.2.  
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2. State of the Art on standard & non-standard usages 
of Temporal Expressions 
Throughout this chapter, I will discuss several influential linguistic and philosophical 
schools of thought, each of which proposes various ways of understanding temporal, 
argumentative and discursive relations in utterances, texts, conversations. Given that 
the actual temporality of temporal expressions is not the primary concern here, and 
given the abundance of research on temporality in linguistics, it goes beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to exhaust all the literature on the subject; instead, the focus will 
be on the different theories’ or approaches’ main arguments, and more precisely on 
what they say about argumentative and/or discursive relations. It will quickly become 
apparent that some of the approaches dealt with here develop this aspect more 
thoroughly than others, and with these approaches there will be more to say. 
Thus, the first subsections will be a general overview of the various proposals 
these approaches have to our problem; in the final two subsections, I will more 
thoroughly discuss the outlooks proposed by approaches that yield insights and tools 
that can readily be used in this study. Section 2.1 is a brief discussion of how several 
language philosophers deal with notions like reference, denotation, indexicality and so 
forth. Section 2.2 summarizes a few semantic traditions and how they handle 
temporal or other relations (e.g. discursive). Section 2.3 is a brief summary and 
critique of a theory that was crucial for the development of procedural pragmatics – 
Anscombre & Ducrot’s theory of argumentation within language. Section 2.4 is an 
overview of Relevance Theory and how this model is used to describe and analyze 
non-temporal uses of temporal expressions. Finally, in section 2.5, I will review 
several different linguistic traditions – from text linguistics to discourse analysis – 
which treat a class of expressions they call ‘Pragmatic’ or ‘Discursive’ markers, and 
whose function is close to that of the temporal expressions we will be looking at here.  
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2.1. Philosophy of Language  
Philosophy of Language offers a wide range of perspectives on temporality, 
argumentation and subjectivity, though in several instances these insights are not the 
central point of the research. There is of course much work in language philosophy 
that is important to a more general theory of language; we cannot give it a sufficiently 
thorough treatment here. Instead, I will focus on just a handful of philosophers whose 
work has been most relevant and influential to my research. We will not concern 
ourselves overmuch with truth-conditions, possible worlds or intensions and 
extensions here, and reference will be important especially insofar as determining how 
expressions used non-descriptively behave – e.g. do they function similarly to 
indexicals20 in Direct Reference Theories?  
For instance, if and when an occurrence of now is used non-descriptively, this 
will mean that now does not refer to the present (time of speech). Naturally, now is no 
ordinary referring word – hence work like Kaplan’s on demonstratives had an 
influence on how the present model was conceived – and we will see further along just 
what now may in fact be referring to in such cases. Thus reference is perhaps the most 
important concept retained from language philosophy: since I think that the function 
of these temporal expressions used non-descriptively may be dependent on just what 
they can be used to refer to, if they do refer to anything, our search for these 
expressions’ basic (or ‘core’) semantic meaning must at least consider the question of 
reference.  
Let us now turn to Kaplan’s model that specifically addresses indexicals and 
demonstratives. Many of his ideas apply equally well to adverbs and connectives 
(much like Lyons 1977), at least those used non-descriptively, as is the case of the 
temporal adverbs and connectives we’re interested in. Furthermore, Kaplan’s notion 
of character – “that component of the sense of an expression which determines how 
the content is determined in context21…” (1978: 359) – is central. In the present view, 
what I call procedural expressions address precisely this question: how to use 
                                                 
20 For Bühler deictic signs point to things (real or abstract) while conceptual signs “do not point, 
but mean” things directly (Bühler 1990: 40). 
21 In the Kaplanian view, context can be construed as a set that includes the speaker, the time of 
speech, the place of speech and corresponding possible world ; we replace the latter with 
‘encyclopedic knowledge’. In a sense we can consider procedural expressions as fulfilling character 
functions. 
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contextual elements to arrive at the most relevant interpretation. For Kaplan there is 
also a resemblance between ‘demonstrations’, ‘depictions’ and ‘descriptions’, which he 
calls ‘indicative devices’ (cf. Kaplan, p. 350 fn23 [p355])22; this points to the 
importance of the (sometimes subtle) relationship between speaker, context, the 
expressions used and what they are used to refer to, or what they are used for if not 
used to refer to something. For Kaplan the role of indexicals is to “tell us what is 
referred to. Thus they determine the content for a particular occurrence of an 
indexical. But they are not part of that content23’’ (Kaplan, 1989: 523). In other words 
indexicals are extra-propositional, that is not part of the proposition itself but 
nonetheless playing a major role in the utterance’s interpretation, and I note that this 
also applies to certain adverbs and connectives (such as the temporal expressions 
analyzed here). 
For Kaplan, the relationship of character to content resembles the one 
traditionally regarded as the relationship of sense to denotation; character is a way of 
presenting content (542). Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Kaplan’s 
theory of demonstratives is his claim that indexicals do not encode concepts but rather 
rules which determine the content of the utterances in which they appear; this is not 
too far from the proposal that certain expressions (i.e. ‘procedural expressions’ which 
includes indexicals) encode rules that help determine the saturation of variables and 
the selection of the correct background information to obtain a ‘full’ interpretation. 
And the question of whether it can be applied to the temporal expressions we will be 
looking at – besides the obvious direct application for now and today etc. – remains 
an open one. I predict that it should function well with yet and then, and most likely 
can be successfully applied more broadly to all the expressions studied here. 
                                                 
22 For Kaplan the establishment of parallels between demonstrations and descriptions leads him 
to consider “…the possibility of a demonstrative analysis of descriptions. If pointing can be taken 
as a form of describing, why not take describing as a form of pointing?” (Martinich, 2008 [1970]: 
350) I like this imagery of ‘description as a form of pointing’; we take this idea a little further by 
stating that now when used temporally (i.e. descriptively) points to time, and when used non-
temporally (i.e. non-descriptively) it points to a relation between clauses or between the speaker 
and their utterance, the situation or the hearer. In brief for Kaplan a demonstration is simply 
pointing at/out, demonstratives are expressions that point at/out and the demonstratum is that 
which is pointed out/at. 
23 The extra-propositionality of demonstratives/indexicals is mentioned a few other times: 
“demonstratives… have both a sense and a demonstration. (…) according to the demonstrative 
analysis the sense of the demonstration does not appear in the proposition. Instead the sense is 
used only to fix the demonstratum which itself appears directly in the proposition.” (Kaplan, 1978: 
350) 
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 Finally, more recently, two philosophers in particular, Récanati (1993, 2000, 
2001, 2007) and Corazza (2002, 2004a, 2004b), address the problem of indexicals 
both in terms of temporality and as operators affecting the point of view within 
utterances. Both have researched the relation between thought and language, with a 
perspective engaging at once the semantics and the contextual data of various 
utterance types. What is of particular interest to our project is their treatment of 
temporal expressions such as now and then, which both see (albeit in slightly different 
terms) as being indicators of perspective24 in addition to, or instead of, denoting time. 
Interestingly, for Corazza (2002:441-443) now and temporal indexicals in general are 
‘pure indexicals’25 (in keeping with Kaplan’s indexical/demonstrative dichotomy); 
while for Récanati it is the opposite: they are ‘impure indexicals’, if indeed indexicals 
at all. Instead Récanati favors the term ‘perspectivals’ to describe here and now 
(2001:125-126). Yet despite these seemingly opposed views (perhaps due to a 
terminological difference) both embrace the importance of perspective as being 
central to our understanding of these terms. To sum their viewpoints up roughly, 
lexical items like now or here trigger a shift in the hearer’s perspective, thus 
prompting the hearer to adopt a point of view consistent with the speaker’s about the 
given proposition. Since I argue that temporal expressions can be used non-
temporally to indicate argumentative or discursive meanings, their notion of 
‘perspective’ was influential to my view of non-descriptive usages. As the view adopted 
in this study is a pragmatic post-Gricean one, this idea of perspective can simply be 
considered contextual information for our purposes here. 
                                                 
24 See also Gherasim’s work on indexicals and subjectivity (2003 and forthcoming), wherein she 
explores the mechanisms of indexicality vis-à-vis Récanati’s ‘perspectivals’; this last notion 
informed our appreciation of how certain classes of expressions can sometimes set off 
interpretations of unexpected points of view.  
25 Corazza (2004:289-290) proposes that now (and here) is a (pure) indexical when it is used to 
refer to the time of the utterance, but works as an anaphoric term when it does not. Given this 
notion, the usages of now analyzed hereafter would not be considered indexicals by Corazza, 
though arguably the non-temporal usages we will see are not anaphoric either. 
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2.2. Semantic Traditions 
Several approaches26 to time and temporality exist in the field of semantics, including 
Vendler (1967) and Dowty’s (1986) seminal aspectual semantics which consider the 
temporal properties of predicates as being directly linked to their encoded aspect, 
aspectual classes and the notion of telicity. Thus, it is widely admitted that (cf. 
Boogaart 1999) if a predicate is atelic the normal progression of time is blocked; 
otherwise, temporal progression is not only allowed, but also mandatory. This point 
may be of some importance since aspect is a feature of sentences that could play an 
unexpected role in triggering the non-descriptive readings.  
For the “traditional” semantic approach, Lyons’ two-volume Semantics (1977) 
gives a comprehensive general overview of deixis and spatio-temporal coordinates, 
nicely summed up below:  
“The term ‘deixis’ (…from a Greek word meaning ‘pointing’ or ‘indicating’) is now 
used in linguistics to refer to the function of personal and demonstrative 
pronouns, of tense and of a variety of other grammatical and lexical features 
which relate utterances to the spatiotemporal co-ordinates of the act of 
utterance.” (Lyons, 1977/2: 636) 
Seeing that a very similar deictic function can be performed by expressions not 
normally associated with deixis is of crucial importance to our own approach to 
temporal expressions. As suggested in the previous section and in keeping with what 
Lyons states above, all the temporal expressions we will be looking at here are in a 
sense deictic, in that they indicate coordinates or relations in utterances and 
discourse27 – and can thus be considered deictics understood in this way. Whatever 
we call these expressions, the problem remains the same: how do they allow for such a 
variety of usages?   
Further along Lyons more explicitly links tense to deixis: “Tense (…) is part of 
the deictic frame of temporal reference: it grammaticalizes the relationship which 
                                                 
26 Other important studies include: Leech (1969), Comrie (1976, 1981, 1985), Bach (1981), Martin 
et al. (1981), Smith (1978, 1981), Franckel (1989), Kleiber (1990b), Declerck (1991), Vet (1991), 
Quirk et al. (2004 [1985]), ter Meulen (1995), Moeschler et al. (1998), Molendijk & de Swart 
(1998). 
27 “By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and 
activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and 
sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at 
least one addressee.” (Lyons, 1977/2: 637) 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
holds between the time of the situation that is being described and the temporal zero-
point of the deictic context.” (1977/2: 678). So for Lyons, time is deictic, a now widely 
accepted notion. This view is appealing from a logical standpoint (cf. Reichenbach, 
1947) and also has good explanatory potential for many if not most utterances; 
however, aspect is not considered deictic for him (1977/2: 705). I am tempted to say 
that it is, in that the attribution of specific reference times for e.g. an interval of time is 
dependent upon precise indications, one of which could indeed be telicity (though this 
goes beyond the scope of this research). However, the main point here is that if time 
(and aspect, and modality) is deictic, then referential linguistic theories can be 
straightforwardly applied to temporal expressions and utterances.   
Formal dynamic semantics, of the type proposed in Discourse Representation 
Theory (henceforth DRT) by Kamp (1981), Kamp & Reyle (1993), Vet (1985, 1991) and 
in Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) by Lascarides & Asher (1993) 
and Asher & Lascarides (2003), refer to rhetorical relations which operate upon 
properties of temporal order, based on their hypothesis that temporal relations are 
linked to general discursive relations. Other recent works within DRT include 
Molendijk & De Swart (1998) and Molendijk (2005). These semantic approaches have 
essentially been concerned with the contribution of tenses to the truth conditions of 
utterances with respect to temporal ordering and causal sequencing in discourse; they 
have yielded complex truth conditional mechanisms for temporal expressions’ 
production of meaning. Though insightful, these approaches have a few limits: with 
DRT we have a strong model which handles standard usages well, but is somewhat at 
a loss for non-standard (i.e. non-descriptive) usages; with SDRT the picture is slightly 
better – the model is more predictive and more thorough, and it is fully capable of 
adequately describing and predicting a variety of temporal relations – but again, when 
dealing with non-standard uses of temporal expressions, SDRT falls short of painting 
a complete picture.  
So, for our purposes here, these theories are too strongly dependent upon logical 
form and default relations; a major consequence of this is a dependence on a 
predominantly truth conditional appreciation of natural language (including temporal 
expressions), and too much difficulty explaining phenomena that fall outside SDRT’s 
list of default relations. Depending so strongly on truth conditionality is too 
restrictive, and these approaches cannot adequately handle non-truth conditional 
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phenomena of the type we are interested in – at least not without some level of 
modification. Furthermore, aspectual and formal semantics do not sufficiently relate 
the importance of the context in utterance comprehension (see Saussure 2003 for a 
detailed discussion).  
Though this study has a predominantly pragmatic orientation, there are a few 
key concepts from a handful of semantic traditions which will be mentioned 
throughout, though in all likelihood I will not necessarily make much use of them. The 
idea being that these elements will be discussed where appropriate for a more 
semantic take of what is occurring with the expressions studied here. I may sometimes 
mention semantic tools like these merely to make clear the approach a more semantic 
study would take to our problem and to eventually highlight a bridge between the 
pragmatic and semantic way of dealing with temporal expressions used in a non-
standard way. 
Thus I may, for a similar group of examples, point out how a ‘standard’ semantic 
approach would address the fact that now or next for instance are used non-
descriptively. In brief though, semantic theories like DRT and SDRT (would) posit 
that language-users have a database of contextually-dependent non-standard 
meanings that are accessed whenever “appropriate” – that is, a language-user will 
access their database when contextually triggered during the process of 
disambiguation, saturation etc.  I can agree with this idea, though it needs to be 
adapted somewhat for the present model, but in essence, we are looking for the 
(semantic) variability of temporal expressions, when these usages occur, and how (and 
hopefully why) these usages can occur. Furthermore, this study’s pragmatic 
orientation means we start from the context that affects expressions, not from 
expressions “searching” for the appropriate contextual parameters28 that are 
necessary to flesh out the full semantic meaning of these expressions. A final note: it is 
the ability of inference that allows one to interpret non-descriptive usages, and 
arguably attributing rhetorical relations in a discourse or text also depends upon 
inference29. 
                                                 
28 Such as the ‘Appropriateness Condition’: A context c is appropriate for an LF Φ only if c 
determines a variable assignment gc whose domain includes every index which has a free 
occurrence in Φ. (Heim & Kratzer, 1998: 243) 
29 See Blass (1990) and Reboul & Moeschler (1998) for a relevance-theoretic take on rhetorical 
relations, coherence and cohesion.   
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2.3. Integrated Pragmatics (or ‘Radical Argumentativism’) 
Anscombre & Ducrot’s (1983) work on connectives in utterances, which they consider 
as being predominantly argumentative, offers a wealth of information in the form of 
well-formulated analyses of typical French connectives (et, mais, ou, donc, enfin, 
ensuite etc.). Their framework considers the use of language as being non-truth 
conditional, as such it is strongly anti-descriptivist. That which is of most interest to 
us is Ducrot’s consideration that connectives do not encode concepts (as do for 
instance “horse” and “door”) but rather instructions (which we will refer to as 
procedures) which tell one in what way an utterance is to be understood or 
interpreted. Another notion that we must keep in mind is the fact that utterances can 
be metalinguistic and that connectives can be used metalinguistically; this enables a 
speaker to refer not to the content of an utterance but to the utterance itself.  
Indeed, though I agree with Anscombre & Ducrot’s idea that utterances can and 
are used argumentatively and/or metalinguistically, their approach seems too extreme 
with regards to their assertion that not only is language essentially non-truth 
conditional, but also that it is “illusory” (their term) to believe that language can be 
used for anything other than argumentation, since it is its ‘argumentative orientation’ 
which, for them, determines the meaning of utterances (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983: 
79-102). This postulate leads almost inevitably to a relativistic conception of language 
and linguistics. More importantly, the type of enrichment that leads the hearer to a 
non-temporal interpretation of a temporal expression is not solved, since the French 
‘integrated pragmatics’ tradition adopts the view that language terms integrate both 
the semantic and the pragmatic, thereby leaving little room for outside influence 
(context). However, if relevant, I will take into account the observations30 made in 
relation to our topic by the scholars of the Ducrotian tradition, notably Rossari’s staff 
in Fribourg (see also Rossari 1997, 2000, 2002, 2006).  
Corinne Iten’s (1999) paper offers a thorough review and convincing criticism of 
Anscombre & Ducrot’s work, from a relevance-theoretic perspective. Iten has this to 
say on how Anscombre & Ducrot use the deep/surface structure opposition in their 
“integrated pragmatics” to describe utterance interpretation: 
                                                 
30 Rossari’s ‘polyfunctionality’ (in Fischer 2006) when discussing connectives is quite close to our 
procedural pragmatic take on such expressions. 
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“According to Ducrot (1984: 181-183), the signification of a deep structure is a set 
of instructions as to how to assign sense to the utterance. Thus to know the 
signification of the deep structure underlying [a given utterance], is to know 
what to do to interpret an utterance of it.” (Iten, 1999: 44-45) 
Iten makes a good case of what is wrong with Anscombre & Ducrot’s Argumentation 
Theoretic account; she convincingly goes over the numerous contradictions in 
Argumentation within Language Theory31, which we believe makes this theory an 
overly complex linguistic analysis at best. One strong objection to Anscombre & 
Ducrot’s approach to argumentation within language is their heavy reliance on 
polyphony (inspired no doubt by Bakhtin’s ideas on polyphony and dialogism); which, 
by itself, adds no relevant explanatory value to the analysis of conversation and 
discourse – though it may be more useful for written texts, particularly fictional ones. 
Luscher (1994, 2002) also provides a description and critique of Anscombre & 
Ducrot’s model. His three main objections to integrated pragmatics are that 1) the 
semantics must foresee every situation/context, and is thus overloaded – as a 
consequence some simple uses of connectives are described with too much 
(unnecessary) complexity; 2) not all discourse/speech is argumentative in and of 
itself; and 3) the description of some utterances may still be undertaken in three 
stages (as prescribed by Anscombre & Ducrot), even if these stages are not visible 
(2002: 26-27). 
For us, the real objection to the Ducrotian view is not with the idea that language 
is non-truth-conditional32 but rather with the idea that all language expressions are 
inherently argumentative – a corollary to the absence of distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics. It is true that language can be used argumentatively, but to 
claim that “argumentativity” resides in every expression used in all utterances would 
be to completely neglect speaker intention and hearer interpretation – in other words, 
this hypothesis would completely sideline the interlocutors’ cognitive processing in 
language production and reception. A more reasonable view would be to say that some 
categories of expressions contain an element that allows a speaker to give utterances a 
specific orientation (argumentative or otherwise).  
                                                 
31 Iten refers to Anscombre & Ducrot’s approach to argumentation within language as 
Argumentation Theory, which is quite distinct from classic logical or rhetorical models or the 
contemporary Pragma-Dialectic theory most commonly researched and practiced today.  
32 Iten calls Anscombre & Ducrot’s “integrated pragmatics” a “non-truth conditional semantics” 
(Iten, 1999: 43-44). 
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2.4. Cognitive or Radical Pragmatics 
This heterogeneous theoretical framework aims to explain communication by means 
of an ostensive-inferential interpretation mechanism, and has two principal 
traditional views of this type of mental or cognitive processing: the Gricean and Neo-
Gricean perspective and Sperber & Wilson’s (Post-Gricean) Relevance-Theoretic 
approach. The Gricean model of natural language processing is perhaps the first truly 
pragmatic take on how people communicate. Grice’s model of language use is now 
well known and generally accepted, whether one admits all four maxims, three of 
them (Levinson 1987: Q, I and M Principles), two maxims (Horn, 1984: Q and R 
Principle) or just one (Sperber & Wilson, 1995[1986]: ‘manner’, or relevance). But the 
maxims are mostly just fluff, as the crucial Gricean contribution is his theory of 
conversational implicature – the idea that ‘what is meant’ is more than just ‘what is 
said’, that an expression’s literal meaning is insufficient for a hearer to completely 
grasp what a speaker actually meant by saying what they did. This opened the door to 
a more widespread understanding of utterances as necessarily being more than just 
the semantics of the expressions composing them – the speaker’s intention and the 
context in which expressions and utterances appear are essential as much as, or more 
so, than an utterance’s logical form. Additionally, since Grice, pragmatic models of 
communication rely on underlying cognitive principles, namely, inference and 
deduction, which are used by hearers to flesh out the full meaning of utterances.  
Neo- and Post-Gricean models more or less follow Grice, perhaps more strongly 
focusing on the economy behind a given linguistic production and its interpretation, 
construed as cost and effect. This can be seen in the interplay between Levinson’s Q, I 
and M Principles, Horn’s Q and R Principles or simply as the overall cost (for the 
hearer) of interpreting an utterance and the cognitive payoff achieved by 
comprehension. Here, the Relevance Theoretic model is favored; it is sounder, simpler 
and proposes a more adaptable framework – it is also, thanks to its “fast and frugal 
heuristics” (S&W, 1995, 2002), more straightforward in its application. Though this 
theory is not specifically tailor-made to describe temporality, as more grammar-
oriented or some narrative approaches have been, it does present several studies 
which will be crucial. I have already mentioned the distinction between conceptual 
encoding and procedural encoding, and Sperber & Wilson address both this 
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distinction (1995) and, more recently, some aspects of time and temporality (1998). 
This framework posits the importance of context since in this model utterances are 
perceived as semantically underdetermined and in need of a cognitive pragmatic 
mechanism to achieve full (or at least optimal) comprehension. Saussure’s procedural 
model (2003) was central to our research as it both addresses temporality and 
postulates the importance of procedural encoding within temporal expressions. We 
will look more closely at Saussure’s model in section 3.1.3. 
Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory though stemming from Grice’s approach 
and adopting many of his general principles, retains but one of his maxims, that of 
manner or relevance. They add or (re)define certain notions essential to their 
communication theory, namely, informative and communicative intentions33, 
cognitive environments34, mutual manifestness35, and ostensive-inferential 
communication36 – all of which, for Sperber & Wilson, are present when 
communicating. The notion of metarepresentation we mentioned above (sct. 1.2.3) is 
particularly relevant to intentions, cognitive environments, mutual manifestness, and 
ostensive-inferential communication. These notions all help build up to their main 
point, the “principle of relevance”:  
“Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance.” (S&W 1995: 158)  
Sperber & Wilson further develop this general principle of relevance, and specify what 
they mean by “Presumption of optimal relevance”:  
“(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make manifest 
to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee’s while to 
process the ostensive stimulus. (b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one 
the communicator could have used to communicate I.” (S&W 1995: 158). 
                                                 
33 “Informative intention: to inform the audience of something; Communicative intention: to 
inform the audience of one’s informative intention.” (S&W 1995: 29).  
34 “A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.” (S&W 1995: 
39) 
35 “Any shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest which people share it is what we will 
call a mutual cognitive environment. In a mutual cognitive environment, for every manifest 
assumption, the fact that it is manifest to other people who share this environment is itself 
manifest. In other words, in a mutual cognitive environment, every manifest assumption is what 
we will call mutually manifest (S&W 1995: 41-42). 
36 “The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator 
and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I.” (S&W 1995: 155) 
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It should be noted that this is the ideal communicative situation, hence the “optimal 
relevance”, although it seems to us that the underlying principle should apply equally 
well to utterances which may not be the most relevant, yet remain “relevant enough” 
to be worth processing. It seems here that there is a potential for understanding 
relevance as a matter of degree – and indeed, that is what occurs in many 
communication acts. This, to me, makes more sense than an all-or-nothing reading of 
this principle; and in Sperber & Wilson’s own words “communication is governed by a 
less-than-perfect heuristic”, which suggests they are more than aware of the possibility 
of more or less relevant utterances, some being just relevant enough and others 
optimally so37. 
Sperber & Wilson’s distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive (or 
interpretive) usages of representations is central to the type of procedural pragmatic 
analysis I will develop here: 
“Any representation with a propositional form, and in particular any utterance, 
can be used to represent things in two ways. It can represent some state of 
affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs; in this 
case we will say that the representation is a description, or that it is used 
descriptively. Or it can represent some other representation which also has a 
propositional form – a thought, for instance – in virtue of a resemblance 
between the two propositional forms; in this case we will say that the first 
representation is an interpretation of the second one, or that it is used 
interpretively.” (S&W 1995: 228-229)  
Clearly, the non-temporally used temporal expressions studied here fit in the non-
descriptive (interpretive) category, for instance sentence-initial still in the following 
example: 
(13) Still, their car was in the driveway. 
(14) Their car was still in the driveway. 
where the main point i.e. the optimally relevant point of this utterance in (13) is a non-
descriptive usage – still is used argumentatively, not temporally (descriptively) as 
opposed to (14). We will elaborate on this further in chapter 3 (and esp. section 4.2.4.) 
below. 
 
                                                 
37 Sperber & Wilson remark quite rightly that it is rather amazing that communication can occur 
at all: “…failures in communication are to be expected: what is mysterious and requires 
explanation is not failure but success” (S&W 1995: 45). 
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There is quite a bit of research on temporality, modality, perspective and 
discourse connectives, and it goes beyond the scope of this work to enumerate them 
all here. Some relevance-theoretic developments on temporality and point of view 
include: Wilson & Sperber’s article on using Relevance Theory to explain how time is 
communicated (1998); work from Sthioul (1998a) on tense and perspective in French; 
Saussure & Sthioul’s description of narrative uses of the French imparfait (1999, 
2005); Rocci’s analysis of epistemic future tense usage in Italian (2000); Nicolle 
(1997, 1998, 2000, 2007)’s work on be going to and will and tense markers in general 
(which was doubly insightful in that his research is both on temporal markers and 
conceptual/procedural encoding). Relevance-theoretic work on connectives and on 
the conceptual/procedural distinction in English has been carried out by Blakemore 
(1987), Wilson & Sperber (1993), Jucker (1993), Blakemore & Carston (1999), and 
more recently Hall (2007) and Schoroup (2011). And in French, Luscher & Moeschler 
(1990), Sthioul (1998b), Saussure (2000b, 2003a, 2007, 2008, 2011), Tahara (2004), 
Saussure & Morency (2006) and Morency (2010) have researched aspectual, modal 
and temporal expressions from a procedural perspective. The more relevant works 
listed above will be dealt with more in Chapter 3. 
The state of the art on the conceptual/procedural divide38 and on discourse 
markers is not limited to Relevance-theoretic research; Fraser (2006) and Nicolle 
(2007) for instance, propose alternative (but similar) accounts of this divide. And 
there is also Bach’s (1999: 342) approach to these terms39, which he claims “function 
as operators on that material [the content of the utterance] to yield the additional 
propositional contents that they do”. This insight makes sense – we could subsume 
diverse classes of expressions, like indexicals (e.g. ‘now’), adverbs (e.g. ‘already’) and 
connectives (e.g. ‘yet’) under this one term based on how they behave in utterances, 
according to their function. This is key, given that the non-descriptive usages of 
temporal expressions are possible precisely because they may have different functions. 
                                                 
38 In addition, the semantics/pragmatics divide also complicates the matter. Jaszczcolt’s Default 
Semantics (2005) blurs the semantics/pragmatics distinction somewhat. It is not clear to me how 
exactly Jaszczolt’s compositionality-intentionality merger account would deal with our 
expressions, and I am not claiming here that these expressions underspecification is what makes 
them so versatile – in fact, if they were strongly underspecified purely conceptual expressions, the 
present approach would be inadequate. 
39 Bach makes a distinction between content connectives and discourse connectives (1999: 342) – 
the former connect contents of an utterance, while the latter connect an utterance’s content with 
something else, something extra-propositional. 
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2.5. Psychological, Cognitive, Textual, & Discourse Approaches  
Discourse analysis and textual linguistics have both made a number of contributions 
to the study of time and temporality; Benveniste (1966, 1974) and Weinrich (1964, 
1973) in particular, whose work on temporal expressions and argumentation has 
inspired more recent theorists, such as Adam (1992, 1994, 1996). Their work has 
pointed out the variation in the behavior of tenses according to the utterances’ 
situation: verb forms will depend, for instance, on whether they are in the context of a 
fictional story, a newspaper article or a historical text. This is plausible for temporal 
adverbs and connectives as well, but for us this is simply another contextual variable 
to be factored into the overall interpretation, rather than an actual constraint that 
necessarily focuses such items according to this principle. 
2.5.1. Psychological Approaches 
Benveniste’s most important contribution to our research is the distinction between 
the (subjective) time of enunciation and (objective) chronological time. This notion 
led linguistics to more systematically take into account subjective or psychological 
factors in utterance interpretation. Most contemporary philosophical or pragmatic 
approaches consider the psychology of speakers as being much more important to 
utterance interpretation than was previously believed. Though some of the notions 
will be relevant for us, our proposed theoretical framework will consider phenomena 
that occur across different types of utterances and sentences – which is why these 
approaches are only of secondary importance to us here.  
Two influential Saussurian principles, as quoted by Benveniste (1966: 93): 
1. la langue est forme, non substance 
‘language is form, not substance’ 
2. les unités de langue ne peuvent se définir que par leurs relations 
‘language units can be defined only by their relations’ 
The second point is essential for us since it is precisely the study of the relations40 that 
certain expressions (i.e. procedural ones) establish or suggest that we are interested 
                                                 
40 Though here Ferdinand de Saussure was concerned with the relations between signifier and 
signified, or how words relate to the concepts they are meant to refer to. In contrast, we will 
consider the relations between the concepts themselves; we will return to this in chapter 3 & 4. 
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in41. Though we shall distance ourselves somewhat from a truly structuralist (or a 
functionalist) conception of linguistics here, the notion of system and structure are of 
course requisite to understanding how words or clauses are articulated in context to 
ultimately allow a speaker to convey some specific meaning to the hearer. Another 
central claim made by Benveniste is that a linguistic system (like any system) is a 
structure composed of mutually affecting units, and these units may combine 
differently: some are frequent, others rare, and some never occur though theoretically 
they could (Benveniste 1966: 96)42. I agree that there are indeed, in what we are 
looking at here, certain combinations – which suggest certain relations and not others 
– that occur more frequently, and if this is the case, it is because these combinations 
are “essential” ones. Concerning the type of relations procedural expressions such as 
discourse markers commonly introduce, we can pinpoint several that are absolutely 
essential to all languages: causal relations, spatial relations, temporal relations, 
argumentative relations. Each of these can be further broken down to encompass the 
totality of relation-types most commonly used in language. 
Causal relations are those that primarily deal with cause & effect, consequence, 
result. 
Spatial relations are used to describe relative situation (proximity, distance), 
absolute location (location, x,y,z coordinates). 
Temporal relations deal with notions of relative time (sooner, later), absolute 
time (dates), chronology.  
Argumentative relations are those used to mark contrast, reinforcement, 
lessening, opinion. 
Guillaume’s earlier (1929) psychological perspective of language was also insightful, 
and here I will recast his perspective for our analyses of temporal expressions used 
non-descriptively. Notably, Guillaume’s “psychomechanical” take on language offers 
us at least one specific component: an anti-polysemic paradigm which posits that for 
any given linguistic form there is a permanent central element in its meaning that 
generates every possible meaning – Guillaume calls this the signifié de puissance, the 
“potential meaning”. This view of language fits in well with our search for the semantic 
                                                 
41 Benveniste’s first point does not however equate to McLuhan’s “medium is the message”; 
rather, this means that the substance (or content) that goes with language is not in language but in 
the minds of Natural Language users. 
42 “Chaque système, étant formé d’unités qui se conditionne mutuellement, se distingue des 
autres systèmes par l’agencement interne de ces unites, agencement qui en constitue la structure. 
Certaines combinaisons sont plus fréquentes, d’autres plus rares, d’autres enfin, théoriquement 
possible, ne se réalisent jamais…” (96, our italics) 
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nucleus or “core meaning” contained in temporal adverbs and connectives. Bélanger 
(1999) sums up Guillaume’s notion of potential meaning as follows:   
“The notion of potential meaning is at the heart of Psychomechanics research. 
The axiom states that words (as well as other parts of the language) all have a 
potential meaning responsible for all the observable (actualized) meanings – the 
various senses – the word has in its use. The potential meaning is a unified 
meaning from which spring out all the particular shades of a given word; it is 
the single prior condition at the source of the senses of the word.” (Bélanger 
1999: 11) 
The very term “psychomechanics” suggests to us that Guillaume’s view of language 
would actually be compatible with a procedural pragmatic account such as ours. I take 
this term to mean that Guillaume sees language as largely dependent upon cognitive 
‘mechanics’ or functions – in other words, from our perspective his is a pragmatic and 
semantic approach to language. It is semantic in that there exists a central element for 
a given linguistic form that means something in itself, and it is pragmatic in that the 
linguistic form can generate more than one meaning, and this occurs in usage. So for 
instance with but the signifié de puissance would perhaps be the notion of ‘contrast’ 
which can then be ‘actualized’ into a variety of meanings – akin to what Relevance 
Theory would call ‘narrowing/loosening’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), also known as 
‘pragmatic enrichment’ enrichissement pragmatique (Saussure 2003). I will not dwell 
on this much more in this study, but Guillaume’s notion of “signifié de puissance” will 
remain in the background, having informed our understanding of the fact that the 
same words can mean several things. 
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2.5.2. Cognitive Linguistics Approaches 
Another influential psychological or cognitive approach is that of Cognitive 
Linguistics, which proposes a framework often portrayed as being at odds with a 
Chomskyan view of language (also a cognitive approach). We need not go into that 
here since it is of no real consequence to our approach – however, it must be said that 
cognitive linguistics and Chomskyan linguistics are two models of language that have 
human cognitive abilities as their cornerstone. One of the major differences, perhaps 
the most important one, is in the application of each approach: the former is more 
often connected with modeling the conceptual part of meaning while the latter is 
linked to the structural part of meaning (which is unsurprising given that it is a theory 
of syntax). The two principles (given below) put forth as the basis for the Cognitive 
Linguistics program are a desire to describe language and language usage in a simple 
and straightforward manner. 
“These are (1) the ‘Generalization Commitment’: a commitment to the 
characterization of general principles that are responsible for all aspects of 
human language, and (2) the Cognitive Commitment: a commitment to 
providing a characterization of general principles for language that accords 
with what is known about the mind and brain from other disciplines.” (Evans & 
Green, 2006: 27-28) 
Neither of these principles is specific enough to give more than an indication of what 
cognitive linguistics would like to do; the first principle is a likely choice for any theory 
or approach. It is the second principle that appears to be what sets cognitive 
linguistics apart from other theories. However, this characterization would be 
misleading, as most contemporary linguistic models do this in some form. Though I 
may agree with some of the basic principles43 of cognitive linguistics such as 
dissatisfaction with some formal theories of language, or a view of the mind as having 
conceptual structure, or even the desire to do away with too-strongly depending on 
truth-conditions, considering (almost) everything to be conceptual is far too reductive. 
Such a broad take on language would be all encompassing and could easily lead to 
linguistic relativism; what is more, it lacks precision when addressing more local 
phenomena, depending too heavily on set expressions (such as common metaphors). 
The polysemic stance adopted by cognitive linguistics will also be rejected here, for 
reasons given previously; furthermore, many of the aspects and processes tied to the 
                                                 
43 See Evans, V. & Green, M. (2006) for a thorough general overview of Cognitive Linguistics. 
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“embodied cognition thesis” such as ‘image schemas’ and ‘conceptual projection’, and 
‘experiential realism’ are, for all practical purposes, just different ways of modeling the 
human language faculty44. For instance Lakoff & Johnson’s (2003: 126) metaphorical 
construal of linear order is an oversimplification: 
“We speak in linear order; in a sentence, we say some words earlier and others 
later. Since speaking is correlated with time and time is metaphorically 
conceptualized in terms of space, it is natural for us to conceptualize language 
metaphorically in terms of space.” 
It is quite natural to correlate speaking with the passage of time; and one could also 
say that time is correlated to space (i.e. the physical nature of time & space), but to say 
that time is (always) conceptualized, metaphorically, in terms of space goes a little too 
far. At any rate, taking this observation for granted seems counterproductive. In 
particular it must be asked why time must necessarily be conceptualized in terms of 
space, since for us there is nothing (not much) metaphorical about it, it is simply 
physics: going from point A/here to point B/there takes time, this is not metaphor, it 
is mechanics. Of course we can use space to measure time (and, arguably, vice versa), 
and when we do, we conceptualize this using language, though metaphor is not 
required to do so. The main problem with the strong version of Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, where every concept is metaphorical, is that it fails to give a fully satisfactory 
explanation to the how and why of temporal expressions used non-temporally (and 
other expressions used non-standardly).45 Therefore, whether this model is correct or 
not (even in its weak version), it does little to advance our understanding of 
procedural expressions’ core meaning. All that Conceptual Metaphor Theory can do is 
describe a non-temporal usage of a temporal expression as a metaphorical extension 
of its conceptual temporal meaning; the explanation for why this is possible also 
depends on conceptual metaphor. Take for instance the non-temporal usage of “now 
now” said by a parent to their child to scold them for the child’s action (say throwing 
food on the wall). What exactly maps onto what for there to be a (metaphorical) 
transfer from “present time of the utterance” to “don’t do that”?  
                                                 
44 For a concise description and critique see Wildgen, W. (1994: 16-17). Process, Image and 
Meaning: A Realistic Model of the Meaning of Sentences and Narrative Texts. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins.  
45 In a recent article, Wilson (2010) draws attention to recent research aiming to reconcile 
relevance theory and cognitive linguistics’ approaches to metaphor. Though insightful for dealing 
with metaphors (in the mind or in language), this new research does not give us a reason to change 
our stance regarding temporal expressions used non-standardly. 
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Perhaps other models from the Cognitive Linguistics tradition have a more direct 
bearing on non-temporal usages of temporal expressions, such as Prototype Theory, 
Frame Semantics or Radial Categories. Prototype theory46 is an interesting approach 
to lexical expressions with clear conceptual content (esp. for its depiction of “family 
resemblance” as applied to taxonomy for instance), but not for the type of expression 
we address here. It appears that prototype theory is better suited to describing and 
analyzing nouns and verbs, or for creating sets of objects among things, e.g. a 
grammatical category – in this sense prototype theory could be a useful model to 
group temporal expressions, or a set of discourse markers47. If we were to use 
prototype theory to describe non-temporal usages, our analysis would fall short. Let’s 
come back to our example of “now now” where a parent is scolding their child. What 
prototype, and what extension of that prototype, can adequately describe what the two 
“nows” are doing? If the prototype for now is the present, or the time of the utterance, 
how do we get to the scolding sense of “now now”? It is not at all obvious what type of 
cognitive process allows for such extension, some component is missing48.  
Fillmore’s Frame Semantics proposes a view in line with ours insofar as he views 
linguistics as a system containing structures; his view also fits in with Benveniste’s 
notion that language is a system of mutually-affecting units as per his definition of 
“frame” which is “any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any 
one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits” (Fillmore, 
1982: 111). However, the use of frame semantics to understand the use and function of 
temporal expressions used non-temporally is, again, inadequate. Beyond highlighting 
that certain non-temporal effects occur more or less often in certain frames (or 
contexts in our terms), frame semantics is incompatible with a procedural approach. 
This is because a procedural approach proposes a rule of use encoded in a given 
expression that is actualized in a given context and which subsequently brings about a 
                                                 
46 See for instance Rosch (1998[1978]) and especially Kleiber (1990a) for a more detailed account 
of Prototype theory and its principles. 
47 But see Mosegaard-Hansen (1998: 241) where she claims that one can make use of prototype 
theory in relation to expressions that do not denote concepts. 
48 One might be tempted to see a similarity between the notion of prototype and Guillaume’s 
signifié de puissance (cf. section 2.5.1), but the former is construed as the most central or 
exemplary member of a category, whereas the latter is understood as a fixed sense that generates 
other senses in context – the signifié de puissance would be situated above the prototype, if one 
could combine the two approaches. At any rate, prototype theory describes a central entity with 
extensions to other entities, while psychomechanics describes potential meaning, and actualized 
uses (in context). 
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specific interpretation (or, a meaning derived by the hearer). Pointing out the frame or 
schema this given expression belongs to does not help with discovering its procedural 
content, although useful for specifying the type of context in which it can appear. 
Fillmore adds that some words “exist in order to provide access of knowledge” of 
certain frames (119) – we could consider such words as “frame-indicators” –  and this 
seems as close as this model could get to describing procedural expressions.  
Finally, let us turn to Lakoff’s radial categories, which can be construed as an 
outgrowth of Prototype Theory and Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Roughly, Radial 
Categories start from a prototype or stereotype (the ‘central’ expression) and then 
extend outward – ‘radially’ – with possible interconnections between the different 
‘spokes’ thus resembling a kind of web. This is really just another way of schematizing 
categories of things (real and abstract) and their subcategories; and using central and 
non-central extensions to describe how specific (sub-categorical) meanings may be 
obtained (e.g. through metaphor or metonymy). For our purposes here, if we looked at 
maintenant through the lens of radial categories, we could say that its central category 
is its temporal sense of ‘time of the utterance’, and its non-temporal usages would be 
seen as ‘non-central extensions’. So for instance the usage in example (3) repeated 
below: 
(3) Jean et Marie se voient souvent, maintenant, je ne sais pas s’ils sont amants.  
Where maintenant is used to highlight what is asserted in the first clause and the 
speaker’s subsequent rejection of what that first clause implicates (e.g. seeing each 
other often = being lovers) in the second clause. In this case, the non-temporal usage 
is non-central since it is not the most salient element of the speaker’s utterance. 
 Mosegaard-Hansen makes use of Lakoff’s Radial Categories in her analysis of 
French alors (1997) and toujours (2004). She describes a radial category as:  
“a category comprising central and less central members, where the latter are not 
predictable from the former, but nevertheless motivated by them. One important 
characteristic of radial categories is that there need be no one property which is 
common to all members, rather such categories are structured by chaining links 
from one member to another.” (1997:170-171, our emphasis) 
So basically she sees all the non-temporal usages of alors as non-central extensions of 
the central temporal meaning of alors (which, she notes, is actually quite rare, 1997: 
171), which is what we noted above with maintenant, and would presumably be the 
case with all the other temporal expressions looked at here. The problem with this 
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approach, and specifically the fact that it is unnecessary to have a single property 
common to all members, is that one could theoretically link numerous words together 
which have little to nothing in common. How does saying that now can be linked to at 
present, currently, [utterance time] and to and or yet, or still to the scolding sense of 
now now help us identify how now actually functions? If there need be no common 
property, and if we are merely dealing with extensions, and especially non-central 
ones, it is hard to circumscribe the actual range of possibilities of now, and harder to 
predict them.  
In light of what we have seen of several Cognitive Linguistic approaches, one 
could come away with the idea that temporality may not be considered “real” – this is 
not the case, and it was not the intent in the previous pages to lead the hearer to this 
conclusion. In fact, Evans (2004) explicitly points out that for cognitive linguistics 
“temporality is a real and directly perceived subjective experience” traceable to 
“neurological states, processes and structures” (31), which is a perspective we can 
completely agree with. The problem for us, however, is that when Evans claims that 
thanks to “metaphoric structuring” we can better “model, extend and understand the 
subjective experiences which we are consciously aware of…” (31-32), there is reason to 
doubt that simply applying a conceptual (metaphorical) structure to non-descriptive 
uses of temporal expressions would yield a sufficiently fine-grained explanation of the 
why and how of these phenomena. Furthermore, if temporality is a “real and directly 
perceived experience” why is understanding time and temporal relations invariably 
analyzed in terms of metaphor (spatial or otherwise)? Finally, how conscious are 
speakers and hearers of their use and interpretation of temporal expressions used 
non-descriptively? It is possible that cognitive linguistics would see the type of 
metaphoric transfer from spatial to temporal terms commonly held to be at work as 
similar, if not identical, to a transfer from temporal items (e.g. yet or still) to 
argumentative or discursive items. In conclusion, applying Cognitive Linguistics 
approaches to our problem is insightful in reframing our descriptions of these 
expressions’ meanings, but in the end, these approaches raise more questions than 
they answer. 
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2.5.3. Textual Linguistics 
At first it may seem that Textual Linguistics could offer us some tools and ideas in the 
form of the notions of “coherence” and “cohesion” (see Halliday & Hassan 197649; 
Beaugrande & Dessler 1981; Sanders, Spooren & Noordman 1992; 1993)50 but in fact 
these notions, though present, are of only minor help for our problem; I will take the 
stance here that expressions such as those we will be analyzing here do not in fact 
directly encode coherence and cohesion, in line with Blass (1990), Moeschler & Reboul  
(1994), Saussure (2003). 
Beaugrande & Dressler’s research proposes “Seven standards of textuality”51 
(1981: 3-10): cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, 
situationality and intertextuality; for them, these seven criteria are what makes a text 
a text. In our words, these notions correspond respectively to ‘syntactic relations’, 
‘semantic relations’, ‘speaker’s intention’, ‘hearer’s interpretation’, ‘salience & 
relevance’, ‘context’ and ‘co-text and encyclopedic knowledge’; all of which are of 
course necessary for understanding communicative language acts generally, not just 
written texts or prepared discourse52. The objection to this linguistic theory lies in the 
fact that though these standards exist (in some form or other), textual linguists of this 
tradition did not go much beyond checking texts for these criteria; this strand of 
linguistics is descriptive without being sufficiently analytical. 
                                                 
49 For Halliday & Hasan “Cohesion is part of the system of language. The potential for cohesion 
lies in the systematic resources of reference, ellipsis and so on that are built into the language 
itself.” (1976: 5)   
50 See Ben-Anath (2005) for a general overview of Textual Linguistics, especially of empirical 
studies on connectives. 
51 Cohesion: “all of the functions which can be used to signal relations” (3); Coherence: “the ways 
in which the components of the textual world, i.e. the configuration of contents and relations 
which underlie the surface text, are mutually accessible and relevant.” (4); Intentionality: 
“concerning the text producer’s attitude that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive 
and coherent text instrumental in fulfilling the producer’s intentions, e.g. to distribute knowledge 
or to attain a goal specified in a plan.” (7); Acceptability: “concerning the text receiver’s attitude 
that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive and coherent text having some use or 
relevance for the receiver, e.g. to acquire knowledge or provide cooperation in a plan.” (7); 
Informativity: “concerns the extent to which the occurrences of the presented text are expected vs. 
unexpected or known vs. unkown/certain.” (9); Situationality: “concerns the factors which make a 
text relevant to a situation of occurrence.” (9); Intertextuality: “concerns the factors which make 
the utilization of one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more previously encountered 
texts.” (10) 
52 “Text” is not only limited to these meanings, in the German tradition of Text Linguistics, and in 
contemporary literary theories, it is used to mean any type of verbal expression, written or oral. 
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Blass’ 1990 work quite thoroughly discusses the main points of the text 
linguistics tradition; we will use her comments on “cohesion” and “coherence” here 
since her approach fits our framework quite well. Blass (1990: 16): “More generally, all 
anaphoric devices, or constructions involving interdependency among elements of a 
text, e.g. so, therefore, are seen as contributing to cohesiveness.” And she adds: “There 
are a number of reasons for thinking that cohesion alone is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for textuality, and is thus inadequate to account for well-formedness.” (ibid). 
She also references Blakemore’s (1987) comment on the fact that these “so-called 
cohesive devices (…) do not always link explicit elements of the text.” (ibid). Instead 
certain ‘cohesive devices’ – such as some of the expressions we are interested in here – 
“encourage the hearer to access certain implicit assumptions from the context (not the 
co-text), and use them in processing the utterance. It seems, therefore, that, although 
Halliday & Hasan may be right that cohesive devices are rooted in language, what 
these devices connect are not always explicit elements of the text.” (Blass, 1990: 17). 
Blass explains that coherence can be split into two types: textual coherence and 
‘comprehensional’ coherence. She says of the first: “Coherence is connectivity of 
semantic or pragmatic content.” (ibid). She defines comprehension as “the recognition 
or imposition of coherence relations” which is dependent upon “those assumptions 
necessary for the recognition of the coherence relations in terms of which the text is to 
be understood.” (20) 
Blass’ take on coherence is that it is “superfluous”. She sees relations of 
coherence and cohesion as “merely a superficial symptom of something deeper (…) 
what is crucial to discourse comprehension is the recognition of relevance relations, 
which are relations between the content of an utterance and its context.” (Blass 1990: 
24-25)53. Given these observations, which I agree with, we will forego using textual 
linguistics’ notions of cohesion and coherence beyond pointing out in passing that the 
examples we will be working with do adhere to these two principles, but that this fact 
alone tells us next to nothing about how temporal expressions used non-descriptively 
actually function.  
 
                                                 
53 Schoroup also sees little explanatory value in coherence and cohesion in his analysis of now, 
instead adopting a relevance theoretic account to describe such phenomena (2011: 2114-2115). 
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2.5.4. Discourse Analysis Theories: Discourse Markers54 
Discourse Analysis approaches are of particular interest for our purposes, since their 
strongly discourse-oriented perspective has the advantage of directly discussing the 
type of expression we are looking at here. Though not all of what is said about 
temporal adverbs or connectives is readily portable to our own approach, many of the 
observations and descriptions are accurate or at least adequate, and as such may make 
an excellent starting point for our own observations in chapter 4. 
Though there are a great many scholars who may perhaps be more central to 
Textual Linguistics, I see Schiffrin and Fraser as two of the more influential Discourse 
Marker researchers, as we will see in what follows. Fraser especially proposes a model 
for Discourse Markers (and Pragmatic Markers in general) which addresses some of 
the temporal expressions studied here and we will retain several ideas to be integrated 
into our own approach. Schiffrin’s work on Discourse Markers, though not entirely 
compatible with our chosen framework, is nonetheless one of the seminal studies on 
the phenomenon, and many of her descriptions are accurate as far as their functions 
are concerned. Unfortunately, her model does not account for why such expressions 
function this way, as her study is primarily a descriptive one. A third scholar who has 
does a great deal of work on French Discourse Markers is Mosegaard-Hansen – we 
will allude to her work in Chapter 4 when dealing with certain French temporal 
expressions (alors, déjà, encore, toujours). 
For Schiffrin both deixis and anaphora are indexical expressions, defining them 
as “expressions whose meaning can be resolved only by reference to how an utterance 
is situated.” (1990: 245). By “situated” she means “contextually situated”, and of 
course given our perspective of the importance of context in utterance interpretation, 
her view coincides with ours. Important to her description of such phenomena are the 
notions of proximity and distance: i.e. now, here are proximal, while then, there are 
distal. (246), and we shall see this will have some relevance for our analyses. In her 
work, she mostly examines then in its temporal usages, where she calls it a “shifter, an 
expression that locates events reported in utterances relative to shifting reference 
                                                 
54 There are several names for the class of expressions we are looking at here: discourse markers, 
discourse connectives, discourse particles or discourse operators – all of which describe 
expressions having the same (or very similar) functions. See Schoroup (1999: 230-234) for a 
thorough review and discussion of the characteristics and criteria of Discourse Markers . 
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points (similar in function to tense).” Schiffrin also notes that then is anaphoric in 
texts, conveying “succession or overlap between the events reported in texts”, or that it 
is a connector relating events described in utterances (248). I cannot but agree with 
her construal of then in its temporal instantiations.  
Schiffrin considers now to be a temporal deixis (a view shared by many), and 
gives the following definition for this term: 
“now is a deictic element, i.e. it relates utterances to the spatial, situational, or 
temporal coordinates of the act of utterance. Their dependence on extra-
linguistic contextual features allows deictic elements to be used to index a 
speaker’s utterance to other features of the situation, and to express additional 
social meanings. We will see that the context to which now indexes an utterance 
is often the discourse itself.” (1982: 242-243) 
Thus for her now is discursively used to make salient a contrast in the topic of 
conversation/discourse by “bracketing” the utterance it is a part of (243). By 
“bracketing” I take her as meaning the utterance which now has scope over. A bit 
further she claims that if now is being used as a discourse marker then it must be 
utterance-initial (243), adding that “Not all propositions whose reference time 
overlaps with speaking time (…) force an initial now to function only as a temporal 
adverb” (244). We will check whether she is in fact correct in saying that now is 
discursive only when utterance-initial, something I have reservations about – I will 
come back to this in section 4.2.1.  
Schiffrin continues listing the many uses of now, saying it “marks a speaker by 
differentiating topics, steps or modes of presenting information” (247), adding that it 
may be combined with other metalinguistic markers for ‘attention-getting’ (for 
example hold it), ‘terms of address’, ‘imperatives for attention’ or even markers which 
“set up an expectation of comparison” (such as it depends) (248) or ‘focusing 
constructions’ (like there’s where) (249). Also, changes in topic (249-250), 
differentiation (250), changes from ‘description to interpretation’ (ibid), changes from 
‘declarative to interrogative’ (251) which she sums up as “changes in speaker 
orientation” with regards to how information is presented, and how this information 
is used in discourse (ibid.). Schiffrin notes still more ways (interactional this time) 
that now can be used as a discourse marker with a “highlighting or foregrounding 
effect”: 1. “speakers mark with now instructions to their hearers for preferred 
interpretations for upcoming discourse” (256); 2. “speakers highlight the propriety of 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
their own views by contrasting them with others’ views and showing them to be ill-
founded” (Schiffren calls them “contrasts”; ibid); 3. “used to report a struggle and to 
implicate prior disagreement [marking] the viewpoint with which the speaker 
currently agrees” (257); 4. “now occurs in competitive interludes, for example in turn-
taking struggles” and she then elaborates on these interactional usages – which 
represent what she is most interested in – further along (258-270). To sum up: now 
can be used discursively in many ways, and it would seem almost too many with all 
the different combinations Schiffrin proposes. We can reduce these discursive 
categories of now to just three: topic-focus, topic-shift and topic-contrast. I agree with 
Schiffrin’s claim that reference time, event time, and discourse time (or speech time) 
all influence the discursive usages of now and then (and presumably other such 
expressions) (1987: 230). For our purposes here this information can be seen as part 
of the utterance’s context (and mode of presentation), though I claim that the type of 
usages we’re interested in – non-temporal ones – cannot be fully explained by using 
Reichenbach’s coordinates (E, R, S) alone. 
The fact that now, then etc. can be described by various ‘grammatical’ or 
linguistic categories just clouds up the whole picture of such terms. Indeed, we can say 
that now is a) a deictic/an indexical, b) a temporal adverb, c) a discourse marker, 
maybe even d) a connective – our goal will be to describe these expressions mainly by 
their most generic function. In the case of now, its generic (and primary) function is to 
focus the proposition it qualifies or modifies in a certain way – this ‘way’ is wholly 
determined by context. So in (15) the context calls for a temporal reading, in (16) a 
discursive one, and in (17) an argumentative one: 
(15)  Paul is at home now. 
(16)  Now now, Paul’s home (no need to worry). 
(17)  Now, I know you think Paul can’t be trusted with the baby, but… 
Naturally, syntactic relations (whether now is utterance-initial or not, for example) are 
also a part of the global context of any utterance. For us, context is a pragmatic 
dimension that includes semantic elements (choice of words) and syntactic elements 
and relations (how the words are arranged), as well as morphological (e.g. tense) and 
phonological elements (intonation). Interestingly, the expression “now now” can be 
used both to reassure someone like with example (16) or to reprimand someone, as in 
“Now now, watch your mouth” (with a harsher prosody, the “disciplinarian” reading 
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would prevail). Overall, Schiffrin’s descriptions of these non-temporal usages of now 
and then quite closely resemble our own. The only thing lacking is a strong/adequate 
explanation as to why exactly this is possible, which will be addressed in chapter 4. 
Fraser’s work on Pragmatic Markers and Discourse Markers, though not 
undertaken in a Relevance-theoretic vein is close to their and our approach to the 
problem of non-temporal usages. We will see that many of Fraser’s observations are 
similar to ours, and I think his approach to Discourse Markers is one of the best on 
hand. Fraser makes a list of DMs, from which I retain those most relevant for our 
purposes here: next, now, still (incl. still and all), then and again (1990: 388). For 
instance, with the following example pair: 
(18) A: John left. Now, Mary was really frightened. 
(19) A: John left. Now Mary was really frightened. 
Fraser notes that in (18) “now functions as a focusing device, while in (19) it serves as 
a time adverbial in preposed position.” (ibid.) He states a little further that  
“when an expression functions as a discourse marker, that it is its exclusive 
function in the sentence. While it may have a homophonous form which is 
analyzable differently (…) it does not serve in both roles in the same sentence. 
This is, of course, what we would expect of a syntactic category. What follows 
from this is the fact that a discourse marker has no effect on the content meaning 
of a sentence.” (1990: 389). 
Said in our terms, when an expression – here now – is used in an utterance it will be 
interpreted as having one meaning (the most relevant one according to the given 
context), trumping other potential senses of the expression; I therefore quite naturally 
agree with Fraser that an expression which can be used in more than one way – 
descriptively and interpretatively according to our approach – will only have one of its 
meaning’s ‘activated’, or ‘recovered’ by the hearer, and this is the meaning interpreted 
by the hearer.  
I suggest that though there may be a residual element of temporality in temporal 
expressions used interpretatively, this residue of temporal meaning has no effect on 
the interpretation and comprehension of the utterance when it is used 
interpretatively. In such cases, temporality will simply not be factored into the 
utterance’s interpretation (since it is not the most relevant). Thus, Fraser’s claim of 
the exclusiveness of one function – or ‘usage’ – fits perfectly with our view. Fraser also 
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states that “the presence or absence of a discourse marker does not alter the potential 
discourse relationship between the message which follows and the foregoing 
discourse. That is, a discourse marker does not create meaning (…) but only orients 
the hearer.” (1990: 390); a conclusion I have also come to and which will be discussed 
for some expressions in chapter 4. In other words, discourse markers are extra-
propositional and do not contribute to the utterances’ truth conditions55 in any 
meaningful way. 
“In this sense, discourse markers are extremely useful guides for clarifying a 
speaker’s communicative intention – what Schiffrin refers to as ‘selecting’ but not 
‘creating’ a relationship.” (ibid.) This coordinates well with the postulates that 1) 
procedural expressions establish relations between things, clauses, utterances, and 2) 
that more often than not we can omit an adverb or connective (used descriptively or 
non-descriptively) from an utterance or a pair of utterances and still infer the intended 
relation, albeit at a slightly higher processing cost56. 
Fraser has a ‘minimalist perspective’ of discourse markers, i.e. he suggests that 
discourse markers have some core meaning, pretty much in the same way as I 
hypothesize further along (sect. 3.2.3.); for him discourse markers “should be 
analyzed as having a distinct pragmatic meaning which captures some aspect of a 
speaker’s communicative intention” (1990: 393) and he convincingly illustrates his 
position with several examples using so. (1990: 392-394) Saying that the core 
pragmatic meaning of so “should capture only that the speaker takes the message 
following to have a consequential relationship to the prior material” (1990: 394). 
Though I will attempt to point out these expressions’ core semantic meaning, the idea 
is actually quite similar – I take it that there is a meaning, perhaps of a very minimal 
sort, which remains at these expressions’ core; however, the actual usage of these 
expressions in context is of course pragmatic, i.e. the semantic meaning of so in our 
view, can be reduced to ‘consequentiality’, while the pragmatic meaning of so can be 
construed as a procedure roughly meaning: ‘establish a relationship of consequence 
                                                 
55 More recently Fraser says this more explicitly: “[Pragmatic markers] occur as part of a 
discourse segment but are not part of the propositional content of the message conveyed [i.e. 
proposition expressed in RT terms], and they do not contribute to meaning of the proposition per 
se.” (2006: 189). 
56 “A DM does not ‘create’ a relationship between two successive segments, since the relationship 
must already exist for the S1-DM-S2 sequence to be acceptable.” (Fraser 2006: 193). See also 
Luscher (1998) for more on relations and processing costs.  
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between P & Q’. Fraser proposes the following two hypotheses:  
H1: There is a single, primary Contrastive Discourse Marker in every language 
(in English, it is but). 
H2: The uses of these primary CDMs are the same across languages. (2006: 73) 
which inspire us to think that with ‘non-primary’ CDMs, that is, discourse markers 
such as now, yet, or still, what makes them out to be CDM-like is their non-descriptive 
usage(s). And the view would be similar for French maintenant – Fraser’s second 
hypothesis may also be the case for the secondary CDMs. Thus the argumentative – 
contrastive – non-descriptive usage of now, French maintenant, Spanish ahora, 
Italian ora, German jetzt, and Russian sejčas would also tend to support this 
hypothesis. But is this the case? Fraser thinks that any universal property of discourse 
markers would tend to be true with discourse markers like but, so, and but not with 
discourse markers like rather, consequently, furthermore (74), and he may well be 
right, but what about expressions (temporal adverbs and connectives) that have 
argumentative and discursive usages? Used in these ways they are discourse markers 
and the question that remains is whether they are used in a way that is identical, 
similar or not at all compatible across languages. 
Finally, Fraser provides a thorough classification of discourse or pragmatic 
markers (1996, 1998, 2009), which is a comprehensive list of most of the usual 
markers, including several of those analyzed here. Besides now (mentioned above), 
Fraser discusses still, an expression he includes in the same sub-group of “contrastive 
DMs” along with but, and nevertheless, and (correctly, in our view) he states that 
“These discourse markers signal that the speaker intends the explicit message 
conveyed by S2 to contrast with an explicit or indirect message conveyed by S1.” 
(1998: 306; NB: S here means ‘segment’). Thus he picks up on the interaction between 
the explicit and implicit that is frequently behind different usages of these markers – 
and this feeds into our way of dealing with the function of several of the temporal 
expressions we look at later on (such as then/alors or still/encore to name a few). Let 
us finish by pointing out that for Fraser, temporality is but one of several possible 
functions for discourse markers57. 
                                                 
57 “For a sequence of discourse segments S1 – S2, each of which encodes a complete message, a 
lexical expression LE functions as a discourse marker if, when it occurs in S2-initial position (S1 – 
LE – S2), LE signals that a semantic relationship holds between S2 and S1 which is one of: a. 
elaboration; b. contrast; c. inference; or d. temporality.” (2006: 191). 
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Another scholar, Claridge (2001), addresses this problem as well. For her now 
can be used both to indicate backward reference (59-60), like just now, and forward  
reference (64-65), though she notes ambiguity between a forward referencing now 
and an ‘information-giving’ now – i.e. an indicator  of what is actual or salient in a 
section of discourse58. She also points out that future reference now is often 
accompanied by a future tense marker like shall or will as in “I shall/will now X”. In 
our view, what now does here is pick out a starting point from which the action (X) 
proceeds onward. So now does not really reference the future (the future tense 
markers do that) it does however explicitly mark a starting point from when the future 
tense markers’ take effect (in a temporal reading), but the most important function of 
now in such cases is discursive (and subjective; for instance engaging the speaker 
more explicitly in a case such as “I shall/will/am going to now X”, akin to a promise). 
In the information sign sense, now is accompanied as a rule by verbs in the 
present tense, in particular often with the progressive aspect. In both examples 
above, now is used to clearly restrict the reference of the statement to one 
particular part of the discourse, thus adding to the precision. Next, which can 
occur both as an adverb or as an adjective modifying terms such as assertion, 
section, thing, enquiry, query, or in the phrase in the next place, is similar to now, 
insofar as the very moment that it is mentioned, the point it refers to is already 
being treated. (Claridge 2001: 68) 
We will not be as definitive as Claridge is by claiming now is ‘as a rule’ paired with 
present tense verbs (for the “information sign sense”) – as we will see, in some 
instances now needs no such accompaniment in order to be (“correctly”) interpreted. 
All in all, Claridge also presents many interesting arguments on the function of 
expressions like now or next. This only reinforces the idea that discourse or pragmatic 
markers would be best served by a general pragmatic theory, rather than being 
constrained to any specific school of thought (more on this in the conclusion in Ch. 5). 
 
                                                 
58 “With all now statements, the point referred to immediately follows. Of course, an alternative 
interpretation of this usage of now would be to regard it not as deictic but as a marker of 
transition. In that case, it would count rather as an information sign.” (2001: 65, our italics). 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
3. Procedural Pragmatics  
3.1. Theoretical framework  
A. Relevance Theory  
The theoretical approach adopted here owes much to Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance 
Theory (1995 [1986]), as already mentioned in section 2.4 above. To briefly recap: 
their approach is a cognitive pragmatic one, based on a Gricean ostensive-inferential 
communication model, which treats natural language utterances and sentences as 
being semantically underdetermined and thus dependent upon these linguistic 
productions’ context and the interlocutors’ background knowledge for overall 
comprehension. This perspective also makes Relevance Theory less anchored to truth 
conditions; rather, it is the interpretative process undertaken by the hearer which 
yields cognitive effects and not the linguistic productions’ truth conditions. In 
addition, Sperber & Wilson’s model relies on a cost-effective cognitive mechanism 
which regulates the process, the idea ultimately being that to achieve optimal 
relevance a speaker must produce an utterance that costs as little effort to interpret as 
possible while granting the greatest cognitive effect possible for the hearer. Thus, in 
Relevance Theory (and other post- and neo-Gricean models, and several other 
pragmatic approaches besides), when the hearer, assuming that communication is 
successful, has achieved comprehension, they will have discovered the speaker’s 
intended meaning. 
In brief, the speaker has a certain set of assumptions (roughly equivalent to 
thoughts) about a state of affairs in the world and wishes to share them with their 
audience – the hearer – and the first step will be in the utterance’s logical form (a set 
of concepts) which will then be decoded by the hearer into its propositional form 
(after disambiguation, reference-assignment etc.) yielding the speaker’s explicit 
content as well as the most appropriate implicit content within the given context. Thus 
communication is not a simple straightforward process; instead, it is an approximate 
one, due in part to the hypothetical inferences at work in the hearer’s mind during the 
comprehension process.  
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If I have chosen to use this theory as the primary methodological framework for 
the analysis and description of temporal expressions which denote something other 
than time, it is essentially for the theoretical soundness of this theory and its 
adaptability (since it is a general theory of human cognition) to virtually any type of 
linguistic production in a number of situations. It is one of three major pragmatic 
theories that stem from the Gricean tradition, and it is a widespread theory of 
communication that either allows those familiar with it to directly use it to analyze 
and describe temporal expressions (and other pragmatic markers), or it may be 
adapted by those familiar with neo-Gricean pragmatic theories. Additionally, 
Relevance Theory makes a distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive usage 
of language, which is central to our problem. The former use deals with utterances 
that represent the speaker’s thought(s) about an actual or desirable state of affairs; 
while the latter are utterances that represent the speaker’s thoughts about attributed 
thoughts a propos a state of affairs. For a more detailed account see Relevance: 
Communication and Cognition (1995: 224-231). 
B. Procedural Pragmatics59 
The general idea behind procedural pragmatics is that the cognitive processes taking 
place in a language user’s mind occur because they are triggered by ostensive 
expressions (or a particular intonation, or even gestures) used in communicative acts. 
The processes occurring in the brain during communication are themselves 
represented in the expressions and gestures – these representations are the 
procedures mentioned earlier that tell the language user what is meant (or most likely 
to be meant) by what is said. For many expressions the procedure is simply a referral 
to the concept conventionally represented in a particular expression; e.g. the 
procedure for snake is simply that whenever the expression appears it must be given 
the appropriate (conventional, default) meaning – if there are several meanings 
possible, a higher-level cognitive procedure manages the relevant selection (for 
                                                 
59 Note on the term “procedural”: It has been pointed out that the term “procedural” is 
problematic because it confuses the terminologies of linguistics and computer science. Though it is 
true that the terms “procedure” and “procedural” are part of the computer science vocabulary, the 
original sense of “a series of steps followed in a particular order” is much closer to the way we 
portray the term here. The terms “procedure” and “procedural” as used in this work refer to 
instructions embedded in natural language expressions which (help) guide users of that language 
establish the correct (i.e. normative or conventional) relations between two or more elements of 
utterances or sentences.  
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instance when snake is used metaphorically to refer to a human being). For many 
other expressions the procedure is of another type; here, the procedure handles 
relations between the concepts conveyed by the surrounding (conceptual) expressions. 
This can be schematically rendered as: 
Conceptual Expressions: x  α or β or γ etc. 
Procedural Expressions: if x, then y ; else, z 
Here our focus will be on procedural expressions, so an algorithmic perspective of the 
temporal expressions analyzed in chapter 4 is what will be most relevant to their 
description. What will be proposed further along, after each of the expressions, is an 
outline for each expression’s algorithm60. I will discuss the function of the procedures 
more in-depth when we examine each expression in turn in the following chapter. For 
now I will quickly review those researchers whose procedural take on Relevance 
Theory is most relevant and influential to how I have developed the model used 
hereafter. 
                                                 
60 Let me make it clear at this point that obtaining a complete algorithm for each of the 
expressions was the initial plan; instead I have settled on the idea of providing a sketch of an 
algorithm – further work is needed to fully flesh out these sketches or outlines into actual 
algorithms. 
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3.1.1. Blakemore 
It is Blakemore who first explored (1987) and later proposed a clear-cut distinction 
between ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’ expressions (2002); she is also one of the 
foremost scholars working on discourse connectives and inferential connectives in 
particular (e.g. Blakemore’s work on and, but, so; 1987, 1988, 2000 & 2005)61. The 
following two examples (20) and (21) taken from her 1988 text on so illustrate the 
stance adopted here as well: 
(20) There was $5 in his wallet. So he hadn’t spent all the money. 
(21)  She’s your teacher. So you must respect her. [our italics] 
The fact that so “introduces a proposition which is deducible from the preceding one” 
is indeed evident with (20 & 21); though Blakemore also describes the non-inferential-
connection usages – those of cause and consequence – and resolves the choice of 
interpretation by applying the principle of relevance and a procedural view of so. In 
(20) so expresses an inference the speaker has made based on physical evidence, while 
in (21) it expresses an inference the speaker made based on moral or personal values. 
In both instances so makes it clear that it is the speaker’s deduction (or that they are 
presenting it as their deduction); without so both utterances would have slightly 
different meanings, and it would be somewhat costlier to reach them. 
Blakemore’s Semantic Constraints on Relevance (1987) is the first work to make 
explicit the conceptual/procedural distinction mentioned in Sperber & Wilson’s 
Relevance Theory. This seminal work focused on but, after all, and even concerning 
the ways these expressions (and others like them) can semantically constrain the 
relevance of utterances they are a part of. One of Blakemore’s most important 
contributions is precisely her notion of contextual constraints; in her own words: 
‘According to this framework, hearers interpret every utterance in the smallest 
and most accessible context that yields adequate contextual effects for no 
unjustifiable effort. This means that if a speaker wishes to constrain the 
interpretation recovered by a hearer, he must constrain the hearer’s choice of 
context. And since the constructions [i.e. discourse connectives] we are 
considering ensure correct context selection at minimal processing cost, they can 
be regarded as effective means for constraining the interpretation of utterances 
in accordance with the principle of relevance.’ (1992:137) 
                                                 
61 See also Allison Hall (2007, 2008 and 2009) for more recent work on discourse connectives in a 
relevance-theoretic framework. 
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From this I understand Blakemore as meaning that procedural expressions – 
discourse connectives or markers – help to constrain an utterance’s possible 
contextual implications in order to make the utterance less costly to process while 
retaining the extra effects, thus helping to make utterances more relevant (138-139). 
Again, in this sense, connectives need not necessarily be used to connect two segments 
of discourse (139)62 – I endorse this idea completely. Blakemore proposes three ways 
an utterance can be relevant, based on Sperber & Wilson 1995: 
1. It may allow the derivation of a contextual implication. 
2. It may strengthen an existing assumption (by providing better evidence for it). 
3. It may contradict an existing assumption. (138) 
Though this refers to overall relevance of utterances, it stands to reason that it is 
equally applicable to the relevance of connectives – after all, their presence in 
utterances helps make them relevant, by lowering processing costs at least, and 
sometimes even by adding strength to implicatures that may be generated by them. 
Let us take another look at example (21) above where, without so, the two clauses 
would be more costly to process, and furthermore, one would not necessarily obtain 
the causal link “you must respect her because she’s your teacher”. 
 In a more recent work (2002, esp. chapter 4) Blakemore discusses procedural 
meaning and discourse markers – a category that encompasses connectives – pointing 
out that discourse markers do not directly encode the conceptual representations of 
utterances but rather that they “(…) encode information about the inferential process 
that the hearer should use” (90). It is of course this information on the inferential 
process which is considered to be procedural; I take this to be one of the guiding 
principles behind the function of temporal expressions used non-descriptively. 
Blakemore defines discourse markers according to the cognitive effects they may 
prompt such as the three mentioned above – in other words she defines DMs 
according to the types of relevance they may yield (2002: 95). She pushes this a bit 
further to claim that beyond simply prompting cognitive effects, discourse markers 
“directly encode the type of cognitive effect intended” (ibid.). As we will see in the 
following chapter, this notion is crucial to an algorithmic appreciation of non-
                                                 
62 For Unger as well the scope of discourse connectives can go beyond the utterance-level, for him 
discourse connectives can also have scope over ‘paragraphs’ (i.e. anything larger than sentence or 
utterance size (1996: 405-408). 
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descriptive usages of expressions that function as discourse markers. It is arguable 
whether or not such encoding is devoid of conceptual information, and what exactly is 
meant by cognitive effects could also bear some fleshing out.  For now I shall briefly 
review the contributions researchers from the Geneva School have brought to this 
paradigm. 
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3.1.2. The Geneva School: Luscher, Moeschler and Sthioul63  
Shortly after Blakemore’s proposal, several other researchers – in particular the 
Geneva School, which is the focus of this section – working toward a slightly modified 
version of Relevance Theory, further explored the conceptual/procedural paradigm 
with the aim of better apprehending and describing temporality. The Geneva School 
thus continued Anscombre & Ducrot’s, and Blakemore’s, work and used it to define in 
some depth what ‘procedurality’ was about, and especially, how it could be used for 
temporal or causal expressions – most notably Luscher & Moeschler (1990), Luscher 
(1994, 2002[1998]), Moeschler (2002), Sthioul (1998a, 1998b) and Saussure (2003, 
2007, 2011 – we will return to his work in section 3.1.3). Their aim was to treat 
temporality (and later, causality) in a procedural manner, at first with just a few key 
expressions (some of which had already been dealt with by Ducrot) and eventually 
considering all temporal expressions as somehow encoding procedures for 
interpretation. Moreover, the Geneva School proposed that procedurality sits more on 
the pragmatic side of the divide than the semantic one (somewhat like Ducrot 1984 or 
Blakemore 1987, 1992). Among the most detailed research is Saussure’s work on the 
function of French tenses both used descriptively (temporally) and interpretatively 
(argumentatively or discursively)64. 
3.1.2.1. Luscher’s contribution 
Previously (sct. 2.3) I mentioned Luscher’s reservations to Anscombre & Ducrot’s 
model. Here we will quickly review his version of procedural pragmatics. Within this 
framework it is now a given that utterance meaning can be explained by a set of 
instructions (i.e. procedures) which indicate how the utterance-in-context is to be 
processed to achieve a complete meaning, and for the hearer to most adequately 
interpret the speaker’s intended meaning. Luscher spells this out in a way similar to 
Blakemore, identifying (and retaining for his own model) one aspect of Anscombre & 
Ducrot’s analysis in particular – “that P and Q are propositions and not sentences: the 
connective ties together propositional contents and not linguistic segments.” (1999: 
                                                 
63 All the quoted texts in the following sections were translated by me from their original French 
versions. 
64 Over the course of 2005-2009 I worked with Saussure on a project (FNS Project #100011-
108149) describing temporal adverbs and connectives in French, furthering the Geneva School’s 
goal of an accurate in-depth analysis of temporal linguistics.  
 
 
 
 
54 
 
89). When utterances contain one or more connectives, Luscher says the connectives 
describe a “semantic structure like P connective Q which provide information on the 
characteristics of the arguments P and Q” within those utterances (ibid.). In this sense, 
meaning is a conglomerate of meanings, which is ultimately interpreted by adding 
contextual information to the whole. 
In an earlier work Luscher (1994) defines markers: “A marker has the property 
of designating the function of a discursive element that it introduces or in which it 
appears. The term thus designates the discursive structural role of the considered 
object.” (175). Like Blakemore, Luscher sees markers as designators of function (as do 
we, and other scholars such as Fraser (1996, 1998) or Bach (1999)). I understand 
Luscher as considering connectives to be one type of marker, where the functions they 
designate specifically handle relations between clauses, and that connection occurs “at 
the global level of discourse and not simply between two terms or two propositions” 
(181).  
He adds, a little further, that connectives are “referentially empty” – meaning 
that connectives do not refer to a concept – and of course must be interpreted in 
context. For Luscher this fact “invites one to effectively invest them with roles 
according to the goal one wishes to reach or the hypothesis one wishes to elaborate.” 
(ibid). In parallel with Blakemore’s notion that connectives impose semantic 
constraints on relevance, Luscher proposes the following three reasons for the 
instructions carried by connectives to be considered essentially pragmatic: 
“(i) [connectives] guide the interpretation and the type of operations they have 
scope over are indeed pragmatic; 
(ii) the inferential engine that pushes one to continue or abort the interpretive 
process is the Principle of Relevance; 
(iii) for a single morpheme we distinguish the constant use of semantic operators 
from the variable use of pragmatic connectives.” (189).  
Luscher also lists the possible occurrences for connectives in French, which have the 
following form(s):  
P therefore/but/and/then Q 
P then. / So Q. 
Luscher then discusses the scope of connectives from a dual perspective: that of 
syntactic scope – the connectives’ position in an utterance and how that pertains to 
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syntactic properties; and that of pragmatic scope – dealing with inferential 
instructions and how they play out in overall utterance interpretation. (217). Scope is 
essential for a procedural approach and, as stated earlier, the expressions analyzed 
here are extra-propositional, an idea that fits in well with Luscher’s notion of 
pragmatic scope (though it is also semantic). Importantly, Luscher describes utterance 
interpretation as a sequential process. So, for an utterance with the sequence P 
connective Q, one will interpret the first proposition P, then interpret the connective 
and finally conclude with the second proposition Q – inferential procedures are thus 
(somewhat) dependent on the respective positions of P and Q, with the connective 
determining the exact role and scope for each proposition (220). For utterances that 
contain more than one connective Luscher notes that the P connective Q relation will 
of course be guided by two or more sets of procedures. He points out two cases of 
“connective sequences”: 
(i) the additive sequence, (ii) the compositional sequence. (i) In an additive 
sequence, the connectives have the same syntactic scope, but the scope of the 
instructions for each connective is different. (…) (ii) In a compositional sequence, 
not only is the syntactic scope of the connectives the same, but their instructions 
are also partially shared.” (222). 
The end result is that connectives, by virtue of the procedures they encode, will guide 
and facilitate the overall interpretation. And the sequential nature of utterance 
processing leads to considering however many sets of instructions in turn, each 
contributing to the interpretation, while sometimes modifying the other procedures 
present. For instance, P then Q so R will be processed in the order written/read or 
spoken/heard, with so’s procedure depending on the previous resolution of P then Q. 
3.1.2.2. Moeschler’s contribution  
Moeschler and associated authors (Jayez, Kozlowska, Luscher, Saussure & Sthioul) 
propose an analysis of temporal reference using a Relevance-theoretic procedural 
approach to the phenomenon. The justification for this is that the usual thesis of 
linguistic determination of the interpretation is inadequate, mainly for two reasons: 
first, linguistically, this thesis is descriptively inadequate since (for Moeschler et al) 
temporal markers are taken to encode procedures and not concepts;  secondly, from a 
cognitive perspective, it is doubtful that the representation of events and their 
relations is specific to a particular language – they propose instead that the capacity to 
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represent eventualities is universal, regardless of the language. (1998: 4-5). In brief, 
they adopt the position that the human language capacity is modular (see Fodor 1983; 
Cosmides & Tooby 2000[1994]; Sperber & Wilson 1995) and that the central cognitive 
processes are universally shared. Therefore, the context and procedure are the 
necessary elements for fleshing out the full meaning of (underdetermined) utterances 
containing expressions that mark time and/or temporal relations between 
eventualities (1998: 5).  
“What is at stake here is the question of the combination of procedural data 
between themselves on the one hand and the combination of conceptual 
information with procedural information on the other hand.” (1998: 9) 
Moeschler et al. suggest that these relations can be summed up as follows: (i) 
Procedural information is stronger than conceptual information. (ii) Contextual 
information is stronger than procedural information and/or conceptual information 
(1998:10)65. In other words contextual information allows one to process the 
procedural and conceptual information in an utterance, with the procedural 
information determining the relevant conceptual information to be processed and how 
it is processed for the overall interpretation of that utterance. Schematically:  
Context > Procedural Expressions > Conceptual Expressions 
Though this may not actually always be the case66, it is relevant to our position insofar 
as each instance of speech or writing does seem to have an order in which its different 
elements must be considered for the overall interpretation. In our view it is just as 
likely that there is a form of feedback between procedural and conceptual expressions 
and the context in which they appear. Thus, a given utterance, composed of 
procedural and conceptual expressions will immediately trigger contextual 
information according to salience and relevance, said context will (or should in 
principle) in turn trigger disambiguation, saturation etc. and once this is achieved the 
instance of speech or writing will at last be fully worked out. 
Finally, Moeschler et al. consider connectives as being the example of procedural 
expressions par excellence, which they list according to the following grammatical 
                                                 
65 See also Reboul & Moeschler (1998), Le temps des événements for their view of the 
conceptual/procedural distinction (chapter 7 in particular). 
66 We could for instance imagine that some expressions (conceptual or procedural) could resist 
contextual information, for instance if the expression is extremely specific, such as a medical term, 
or some highly-specialized technical jargon whose meaning is the same in every context. 
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categories: 
a) Coordinating conjunctions – mais/but, et/and, ou/or, ainsi/thus, 
donc/therefore 
b) Subordinating conjunctions – malgré/though, même si/even if, de 
sorte que/so that, parce que/because, puisque/since 
c) Adverbs – cependant/however, même/even, de fait/indeed, de 
plus/moreover, finalement/finally 
d) Adverbial phrases – en bref/in brief, à la fin/in the end, tout 
considéré/all things considered (1998: 149) 
Let us add that it is not necessary for us to differentiate between the above categories, 
since they are all connectives of some sort – and besides, the temporal expressions we 
are interested in could also be classed according to different categories. Reboul & 
Moeschler (1998) say as much in their definition of pragmatic connectives, which are a 
type of linguistic marker that “a) articulates maximal linguistic units or discursive 
units, b) gives instructions on how to link these units, c) requires the interpretation of 
conclusions which would not have been the case had the connectives been absent” 
(77). Within the class of pragmatic connectives they include coordinating and 
subordinating conjunctions, adverbs and adverbial phrases. So, again, what matters 
most to us here is not the grammatical (or other) category of the expressions to be 
analyzed, but only that the temporal expressions herein are procedural expressions. 
3.1.2.3. Sthioul’s contribution 
Sthioul is among the researchers who adopt a procedural approach to temporal 
expressions, and what is most relevant to us here is how he deals with the 
phenomenon of “subjectivization”. Basically, by this he means that interlocutors 
“retrieve a conscious subject” (1998a: 200) when processing an utterance – that is, 
they can obtain the speaker’s point of view from the utterance, or at the least hearers 
can reasonably attribute a point of view to a speaker based on what the speaker said, 
and meant. This is often the case, but with temporal (or spatial) expressions such a 
perspective is central to understanding utterances, particularly in cases where 
indexicals and anaphors are used. In other words, it is (optimally) relevant to the 
utterances’ interpretation that the event(s) described be referentially salient. Put 
somewhat differently, temporal and spatial expressions need the correct deictic 
anchoring for the hearer to be able to interpret the perspective intended by the 
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speaker and from which the relevant information is to be retrieved. Sthioul’s goal here 
is to show how “subjectivization effects can be inferred from the necessity to reconcile 
– in the process of determining the temporal reference of a process/event – contextual 
constraints with the constraints of the verbal ‘pigeonhole’ which is used.” (219). Thus 
‘subjectivization’ arises when contextual constraints and lexical constraints are 
factored in together for overall utterance interpretation. We will see further below that 
subjectivization effects are often the raison d’être of several of the non-descriptive 
usages examined below. 
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3.1.3. The Geneva School: Louis de Saussure’s model 
Finally, let us turn to Saussure’s model of procedural pragmatics; building upon 
Luscher, Moeschler, Sthioul and his own previous work, Saussure (2003) proposes a 
more fully developed and computational approach. Saussure considers the very 
process of utterance interpretation as a procedure (2003:139), with the aim of 
proposing a general algorithm for overall utterance interpretation, including within it 
one or more “local” algorithms specifically addressing the temporal procedures of 
expressions like ensuite or puis or the French imparfait or plus-que-parfait tenses. I 
also take this stance here, namely that the mind’s cognitive processing of language can 
reasonably be seen as a general procedure for interpreting speech and writing, and 
that specific procedures govern each procedural expression, or a set of such 
expressions, within the speech or writing that is to be interpreted. If looked at from a 
bottom-up perspective, we can see that one interprets a word, which is contained in a 
clause, contained in an utterance, sometimes contained in a piece of discourse – at 
each level there is some processing involved, and the higher up one goes, the more 
contextual and encyclopedic information factors into the processing. Adopting the 
position that the mind uses a general procedure for overall utterance or discourse 
interpretation is a straightforward assumption and easily fits into the modular theory 
of mind (i.e. Fodor 1983, Sperber & Wilson 1995, Cosmides & Tooby 1994, 2000, 
Sperber 2005), adopted here as a plausible view of how we think.  
Saussure’s starting point for his procedural model is that temporal expressions in 
general can be separated into two categories: conceptual expressions and procedural 
expressions. This hypothesis was developed by Saussure based on Blakemore’s (1987) 
descriptions and analyses of connectives and on Moeschler & al. (1998) and especially 
Saussure’s work on temporality and negation (2000b) and his research of verb tenses 
(2003). For Saussure, tenses are all procedural and their potential enrichment into 
non-descriptive uses is due either to their inherent procedure or to natural pragmatic 
enrichment. This procedural model is situated within Relevance Theory and considers 
the interpretation process as a computation based on an utterance’s constituents’ 
semantic properties, pragmatic derivation and according to instructions (procedures) 
encoded within certain expressions. Following Relevance Theory’s postulate that 
interpretation is not only a matter of decoding, Saussure’s model proposes to describe 
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what precise linguistic procedures can be recovered from expressions, and how the 
mind’s reasoning capacities deal with these instructions to reach the appropriate 
conclusions. More specifically for this research, which can be viewed as a continuation 
of Saussure’s work on temporal expressions, his procedural pragmatics model makes 
much use of the conceptual/procedural distinction; this will be an appropriate 
orientation for our analyses of temporal expressions used non-descriptively.  
Saussure’s algorithmic model of utterance interpretation is built on many 
Gricean and Post-Gricean principles, and can thus easily work within frameworks of 
those types. Whether the algorithmic model can be applied to other non-pragmatic 
frameworks is not our main concern here (though there should be no problem with 
this a priori), but for us it is clear that his goal was not for these algorithms to be 
limited to any particular theory or approach. That said, Saussure’s model was built 
upon Relevance Theory and below I list the principles adopted from this approach into 
his own: 
- under-determinacy – which is important in the sense that if expressions were 
all fully determined beforehand there would be little room for procedures (let 
alone algorithms) 
- the narrowing and loosening processes (pragmatic enrichment in Saussure’s 
terms) – these processes are themselves procedures of a more general cognitive 
type. 
- the principle of relevance – essential to calculating the algorithms’ stopping 
point. 
- context, mutual manifestness and encyclopedic knowledge – essential for 
saturating any variables in the algorithms. 
- the descriptive/interpretive distinction 
- the conceptual/procedural distinction 
All of these principles are essential to his understanding of temporal expressions and 
the establishment of the algorithms behind them. Saussure adopts for the most part 
Luscher’s definition of procedure but adds the following criterion: “a procedure is the 
application (…) of the same principles that handle the establishment of computer 
procedures” (166). This addendum is understandable given his goal to model temporal 
linguistic terms so as to be computational – though of course this in no way prohibits 
the use of procedures (seen this way) to be compatible with a plausible cognitive 
pragmatic model. For Saussure a procedural model of communication cannot be an 
entirely semantic one. In other words, a model that returns the same output for the 
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same input every time cannot properly handle the mental inferences required for a 
functional procedural model, to say nothing of the importance context plays here (see 
2003: 169-173 for a thorough discussion). So, in a nutshell, ideally the hearer follows 
the preferred paths of interpretation in the procedure, and this can be for reasons of 
salience, plausibility, encyclopedic knowledge, and/or because instructions67 are 
encoded in some expressions of the given utterances. 
Saussure further delves into the notion of what is procedural and what is 
conceptual. For him, a procedure is essentially a series of “interpretive choices” made 
by a hearer regarding a “set of possibilities” (2003: 170). I see this search for 
possibilities as an active investigation of the most adequate (i.e. relevant) choices of 
possible meanings based on a given item’s potential meaning and its actualization in a 
specific context (akin to Guillaume’s “psychomechanical” view). Regarding 
conceptuality, Saussure sees “contextual relations” – “scripts, causal relations, 
stereotypical relations” (204) – as quintessentially being “conceptual relations”. He 
calls contextual relations “conceptual relations” because they group together concepts 
and eventualities (and how the latter are conceptualized). As an outgrowth of this 
stance, he rejects the formal semantic (SDRT) notion that such relations are in fact 
rules; Saussure favors the pragmatic take on these relations as being firmly within the 
(pragmatic) realm of implicatures instead (204). For Saussure, it is mainly thanks to 
the speakers’ and hearers’ encyclopedic knowledge that the “correct” or appropriate 
inferences can be drawn. Since he is focusing here on temporality, he postulates three 
relations that facilitate the inference of temporal relations: a) an event is the cause of 
another; b) an event necessarily precedes another; c) an event generally has a causal 
or temporal relation, whatever it is, with another, by virtue of the habitual or 
stereotypical relations accessible in the hearer’s knowledge of the world (ibid.). 
Moreover, Saussure will develop this notion of conceptual relations68 by dividing them 
into those that are causal and those that are not, and those that are necessary and 
those that are not (206). “Not all causal relations are necessary relations, and, 
conversely, some non-causal relations are necessary” (ibid.). For instance, in the case 
                                                 
67 For Saussure and I both, the procedural descriptions of pragmatic expressions all function in 
this manner (adverbs connectives, verb tenses etc.) 
68 See Saussure (2003 : 209) for his definition of these relations, and see page 211 for an 
explanation of his hierarchy of constraints for conceptual relations: 1. necessary causal conceptual 
relations (strongest), 2. necessary stereotypical relations, 3. non-necessary causal conceptual 
relations, and 4. non-necessary stereotypical relations (weakest). 
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of a car crash, there is no necessary causal relation between the car crashing and death 
of the vehicle’s occupants – many car crashes are without fatalities. But of course if a 
person dies in a car accident, the cause will (most often) have been the crash (except 
in cases where the driver’s death is the primary cause of the crash). This is a type of 
non-necessary causal relation. On the other hand, some relations are necessary but 
are not the cause of subsequent events, for instance the fact that a plane has landed is 
necessary for the passengers to disembark, but is not the cause of their disembarking.  
He adds three further explanations for these conceptual relations: 1) non-
necessary conceptual relations can be triggered by having recourse to more 
encyclopedic knowledge, rather than resorting to “usual” situations or circumstances; 
2) some of the so-called “necessary relations” can be canceled; and 3) the cognitive 
status of said relations. The third is the most crucial to us here, where Saussure again 
rejects the SDRT notion that these relations depend on a set of rules that the hearer 
has at their disposal as is, and from which they may choose the most appropriate 
(212). Instead, Saussure claims it is for a question of the (Relevance-theoretic) 
economy of processing effort and storage, by considering “that the hearer does not 
dispose of preexisting conceptual rules, or that they only have a small number of 
such rules at their disposal” (212, author’s emphasis). Thus he proposes that if there 
are rules, they are few and general ones – thus echoing Relevance Theory’s take on 
“fast and frugal heuristics” (Sperber & Wilson 2002); I see them as the kind of rules 
which are necessary to general conceptual cognitive processing. Saussure adds that 
the hearer does not necessarily access a rule directly but instead infers an ad hoc 
relation based on the knowledge they have concerning the eventualities (actions, 
activities, events) described in the utterance(s) (212-213)69. Finally, to sum up this 
discussion, Saussure states that “conceptual relations are not relations that are a 
priori linked to the predicates for purely lexical reasons (with the exception of lexical 
implications), but are implicatures the hearer considers relevant or not with regard to 
the speaker’s informative intention” (213, author’s emphasis). Finally, for Saussure a 
temporal connective trumps any conceptual relation, no matter what its strength (213) 
– this is a good starting point for our model of procedural pragmatics.  
 
                                                 
69 See also Sperber & Wilson (1998) for more on ad hoc concepts treated in a Relevance-theoretic 
vein. 
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We will see that temporal connectives such as those analyzed hereafter keep to 
this observation; I claim that this is of course because of their extra-propositional 
nature. Thus we will always see such expressions as having scope over the 
propositions they augment, restrict or otherwise affect/modify – even when they are 
not temporal (i.e. when they are non-descriptive). But Saussure’s algorithmic model 
represents a problem for our hypotheses; namely, the fact that its basic architecture – 
Vn : {R=tx ; E=ty}70 – and the basic premise “instruction temporelle par défaut” 
(‘default temporal instruction’) are so engrained in his 2003 account makes it 
somewhat difficult to reconcile with the idea that temporal adverbs, connectives, or 
indexicals are not necessarily default temporal procedures. As stated previously, 
throughout this study I will explore whether the terms are in fact temporal by default, 
or if, instead, the procedures which are encoded in these expressions are in fact more 
general and open-ended. All in all however Saussure’s algorithm for temporal 
expressions used temporally is functional; what needs to be done in our case is some 
modification of what should be considered the default in these expressions. 
                                                 
70 Where Vn designates a two-dimensional temporal variable n; R and E are the Reichenbachian 
coordinates for the Reference point and Event point respectively, serving as indexes for the overall 
temporal interpretation. See Saussure (2003: 276-277) for a more detailed account. 
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3.1.4. Other views  
There are a few other language models that could perhaps be used to tackle the 
problem that is dealt with here. There are notably a few lexical semantics or 
pragmatics traditions which could integrate a procedural view of language with 
relatively little modification. For instance, Clark (1996), for whom “language use is 
really just a form of joint action” (3), which requires “solvability”, “sufficiency”, 
“immediacy” and “joint salience” for one to succeed in communication. Viewing 
language as a joint action is not too far from the Gricean view of cooperation71. The 
Principle of joint salience, defined as “the ideal solution to a coordination problem 
among two or more agents is the solution that is the most salient, prominent, or 
conspicuous with respect to their common ground72” (67), could just as easily be 
defined in terms of relevance, encyclopedic knowledge and mutual manifestness. I 
will retain the notion of salience in addition to relevance, since, though something 
that is salient can be relevant, this need not be the case. But salient information 
(unless one is being manipulative) contributes to the informativeness of a given 
utterance. I take procedural expressions, particularly connectives and adverbs, to be 
salient markers, in that they make explicit a restricted set of possibilities. Seen this 
way, salience has some measure of importance for the (procedural) pragmatic 
selection of a non-descriptive usage of our temporal expressions.  
Three of Clark’s stated premises, those of solvability – whereby interlocutors can 
assume that the initiator of an exchange (“coordination problem”) chooses its topic, 
the form it should take, has a predetermined goal (“solution”) and finally believes it to 
be interpretable (“participants can converge on that solution”; 68); sufficiency – 
where participants in the exchange can assume that the initiator gave all necessary 
information to achieve understanding (69); and immediacy – where interlocutors can 
reasonably expect to achieve understanding immediately (ibid.) – all have their place 
within a procedural pragmatic model of language processing. For a relevance theorist 
this would all be a part of optimal relevance, but I think this may be useful in 
establishing an algorithm for our temporal expressions. After all, a speaker cannot use 
                                                 
71 Grice’s Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you 
are engaged.” (1975: 173). 
72 Clark uses this Stalnakerian notion to describe the “sum of [speakers’] mutual, common, or 
joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions.” (1996: 93).  
 
 
 
 
65 
 
now or then non-temporally and not expect the hearers to correctly interpret their 
utterance, and the hearers can reasonably expect the speaker to be trying to actively 
communicate something despite using a temporal expression non-temporally. In 
other words, a non-descriptive usage is solvable – one can indeed interpret it, 
sufficient – one need no further information to interpret it, and immediate – one need 
no more than an instant or two to interpret the utterance. 
This prompts a few questions: could it be that these terms arose to be used as 
metalinguistic operators, able to equally specify temporal, discursive or argumentative 
relations? What if the semantic instructions of such operators made systematic 
appeals to the mind’s pragmatic-processing “module”? Would this mean the index is 
the semantic procedural core of meaning of an expression and the tokens are the 
pragmatic, context-dependent applications to salient and relevant referents? This 
seems a plausible view of these expressions; the perspective adopted here is that the 
mind is of course responsible for general processing operations, and it must do so 
efficiently. Arguably, indexing specific cognitive and linguistic items contributes to 
efficient cognitive processing. Thus, the mind, upon interpreting a given utterance, 
breaks down the input into items that need specific referents, and items that require 
specific inferences – thus an utterance is interpreted in terms of representations of the 
world and relations between those representations. In section 2.1 we looked at 
Kaplan’s take on demonstratives, and saw that his notion of character could play into 
the present approach. Higgenbotham (2009), when discussing demonstratives, makes 
an interesting use of Kaplan’s terminology: 
“… let us broadly divide the linguistic pieces of an utterance into those 
with meanings, and those with rules of use. Ordinary nouns and verbs have 
meanings (…). Words like ‘this’ do not have meanings, but have rules of use that 
are as much common coin as meanings are, which specify how they are to be 
employed in setting up an utterance to be evaluated for truth or otherwise 
appraised.” (183-184, our emphasis) 
This distinction fits nicely with the procedural pragmatic account endorsed here: for 
us meaning is equivalent to ‘conceptual meaning’ and conceptual expressions, while 
rules of use is equivalent to ‘procedural (or instructional) meaning’ and procedural 
expressions. However, I resist the notion that these “rules of use” set an utterance up 
to be evaluated for truth; instead, I propose that they are used to set an utterance up 
for incorporating a salient (and relevant) element into the utterance’s interpretation; 
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it can then also be truth-evaluated as a whole, and the truth of the proposition 
expressed will sometimes be the most relevant element to be interpreted, but this need 
not be the case. 
At any rate, such “rules of use” also have some form of meaning – what I called 
“core meaning” earlier – and function as extra-propositional operators. Put 
differently, if a conceptual expression has a meaning, it is because its semantics 
encodes an index that refers to the relevant concept, which is represented in the 
language user’s mind. A procedural expression has a basic type of meaning, which 
encodes “rules of use” which are also indexed in such a way as to refer to the relevant 
relations which are to be established between an utterance’s various parts. If such is 
the case, we have here a way of integrating more formal semantic models into the 
appreciation of temporal expressions used non-temporally. We will set this aside for 
the present. 
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3.2 Framework & Methodology 
3.2.1. Some Theoretical Assumptions: ‘Procedurality’ & the Conceptual / 
Procedural Continuum 
Our approach to this phenomenon of temporal expressions used interpretively is 
largely based on Relevance Theory for several of its underlying principles and notions 
(Relevance, context etc.) and especially for the procedural/conceptual distinction. 
However, the goal here is to propose a rules-light way of describing the processing and 
interpretation of these expressions, and one that need not depend only upon 
Relevance Theory, though of course it should be an inferential theory of 
communication that, if not essentially a pragmatic one, must at least appropriately 
take pragmatics into consideration. As such, it will probably not be as detailed and 
precise as some would like; nevertheless, at the very least I propose to sketch out an 
outline procedure for each of the expressions dealt with here. In later research, these 
outlines can be fleshed out into more formal and functional algorithms. Ideally, a 
unique ‘meta-algorithm’ (one for each language treated here: English, French) that 
could schematically account for the different functions these expressions may adopt, 
would be an outcome to work toward in subsequent research. 
The first order of business before beginning the analysis proper is to elaborate 
somewhat upon the theoretical approach adopted here - procedural pragmatics73. 
Simply put, procedural pragmatics is a theory that considers that there exist two types 
of expressions (in the largest sense, i.e. including morphemes): those that encode 
concepts - such as tree or love - and those that encode procedures - such as but, 
yesterday or -ing. This approach originates with Ducrot’s view that some expressions, 
namely connectives, encode ‘instructions’ for how these expressions are to be 
interpreted in utterances where they appear. Classic examples of expressions analyzed 
by Ducrot are même (‘even’) or mais (‘but’). Later, Blakemore adopted a more 
moderate view of Ducrot’s ‘expressions-encode-instructions’ idea and proposed an 
analysis of ‘semantic constraints on relevance’ wherein she renamed Ducrot‘s 
‘instructions’ procedures and considered only certain types of expressions as encoding 
                                                 
73 Again, procedural pragmatics should not be seen as a purely Relevance-Theoretic approach, the 
idea being that procedural pragmatics can be integrated into any (cognitive) pragmatic account. 
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information on how to interpret utterances containing them74. The stance I take here 
on procedural pragmatics is for the most part derived from the above researchers’ 
insights into how such expressions function. 
For our purposes here, “procedural” is understood as an equivalent of 
“algorithmic” and this may be misleading: do conceptual expressions not have an 
algorithm which searches and retrieves the contextually appropriate meaning of these 
expressions? I will not go into this in much detail here – I will say that in a 
computational model of language processing algorithms intervene at different levels: 
at the level of individual expressions (words or clauses), at the utterance or sentence 
level, and at the more general level of overall comprehension. The goal of procedural 
pragmatics is to ‘discover’ or model the algorithms responsible for establishing the 
relations between the concepts (propositions) which they link or affect (and have 
scope over) in temporal adverbs, connectives and indexicals. At the most basic level 
one can imagine there being a kind of ‘switch’ that guides a hearer along the 
appropriate interpretive path (cf. Luscher 1994, 2002) – temporal or non-temporal, 
incidentally choosing between a descriptive or non-descriptive usage. 
Ideally the algorithm should a) store the utterance’s constituent parts, b) check 
the context, which includes saturating the utterance’s variables, then c) retrieve the 
relevant relational information from memory (encyclopedic knowledge, conventions 
etc.) and d) make the (intended) interpretive path most/more salient to the hearer. 
Overall, procedural expressions can be seen as interpretive expressions in that they 
aid one’s mind to choose the most adequate (i.e. optimally relevant), intended 
interpretation of a given utterance. This would of course operate conjointly with the 
mind’s general language processing capacity. Such algorithms can be viewed as two-
step procedures, schematically: 
Evaluation procedure: a procedure that takes the input (an expression) and an 
environment (its context) as its arguments 
Application procedure: a procedure that takes two arguments: a procedure and 
a list of arguments (to which the procedure is applied) 
The linguistic part of the mind evaluates an expression according to its environment 
(i.e. context), for instance the expression already in the environment ‘Strawberries 
                                                 
74 Ducrot and his school of thought will eventually adopt Blakemore’s notion of semantic 
constraints in later work, in e.g., “Argumentation and the lexical topical fields” in Journal of 
Pragmatics 24 (1995): 99-114. 
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already have sugar.’, and then the language module interprets the expression by 
selecting the most likely meaning(s) from a) a list of conventional meanings, b) a list 
of non-standard meanings or c) outputs a novel meaning by inference from a) and/or 
b). For the purpose of language analysis, data would comprise lexical items and 
context, while procedures are both the cognitive processes and a special class of non-
lexical expressions (grammatical or procedural expressions); thus when an utterance 
reaches the parts of the mind which process language, a set of general procedures 
which includes disambiguation, saturation of certain variables etc., “crunch” the given 
information and then, if necessary, more specific (partly) linguistically-coded 
procedures are prompted by specific expressions and run in the mind’s general 
language-processing module (with another set of procedures) to finally obtain a 
relevant result (sometimes the most relevant, but need not be so). 
It is interesting to note that temporal adverbs and connectives, when used 
temporally, are “stronger” than other temporal indicators. It is these expressions 
which most unambiguously indicate temporal information to the hearer, and with the 
least amount of processing effort. For Saussure and for us here, these expressions can 
be viewed as strong constraints (2003: 193) on temporal interpretation that “do not 
call for complex inferences but rather encode clear instructions.” (2003: 194). For 
instance already in “The sun is already up” encodes that [sun, be up] was the case 
previous to and concurrent with the time of speech or reference (additionally there are 
other inferences to be drawn, e.g. “you are late for work”). Let us recall that in our 
view, temporal expressions may or may not have only, or primarily, temporal 
instructions encoded in them; instead, it may be the case that time and temporal 
relations are actually (perhaps mostly) inferred by our cognitive processing; and 
temporal expressions can be seen as indexes to the specific mental operations that 
lead one to cognitively work out the appropriate temporal information. I think this is 
also the case for Saussure’s “conceptual relations” – i.e. it is thanks to our minds’ 
cognitive processes that we can work out these relations. Basically, we either have an 
utterance such as (22) below where only general cognitive procedures sort through the 
linguistic information and establish the necessary relations, while in (23) both general 
cognitive processing and processing governed by specific procedural information 
encoded in the connective are used to establish the necessary relations:  
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(22) The sun is up. 
(23) The sun is already up. 
The difference between (22) and (23) is that with the first utterance, the speaker is 
merely describing a state of affairs, that the sun has risen, and thus that it is daytime. 
With (23) the speaker is describing the same state of affairs as in (22) but in addition, 
the speaker is commenting on this state of affairs, for instance noting that the state of 
affairs is somehow surprising. Through pragmatic inference based on encyclopedic 
knowledge the hearer understands that the speaker cannot mean that the sun having 
risen is itself surprising, therefore the hearer must search for something more 
relevant. In this case, the hearer could interpret the utterance as meaning that the 
speaker believed it was earlier than what is actually the case – further inferences could 
lead the hearer to deduce that the speaker is late, overslept, even going so far as to 
infer (given contextual information) that the speaker stayed up too late or had gotten 
inebriated the previous night. On the surface, it would appear that (22) takes less 
processing effort to interpret than (23), but let us not forget that the net benefits for 
interpreting (23) outweigh those interpreting (22). It is possible for a hearer to infer 
something similar with (22), but more mental processing effort would be required to 
obtain such an interpretation. In other words, the speaker/writer of (23) intends the 
hearer to necessarily infer additional information, and by so doing, reduces the 
hearer’s processing cost, just as with Blakemore’s constraints. Recall what was said 
about metarepresentation earlier (sct. 1.2.3.); here it should be evident that such a 
capacity is being used by both speaker and hearer for the full impact of the utterance 
in (23).  
One of the background assumptions concerning temporal expressions – whether 
temporal adverbs or temporal connectives – along with modal expressions (may, will, 
possibly etc.) is that the information they carry is, more often than not, of an extra-
propositional nature. This is clearly the case with adverbs and connectives (temporal 
or no), as can be seen in the following examples: 
(24)  George already finished filling out his IRS forms! 
(25)  Those paintings are expensive and unappealing yet people buy them. 
(24’)  already [George, filling out forms, finished] or already [P] 
(25’)  [paintings, expensive & unaesthetic] yet [people, buy (paintings)] or [P] yet [Q]. 
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Since expressions of this type operate on a higher level than propositional contents, 
that is, since they have scope over such content, the question of truth conditions will 
not be addressed here to any extent; like Sperber & Wilson and other Relevance 
Theorists, I am most interested in whether the utterances are relevant, and how they 
are relevant. In other words, we will not ascribe truth conditions to adverbs and 
connectives since doing so would be not only difficult to justify in many cases, but also 
often trivial in connection with the problem at hand. Take for instance example (24) 
above, where the relevant, salient information that is to be interpreted cannot be 
captured by a truth-conditional approach (whether semantic or pragmatic): what is 
communicated by already in this example is something akin to “the speaker [of (24)] 
is stating/asserting that [George, filling forms, finished] is the case (or, is true) and 
this ‘fact’ is surprising to the speaker”. This notion of surprise is not included in the 
semantic content of either already, or the proposition [George, filling forms, finished] 
but is interpreted through a pragmatic, inferential process which takes into account 
background assumptions/encyclopedic knowledge, in this case dealing with the 
amount of time it takes to fill out IRS forms. In Kaplan’s terms, what we are 
addressing here is the character of utterances such as (24) or (25) – or how one is to 
interpret such utterances (and recall that character is non-truth-conditional). 
There is currently a lively discussion as to where exactly to situate the 
conceptual/procedural divide, and even to redefine what “conceptual” and 
“procedural” actually mean (Escandell-Vidal et al. 2011) – so far there is no consensus. 
At least one researcher (Nicolle 1998a, 1998b, 2007), has returned to the original 
conceptual/procedural distinction and proposes that there are in fact three classes: 
conceptual, conceptual-procedural and procedural expressions75. Fraser (2006) also 
questions the conceptual/procedural dichotomy and proposes a third category he calls 
combinatorial which “specifies with what constituents and in what way it may 
combine to produce more complex semantic structures”. For Nicolle, this is a choice 
based on observations in grammaticalization, and for Fraser the reasoning is that 
most Discourse Markers have some conceptual content even as they have procedural 
content (a view close to that adopted here). A strict conceptual/procedural dichotomy 
                                                 
75 “…there is in principle nothing to prevent a single expression encoding both conceptual and 
procedural information [which] accounts for the phenomenon of semantic retention, whereby a 
gram may continue to give rise to specific interpretations derived from the semantic content of its 
lexical source.” (1998b: 30)] 
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is also rejected in what follows, as it seems to limit the versatility these expressions 
have in usage. 
We will adopt the idea of a continuum, which to me seems equally plausible, but 
only insofar as we add some nuance to the meaning of procedural expressions. 
Granted, the continuum model proposed here is perhaps not the simplest way to 
model procedurality76. Indeed, choosing the conceptual/procedural dichotomy may in 
the end prove most straightforward, but this choice would not do justice to the finesse 
and complexity of the language module77. The continuum model I imagine is not 
exactly that proposed by Nicolle in his grammaticalization research, nor quite what 
Fraser proposes with his combinatorial category.  
A working hypothesis on those procedural expressions that do have some 
conceptual content is that this conceptual content only serves to reinforce the encoded 
procedure and perhaps further constrain the possible interpretations of how to apply a 
certain procedure. If such expressions exist, we will primarily be interested in their 
procedural usages. In addition to saying that procedural expressions encode 
instructions, I want to specify that the instructions concern first and foremost the 
relation between concepts (or representations)78; thus, for our purposes here, the 
limit is not whether some expressions have both types of information or not, but 
between those that have exclusively conceptual information (conceptual expressions) 
and those that have procedural information, whether or not the conceptual 
information is completely absent.   
Thus far, we have not really entertained the notion that grammaticalization 
could be a (major) reason why certain expressions (i.e. those examined here) can be 
used the way they are. Indeed, it could very well be the case that now/maintenant, 
already/déjà, and most other expressions described in Chapter 4, are all expressions 
somewhere along the grammaticalization79 path. This, if true (and it is a plausible 
                                                 
76 If this perspective is proposed here, it is a programmatic and theoretic choice, and the 
continuum model may not be crucial to the procedural approach to the expressions undertaken 
hereafter (although it could modify the algorithms’ architecture). 
77 The mind’s architecture is not our primary concern here, and whether the mind is massively 
modular or not (cf. Cosmides & Tooby (1994, 2000), Sperber (2005) to name just a few), I do 
endorse a modular and complex conception of the mind. In this conception there are central 
processing systems, and peripheral processing systems of several types – what is said here 
concerns only the parts which process language and discourse. 
78 Close to what Luscher (1994, 1998) proposes in fact. 
79 Mosegaard-Hansen (1998b: 237-238) makes this case for discourse markers. 
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hypothesis, though not one we go into here), should not affect the procedural 
approach we have to these expressions. Nicolle (1998b) makes a strong case for 
certain expressions encoding both conceptual and procedural information. In his 
account, expressions like be going to are undergoing grammaticalization, which he 
sees as a gradual occurrence, and as such maintain (i.e. “semantic retention”) some 
conceptual content that can, and in some circumstances80, is accessed to render a 
relevant interpretation for utterances where such expressions occur. The view 
proposed here is that our temporal expressions (used as discourse markers) function 
in a way similar to be going to and other modal auxiliaries insofar as encoding both 
conceptual and procedural information81. That is, it could very well be that 
grammaticalization is the underlying reason that the expressions examined in Chapter 
4 have both a conceptual and a procedural content.  
This is not something Saussure (2003) considered when proposing his 
algorithmic architecture for tenses. Furthermore, Saussure’s more recent view (2011) 
is one based on a strict dichotomy between two different, mutually exclusive types of 
information – an expression cannot simultaneously be both. At this stage, I must draw 
attention to my divergence with Saussure on a few points: one is a major concern, the 
other relatively minor. The first has to do with Saussure’s (2011) approach to the 
procedural/conceptual distinction. The second deals with how he proposes to treat 
procedural expressions (via his algorithm). With regards to the second point: Saussure 
(2003: 251-252 & 260-261) uses  an algorithm based on Reichenbach’s temporal 
coordinates; the problem is with his exclusive usage of temporal coordinates, and a 
temporally-oriented algorithm for dealing with temporal expressions. In light of this, 
his model works very well given two conditions: 1) that temporal expressions are, at 
their core, temporal by default and 2) that one restrict oneself to the description of 
verb tenses and temporality. If the chosen expressions are not temporal by default or 
if one deals with temporal expressions other than verb tenses Saussure’s algorithmic 
model cannot accurately account for (or predict) the types of usages we will be looking 
at here.  
                                                 
80 “If (…) the resulting interpretation does not result in adequate contextual effects, or if the 
context is such that the choice between be going to and an alternative future expression, such as 
will, could result in a different proposition being conveyed, the conceptual information also 
encoded by be going to will be recovered and inferentially enriched.” (1998b: 29)  
81 See also Bybee et al. (1994: 15-19) on “semantic retention” and its consequences. 
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The other divergence with Saussure’s approach is his desire to maintain a strict 
dichotomy between conceptual and procedural expressions. Again, I hypothesize, in 
line with a few others (Nicolle 1998a, 1998b, 2007, Moeschler 2002, Fraser 2006), 
that this dichotomy may not in fact exist. Instead, there could be a continuum going 
from one end of the spectrum to the other. Thus, when Saussure puts forward the 
claim that the verbs have or avoir have two separate entries in the lexicon, I believe 
the claim too strong; I propose, unlike Saussure, that auxiliary verbs (and modal 
verbs) are astride the middle mark of the conceptual/procedural continuum (akin to 
what Nicolle 1998a proposes for will and be going to), being conceptual – that is, 
more conceptual than procedural – when used as full verbs, and procedural – that is, 
more procedural than conceptual – when used as auxiliaries. Another (more minor) 
point of divergence is Saussure’s reluctance to endorse the idea that all connectives 
(and grammatical expressions) are procedural – something I claim is the case – but 
this is understandable given his interest in maintaining a strict conceptual/procedural 
dichotomy (Saussure 2011: 57-59).  
Saussure goes on to argue that it is cognitively unfeasible that there be three 
types of expressions – he claims that it is cognitively less costly to have to choose 
between just two types of expressions, as far as storing the entries in memory (57). 
The real question is whether we have to actively choose or not, and why this choice 
must be restricted to one of two things; it seems just as cognitively plausible that the 
language-processing part of the mind need only access a single continuum of meaning 
for a given expression and move along that axis, stopping where the (pragmatically 
enriched) meaning fits the speaker’s intention and context. Or, seen differently, the 
mind could choose between three, four or more types of expression, especially since 
the mind does not necessarily function sequentially – something Saussure himself 
agrees with. I propose that – as we shall see with the temporal expressions’ outline 
procedures in Chapter 4 – there is a dichotomy, one between descriptive and 
interpretative usages (a continuum representation at this level would only complicate 
matters). However, once within the interpretative side of things, a continuum is much 
more plausible given the variety of meanings that can be obtained. So, the dichotomy 
is between when now is used temporally, and when it is not. When now  is used 
interpretatively the mind’s language parsing module makes use of a continuum of 
meaning. Let us be clear, this is not a continuum where all the meanings of now are 
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indexed, with the mind merely picking out the relevant one, the continuum envisioned 
here is one where the mind accesses now’s potential meaning (recall Guillaume) and 
“moves” this core sense along a spectrum of contextually relevant outputs, selecting in 
the end the most appropriate one for the utterance currently being processed. This 
view is not as open-ended as the relevance theoretic notion of ad hoc processing, it is 
more readily comparable to Blakemore’s semantic constraints, except that what is 
being constrained at this level is now’s potential meaning, its core sense. 
Another recent claim made by Saussure (64) portrays procedural expressions as 
not being subject to narrowing or loosening (see Sperber & Wilson 1995; Carston 
2002; Wilson 2004), based on his view that there is a clear-cut distinction between 
conceptual and procedural expressions (and that only concepts can be enriched in this 
way). We will return to these notions in Section 3.2.3, for now I will simply propose 
the idea that (given an acceptance of continuum of meaning) if there is a general 
primary procedure for temporal adverbs and connectives, the selection of one output 
over another may indeed be a type of narrowing or loosening in itself (perhaps at the 
meta-linguistic level). Indeed, there is no reason why the narrowing/loosening 
‘mechanism’ could not be equally applicable to individual expressions, to clauses, or 
even to entire sentences and utterances. Saussure’s idea that some expressions use 
conceptual content as a parameter for the interpretation of the procedural relation 
seems both relevant and solid, although he downplays the importance of this when he 
says that “Incorporating a notion of ‘contrast’ in the analysis of but does not bring 
anything useful vis-à-vis the procedural analysis.” (2011: 65). Again, our views 
diverge: to me this notion of ‘contrast’ is the semantic core of but and is on a level 
preceding the conceptual/procedural distinction, without it, there would be nothing 
for the expression to start out from. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, I hypothesize that 
all expressions (whether conceptual or procedural) have some primitive semantic 
meaning from which instructions for assigning the relevant denotation or the relevant 
relation necessarily stem.  
In the present view, but (and other procedural expressions) does encode a 
concept, albeit a very skeletal one, and this must be the case I surmise, since but 
encodes instructions that constrain utterances in which it appears. The type of 
instruction – for instance, establishing a contrast between two sentence clauses – 
must be dependent upon some form of meaning. I understand Saussure’s above claim 
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as meaning that the notion of contrast is derived pragmatically from the immediate 
cotext – the two clauses joined by but – and thus the expression but need not have a 
semantic component meaning “contrast”. Though it is indisputable that one can infer 
contrast between two clauses in absence of but, this does not necessarily imply that 
but cannot have this meaning. Saussure is, I believe, overlooking that it is precisely the 
fact that but does incorporate “contrast” which makes it such a useful procedural 
expression – especially seen through the relevance theoretic lens whereby utterances 
where but is present are optimally understood as setting up a contrast between two 
elements, without the added cost of having to infer one from the context.  
If we turn for a moment to now we can see that it too – considered here as a 
procedural expression – encodes at the least a basic concept of the present time (of the 
utterance). It too constrains the utterances in which it appears, to signal a temporal 
relation in some cases, or to establish a relation of a different sort when not used 
temporally. To situate now (and the other temporal expressions) decisively on one 
side or the other of a conceptual/procedural divide seems a difficult feat, and one that 
is not really necessary if one entertains the idea that there is a continuum rather than 
a strict dichotomy. Saussure’s (and others’) strict dichotomy is sound as far as 
economy of effort goes, and if it is the case that the mind works in a linear, sequential 
way. With a modular conception of mind, one where several modules work conjointly 
to establish meaning in language, the idea of a continuum model is equally plausible. 
Furthermore, a continuum model is compatible with Guillaume’s “potential signified” 
if one accepts that the potential meaning generated can easily slide up and down a 
continuum according to the actualization (in-context prompts). As a final word on the 
conceptual/procedural continuum I will add that the continuum I envision is not 
necessarily restricted to a two dimensional line, I think it equally tenable that, within 
the confines of an organ geared towards abstract symbol manipulation, this 
continuum be a three dimensional affair (and possibly more)82. 
So, to sum all this up, I think it is quite plausible that the mind has a meta-
procedure for overall interpretation which would be something like: assign the correct 
denotation or relation to every X in the utterance U (X being the variable expression) 
                                                 
82 This idea was prompted by the geometrical representation of movement using Cartesian 
coordinates. Recent work by Chilton (2014) applies a three-dimensional model to the 
conceptualization of spatial expressions along similar lines, albeit within in a different and recent 
paradigm (Deictic Space Theory). 
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– thus the mind assigns the relevant meaning to each expression in an utterance (or 
group of utterances) to obtain the overall interpretation – sometimes there are no 
explicit procedural expressions, but the mind can, and does, nevertheless compute the 
relevant relations between expressions or clauses within an utterance, or between 
utterances. Assigning the correct (i.e. relevant) denotation or relation depends on the 
instructions encoded in each expression present in the utterance being computed. 
Furthermore, our take on conceptual and procedural expressions is that both 
encode procedures of a sort: conceptual expressions encode a procedure that identifies 
the most relevant denotation for interpreting an utterance (or part of an utterance); 
procedural expressions encode a procedure that identifies the most relevant relation 
in an utterance (or between two or more utterances). For our present purposes, only 
those expressions that encode rules for relations are to be considered ‘procedural’83. 
In short, (mostly) conceptual items refer to real and abstract things (objects, actions, 
states) in the world, while (mostly) procedural items refer to relations between real or 
abstract things. Let us be clear: for us procedural expressions are semantic in that they 
do in fact mean something, and they are pragmatic in that they mean what they do 
according to the various contexts in which they are to be found (as with, for instance, 
Kaplan’s “character”). 
                                                 
83 This is somewhat similar to Saussure’s proposal, though he does not dwell as much on the 
notion of relation, as I do here. Saussure prefers the term ‘operations’ (2011:59). 
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3.2.2. Hypotheses 
I have already mentioned the main hypothesis in the introduction, but I restate it here 
and will further develop it in what follows. The principal hypothesis and the 
hypotheses given below were prompted by the research questions stated in the 
introduction, and represent an attempt at answering them. I repeat them here for ease 
of reference: 
1. why and how is it that temporal expressions do not necessarily yield a temporal 
interpretation? 
2. how do hearers arrive at an understanding of this sort, and be reasonably 
confident that this interpretation is what was actually intended by the speaker? 
3. what specific conditions must exist, or, in what context(s) do these temporal 
expressions function in this way? 
The principal hypothesis given in the introduction is reiterated here: 
procedural temporal expressions encode both temporal instructions and non-
temporal (i.e. argumentative or discursive) instructions – and thus, temporal 
expressions, though they may be used non-temporally (non-descriptively), are 
temporal by default, and are pragmatically modified to fit the context  
The following three hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses are a development of the 
above hypothesis. Restating the main hypothesis this way served a twofold purpose: 
first, as a means of delineating the several ideas contained within more precisely; and 
second, as a means of offering slightly different versions of the overarching proposal. 
Hypothesis 1. temporal expressions, when used descriptively, are used to establish 
temporal relations between eventualities or situate an eventuality temporally.  
Hypothesis 2. temporal expressions, when used non-descriptively, are used to 
establish relations other than (or in addition to) temporal relations, for instance 
argumentative or discursive ones. 
Hypothesis 3. temporal expressions – adverbs, connectives, indexicals and verb 
tenses – are procedural expressions84, as such they encode procedures for their 
usage. 
Sub-hypothesis 1. temporal expressions encode both temporal procedures and 
non-temporal (i.e. argumentative or discursive) procedure – and thus, temporal 
expressions, though they may be used non-temporally, are, by default, temporal. 
Sub-hypothesis 2. temporal expressions encode instructions that are interpretable 
in context as temporal, argumentative or discursive – and thus such expressions 
                                                 
84 Recall that in the terminology used here procedural expressions contain (or retain) an element 
of meaning, however slight, but are considered procedural because that is their crucial role in 
language use.  
 
 
 
 
79 
 
are not temporal by default (time is not inherent to their core sense. 
The first hypothesis needs little or no proof, it is common knowledge: temporal 
expressions by definition bear a direct relation to temporal linguistic phenomena. 
Perhaps the only point of contention is the inclusion of relevance-theoretic 
terminology – descriptive versus non-descriptive usages (see sections 2.4 and 3.1). 
The second hypothesis was perhaps controversial at some point, but today no one 
could reasonably discount the fact that temporal expressions can be, and are, used to 
denote something other than time (see the examples already given above and the 
numerous examples that will follow in chapter 4). What remains somewhat 
controversial is why this can occur (see the brief discussion of various language 
models and theories in chapter 2). Now, our third hypothesis and its two sub-
hypotheses may require more justification via experimental work, we do not have the 
space for that here. Nonetheless, the sub-hypotheses represent the most interesting 
aspect of this research in our view; we will return to this in our conclusion85. 
Priority will be given to the second sub-hypothesis, though slightly more radical 
and a priori somewhat less likely, and confront it with the descriptions and analyses 
of the temporal adverbs and connectives herein; I think that, this way, we will better 
be able to expose these expressions’ meaning and function by stripping them down as 
much as possible to their core sense. And, if this second hypothesis proves false or is 
inconclusive, then it will be a simple affair to fall back to the first, more likely, 
hypothesis. In fact, by invalidating the second hypothesis, the first should be 
reinforced (perhaps even confirmed). 
The first sub-hypothesis is based on aforementioned observations of temporal 
expressions that denote an argumentative, discursive and/or subjective value over the 
temporal reading. Thus, these expressions will be said to be used non-descriptively as 
per the distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive usages. This hypothesis 
poses no problem as to its validity within the relevance-theoretic framework. 
Furthermore, it is compatible (or can easily be made so) with other pragmatic 
approaches, particularly Gricean or neo-Gricean models of utterance interpretation. If 
this option proves to be more adequate, then we must take temporal expressions to be 
                                                 
85 These two sub-hypotheses are best understood as specifications of what is encoded by temporal 
expressions, that is the precise nature of their procedures. In addition, they are clearly 
incompatible with one another: either Sub-hypothesis 1 is correct or Sub-hypothesis 2 is. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
temporal by default, and to somehow being pragmatically enriched (though not 
necessarily narrowed or loosened, in the usual sense) when used non-temporally. In 
this case, it must be explained why and how non-temporal usages are possible. 
The second sub-hypothesis stems from the observation that expressions can be 
construed as conceptual or procedural. Thus, I will posit that procedural expressions 
either authorize or prohibit non-descriptive usages according to their interpretative 
algorithm. When they do authorize such usages, the algorithm will specify ad hoc the 
conditions of this particular pragmatic enrichment as well as the different outputs 
possible. In this way, we shall be able to explain the possible meanings and nuances 
with the required high level of granularity necessary to pragma-semantic analysis. If 
this option proves to be the most adequate, then we must see temporal expressions as 
being merely one instantiation of a more general type of expression. In this case, we 
must find out what class of (meta)expression such items belong to, and justify their 
being placed within this class. 
Conceptual expressions lead to regular pragmatic enrichment through inference 
wherever the context permits it, as required by the search for relevance. Pragmatic 
enrichment can concern either the meaning to be attributed to the expression itself – 
in which case it occurs at the level of the explicatures – or it will take place for the 
interpretation of the utterance as a whole, for instance a non-literal proposition – and 
in this case the communicative act is produced by implicature. As already noted, in the 
case of enrichment centered on a particular expression, the non-descriptive usage can 
be obtained through narrowing or loosening. 
We have seen Sperber & Wilson’s distinction between a descriptive use – the 
utterance is a representation of the speaker’s thought(s) about a real of desirable state 
of affairs – and an non-descriptive use – the utterance is a representation of the 
speaker’s thought(s) about an attributed or relevant representation (for instance 
someone else’s thought(s) about a real or desirable state of affairs). Initially, I thought 
of adding two further categories of usage – ‘argumentative’ or ‘discursive’ – but this 
seems unnecessary since these two usages are characterized more by the speaker’s 
informative intention than by whether they are actually descriptive or not. However, 
for our purposes here we must distinguish between the descriptive or non-descriptive 
usage of specific expressions – temporal ones in this case – and the descriptive/non-
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descriptive use of complete utterances in which temporal expressions appear. Clearly 
for us, when a temporal expression is used in a context where it means something 
other than, or in addition to, the time of one (or more) of the eventualities, it is used 
non-descriptively. The actual informative intention of presenting utterances for use in 
argumentation or for (discursively) signaling the speaker’s attitude, belief-state or 
perspective is situated at a level that precedes the actual information conveyed by the 
words that compose the utterance. Therefore, a given language’s ‘argumentative usage’ 
is only one way of communicating, and by doing so, it does not imply that the 
informative aspect of language is absent. Likewise with ‘discursive usages’, 
‘interactional usages’ and other uses of a language to convey information 
characterized by something other than truth, factor a straightforward description. 
Naturally, I foresee that such usages will be applicable to both oral (e.g. classes, 
political speeches) and written linguistic productions (e.g. scholarly writings, 
newspaper articles).  
Finally, I posit a more radical hypothesis: linguistic expressions deemed as being 
procedural (such as a temporal expression which can be used non-descriptively) may 
encode instructions with no given hierarchy – that is, in the case of temporal 
expressions, the temporal instruction is not necessarily the default procedure. We 
shall see if this hypothesis is too extreme for all temporal expressions, and if it is 
perhaps only applicable to linguistic units that pertain to more than one grammatical 
category. (For instance, this may be the case for yet which is both an adverb and a 
conjunction.) If this hypothesis holds, we could say that the procedures encoded 
within certain expressions are purely determined by context, in other words, they 
would be strongly pragmatic discourse markers. In addition, this may have 
consequences for the point of view or perspective of a given linguistic production. 
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3.2.3. Methodology 
“One of the most basic things that we do when we communicate through 
language is to [1] pick out entities in the world and ascribe properties to them, or 
[2] indicate relations between them.” Cruse, A. (2000: 303) 
[1] is something we could say of conceptual expressions and [2] corresponds to our 
procedural expressions; if so, then why not take the stance that whatever the level or 
amount of actual procedurality of certain expressions, we can clearly put the temporal 
expressions examined here – along with Discourse Markers more generally – as 
fulfilling the second function described by Cruse. It is tempting to just rename this 
disparate class of words entirely, such as Cruse’s “grammatical words” which are 
words that have (almost) no lexical roots i.e. ‘non-lexical’ words such as the, and, of. 
(Cruse 2000: 88).  
On a very general level, I planned this research according to the principles of a 
naturalist and mechanist methodology; the hope is that such an approach will reduce 
unwarranted speculation. By a naturalist and mechanist methodology, I mean a 
methodology that concerns itself with language as being part of the natural world, and 
which follows laws and principles that are grounded in reality. In this sense, though 
objective reality may in some cases not be readily accessible, it can be known through 
inference and experience. The idea is to eschew a relativistic perspective of language, 
and specifically of temporal expressions used non-temporally. For this, a controlled 
reductionism shall be applied to our framework, through the use of a rules-driven 
inference model which in principle should help avoid occurrences of unfalsifiability 
and unfounded deductions. I adopt a weak version of compositionality aka “the 
semantic skeleton model” (Cruse, 2000: 79), where the meanings of expressions are 
underdetermined (much like in Relevance Theory) and need context, encyclopedic 
knowledge, etc. to be fully fleshed out. This scientific perspective will limit this 
framework to a reasonable methodology, thereby ensuring epistemological soundness 
from the formulation of the aforementioned hypotheses up to the end-results. In so 
doing, we shall keep clear of holistic perspectives both for the phenomena treated and 
the overall research process. The chosen approach can thus permit us a certain level of 
transdisciplinarity, with each perspective contributing some elements to this research, 
functioning as an efficient heuristics, while shunning a naïve and inoperable mixing 
and matching of diverse disciplines.  
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To do this we will proceed as follows: first, I will start by listing natural language 
occurrences in ordinary conversation (principally in English and French, though 
Italian and Spanish data may also be mentioned here and there) wherein temporal 
expressions do not function as we would normally expect them to – e.g. by denoting 
the time of events or actions in the world. We will list, describe and focus on analyzing 
whether these non-descriptive usages are of a conceptual or procedural type and 
proceed to classify them accordingly. The second stage will consist in the actual 
pragma-semantic analyses, which will include a description of the natural inferences 
which can be derived in the case of the conceptual expressions; a modelization of the 
expressions considered as procedural will be undertaken on the basis of Saussure’s 
algorithmic procedural model as applied to non-descriptive uses of French passé 
simple, imparfait and plus-que-parfait. The final stage of our research will include 
our review of the problematic cases – borderline or undecided cases – and an 
examination of the semantics-pragmatics interface (and possibly tweaking the 
procedural model)86.  
As has been noted above repeatedly, we will distinguish between two types of 
meaning determination of linguistic expressions in context: conceptual and 
procedural expressions. Recall that an expression is considered conceptual if the 
totality of its possible meanings can be determined on the basis of the underlying 
encoded concept. On the other hand, an expression is considered procedural if all its 
potential meanings cannot be foreseen by conceptual material and normal enrichment 
mechanisms e.g. the derivation of implicatures (cf. Saussure & Sthioul 2002). In other 
words, expressions deemed procedural are not to be seen as devoid of any concept, 
just that this concept is accompanied by, or dependent upon, the computational 
instructions encoded within. When a given expression is conceptual then all possible 
uses of this expression can be determined either by narrowing or modulation (in 
Récanati’s terms, cf. Récanati: 2004), that is, by designating a referent which satisfies 
its semantic properties, or by loosening or sense extension (in Récanati’s terms, ibid.), 
which enlarges the range of possible referents the expression can have (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995).   
                                                 
86 Though I anticipate no problems with it, Saussure’s model has been specifically tested on non-
descriptive temporal expressions in French (specifically verb tenses) and thus may not function 
exactly the same for temporal adverbs and connectives used non-descriptively (in French or 
English). This however changes nothing as to the soundness of his model’s plausibility and should 
in principle function equally well on temporal adverbs and connectives, with little modification. 
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A classic example of the first occurrence is the verb open which can be coupled 
with door or bottle, but whose properties must be narrowed down to accommodate 
two different actions; hence, some of the properties of open could be “remove”, 
“push”, “pull” or “lift” – the property of “push” or “pull” will more readily be 
associated with a door than with a bottle or a tube of toothpaste. With loosening, an 
expression will not use its regular properties – indeed some may even be cancelled out 
– but rather an appropriate meaning will be assigned with regards to context; for 
example flat in the phrase “Holland is flat”, which it is not, strictly speaking, but in 
comparison to Switzerland or Tibet (part of the context or the interlocutors’ cognitive 
environment) it would be appropriate to qualify Holland in this way. 
When, on the other hand, an expression is procedural, in principle87 neither 
narrowing nor loosening are applicable to achieve a relevant meaning. This is 
purported to be the case of common conjunctions such as and or but, or of several 
temporal expressions such as since or then. Note that but is not restricted to a purely 
contrastive usage, as in “nobody here but me” (but = except); something similar can be 
said of since’s usual temporal usage, for example in “since you’re here, stay for lunch” 
(since ± because). What if, however, narrowing and loosening do apply to procedural 
expressions? What does this imply? Well, in the case of now, which, I claim has some 
conceptual content, when it is used temporally, it can be loosened from the sense of 
“present time of utterance” to a much larger timescale, like “the present epoch” (which 
of course includes the present time of the utterance, but extends much further in both 
directions). When now is used non-temporally, what is to say that, on the interpretive 
side, there is no narrowing or loosening occurring? Perhaps it is terminologically 
inappropriate to say this, but ultimately, mental language processing may indeed 
make use of something quite similar (if not identical) to the narrowing/loosening 
mechanism. For now, this may be situated at the level of selection between an 
argumentative, attitudinal or expressive interpretation of a discursive usage (we shall 
return to now and its outline procedure in section 4.2.1).  
 
                                                 
87 This was briefly discussed in section 3.2.1 above; recall that I am not convinced that one cannot, 
‘in principle’, apply narrowing or loosening to procedural expressions on the grounds that there 
may be no clear-cut distinction between conceptual and procedural expressions. Perhaps another 
term, such as Récanati’s “modulation”, would make this notion more accessible regarding 
procedural expressions. 
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The potential inferences procedural expressions can activate, whether it be on 
the level of explicatures or that of implicatures, are instructed by a specific inferential 
schema. We have seen several perspectives of this type of expression, and several 
approaches of how to predict their in-context usages. There are currently three 
principal procedural models (more or less) within Relevance Theory: Blakemore’s 
inference chains, Luscher & Moeschler’s inference trees and Saussure’s procedural 
algorithms (2000, 2003), a modified version of which will be used here. The 
algorithmic inference schema presents the double advantage of being more flexible 
than the chain model and more precise than the tree model with respect to the 
interpretative conditions.  
Our descriptions and analyses must necessarily make use of several interfaces in 
order to provide a complete account of how the interpretation of non-descriptively 
used temporal expressions actually functions. By thoroughly analyzing temporality, 
argumentation and subjectivity in utterances and sentences, the aim is to:  
1.  help expand the knowledge of how time functions whether used descriptively 
or non-descriptively;  
2. shed light on derived discursive (including: argumentative, attitudinal, 
expressive) uses, through the use of expressions not seemingly designed for 
that purpose; 
Our results may point to the need for a selective re-categorization of grammars’ 
traditional classification of parts of speech according to their functions and perhaps 
re-consider tenses as being more than just a means of explaining time in language and 
thought.88 
Our end goal is to achieve a better understanding of our linguistic 
comprehension processes which, in turn, will enable a more thorough investigation of 
human communication and cognition. Ultimately, our research should help in 
classifying temporal expressions in such a way as to render them more readily 
accessible for use in general research in theoretical linguistics, second language 
teaching, translation, computational linguistics and psycholinguistic experimentation. 
 
                                                 
88 By this we do not mean "discourse type" markers that lead to modifications of grammatical 
expressions according to their text or discourse type. 
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4. Non-descriptive Usages of Temporal Expressions  
We have already outlined what we mean by “non-descriptive usages”, using 
Relevance Theory’s definition as the foundation (see section 2.4). Here we will briefly 
recall the basic idea behind this type of usage and discuss it a little further. As 
previously stated, the distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive (or 
interpretive) usages hinges on whether a given utterance is used to represent a (real or 
imagined) state of affairs or not89. When an utterance does this, it is used 
descriptively, giving a representation of a person or thing, an action or an event90. 
This is so whether the utterance is made by a real person, say someone we are 
conversing with, or who wrote us a letter or email, or by a fictional character in a 
novel, or the novel’s narrator. On the descriptive side, it matters not that the 
eventuality or thing described actually exist in the real world, or in a fictional one; 
what matters is that the eventuality represented by the utterance or sentence be 
understood as being a factual one. Thus, even a lie is a descriptive usage since the liar 
wishes their audience to believe what it is they are saying.  
When an utterance (or part of an utterance) is not used to factually represent an 
eventuality or an object in the world, it is still used to communicate; what it 
communicates however is less straightforward. This is so whether the utterance is 
made by a real person or a fictional character. So for instance, an ironic utterance such 
as “great day for a picnic” said during a thunderstorm, is a non-descriptive usage, for 
what it communicates is not that it is, factually, a great day for picnicking, but rather 
that the speaker is mocking someone (even themselves), or is trying for some comic 
effect, and this utterance does so by representing another (in this case, absurd) 
representation. Another instance of non-descriptive speech is when someone reports 
on another person’s sayings, doings or beliefs, as in “John believes the Earth is flat”, 
where the speaker is communicating (and representing) a third party’s beliefs and not 
their own (regardless of whether or not the reporter also believes what they are 
reporting). 
                                                 
89 See Sperber & Wilson (1995: 224-243) for a detailed discussion of descriptive and non-
descriptive use of language. 
90 Recall the brief discussion on metarepresentation in section 1.2.3., where a representation is 
the norm for descriptive usages and metarepresentation is used with non-descriptive usages, since 
such utterances require an added level of representation to be properly understood.  
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The way ‘non-descriptive usage’ is understood in the present research is an 
outgrowth from the above observations. In the case of procedural expressions, such as 
the temporal terms analyzed hereafter, descriptive usages are when the expressions 
express their core, or default meaning – such as now meaning ‘the present’. When 
these expressions are uttered with another intention, that is when the speaker intends 
to communicate something other than time – such as now being used to console a 
child, as in ‘now now’ – the expression (and utterance) is used non-literally. We will 
see that with the expressions examined here, the non-literal (or non-descriptive) 
usages have little to do with irony, metaphor or reported speech or thought.  
Instead, the non-descriptive usages of such expressions point to a use which 
serves to communicate argumentative or discursive relations to be derived in the given 
utterances. Said somewhat differently, these temporal expressions are pragmatically 
enriched to yield a specific type of utterance interpretation, an interpretation which is 
possible because of certain characteristics inherent in the expressions themselves. 
These procedural expressions have the capacity for such enrichment because they 
encode something other than (or perhaps in addition to) a simple straightforward 
concept. Thus procedural expressions serve a quite different function from conceptual 
expressions. And it is because procedural expressions encode relational functions that 
they may be enriched to express one or more additional functions, according to the 
context in which they are uttered. When a conceptual expression is enriched, like flat 
or tree, its concept is not fundamentally changed, but is loosened to include other 
degrees of what it means to be flat or a tree. When a procedural expression is 
enriched, like and or now, its procedure is not changed, but instead is refocused to 
trigger the interpretation of different relations. 
The latter are restricted to representing the encoded concept, even when 
enriched to an extreme degree, and thus their function is the straightforward one of 
representing a semantic content. Procedural expressions, on the other hand, are able 
to represent more than one function, functions which sometimes no longer have all 
that much to do with the basic default one. Different functions can be categorized 
according to a specific aspect of language which they represent. There exist many 
aspects to language, but here we will focus on a few, namely, temporality, spatiality, 
subjectivity, argumentation and discursiveness. Quite naturally the primary function 
of temporal expressions is to represent temporality in some form. For instance, an 
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expression like today represents time as being the day upon which the utterance is 
uttered. More specifically, such an expression points to a temporal relation to be 
established between the act of speech, and that which is spoken about. 
Yet, if temporality91 is but one of several possible relations that can be expressed 
in a given language, it stands to reason that there be either specific lexical items that 
express this type of relation, or else that there exist lexical items which can express 
temporality, among other types of relations; this is the case of the auxiliary will, which 
can express a notion or a function, one of which is the temporal relation of futurity.  It 
would seem that procedural expressions, such as temporal or spatial adverbs, 
connectives and indexicals, are precisely the latter type of lexical item. These types of 
expression allow for pragmatic (contextual) enrichment, while conceptual expressions 
are more restricted in their meanings. Likewise, while both conceptual and procedural 
expressions may be used non-descriptively, the former do so in different ways – 
notably they are used ironically, metaphorically or metalinguistically – while the 
latter, are used in ways where the actual function of the term is modified, or even 
completely changed92. 
                                                 
91 Recall that for the present work, aspectuality is included in temporality; I take it as self-evident 
that tense, aspectuality and mood are three crucial elements in language whose primary purpose is 
the establishment and/or modification of relations between objects in the world – temporal 
relations, referential relations, discursive (argumentative, attitudinal or expressive) relations 
principle among them. 
92 For Saussure (2011: 64) there are “indefinitely many possible meanings in context” for a 
conceptual expression, due to the fact that they may be loosened or narrowed, while for procedural 
expressions there are not so many possibilities. Our focus here is not on all the possible meanings 
of expressions, but on the possible functions they may have. 
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4.1. General observations and typology of temporal adverbs, 
connectives and indexicals 
First, recall that the expressions that are analyzed here do not always belong to the 
same grammatical category: sometimes they are classified as temporal adverbs (i.e. 
when used descriptively), sometimes they are called Discourse Markers (i.e. when 
used interpretively) – in addition some are also connectives (whether used 
descriptively or not) and some are indexicals (ditto). Second, there is a difference in 
function for these expressions: there is a grammatical function and there is a 
discursive and/or argumentative function. It appears that grammatical function – 
whether the expression used is an adverb, conjunction or preposition – plays a role in 
their ability to be used non-descriptively. The difference in grammatical category of 
these expressions, and whether the expressions can belong to more than one such 
category, may have some influence on whether some may be more readily used non-
descriptively or not, we will return to this where relevant, and in Chapter 5. 
So, what we have here is a disparate group of expressions whose single 
overarching commonality is that they are generally used to express time. But 
individually a few of these expressions belong to just one category, like soon or again 
– adverbs, while the others belong to two or more – they can often be adverbs, 
adjectives and conjunctions, sometimes even adjectives. It would seem that this 
belonging to different grammatical categories is at least partially responsible for these 
particular expressions’ flexibility; belonging to more than one category is not a 
necessary condition for them to be used non-descriptively, otherwise both soon and 
again would not be included on our list. Rather the fact that these two items present 
less derivative, non-temporal usages leads us to consider that while belonging to 
several grammatical categories may not in fact be what enables non-descriptive 
usages, it at least seems to provide for a wider variety of such usages. 
 Perhaps this is part of the reason why some approaches choose a polysemic view 
of language; and it is a reasonable assumption. Here however we favor a monosemic 
view, in following with Guillaume’s potential signified and in following with the 
Geneva School. The reasoning is that a monosemic stance is more plausible: first, 
because the view we take of how the human mind works is one where the general 
language processing system is much more efficient seen this way: if but a single 
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concept or procedure is indexed to each item, which can then be enriched 
contextually, there is much less need for an endless storage capacity than would be the 
case for the mind stocking each item with every possible contextual meaning it could 
have attached to it. Just as the human hand can be used to do a wide variety of things 
– push, pull, point, grasp, flick, snap, punch, slap etc. – so too can the mind, and this 
is also the case when it manipulates symbols and representations of symbols. 
Secondly, a monosemic take also appears more compatible with our procedural 
approach, that is, the associated algorithms for processing each expression can be 
much simpler and more straightforward in a monosemic view93.  
The algorithm we need must possess a straightforward structure, “mapping” the 
signification from the expression’s (basic, underdetermined) semantic meaning to its 
(actual, contextualized) pragmatic meaning. With, for instance now, given the right 
circumstances, the hearer will not infer the temporal sense but a discursive or 
argumentative one instead – the contrastive sense of now will be made salient (and 
thus more likely to be relevant) and the context will supply the remaining variables for 
a specific instance of usage. Said roughly, what needs to be kept in mind when 
working with such expressions, while searching for an adequate algorithm for each, 
are the following three points: 1. Most (ideally all) possible meanings for X should be 
generateable by the algorithm; 2. The most irreducible core meaning/lowest common 
denominator needs to be present in the algorithm; and 3. The quality or function that 
sets X apart from other, similar, expressions – what is the particularity of each 
expression, and of each usage it may allow? 
A schematic general procedure for treating temporal expressions could resemble 
the one outlined below. I am basing my representation of this procedure on Saussure’s 
(2003: 282) “Temporal Interpretation Procedure”, with some modification to suit the 
non-temporal meanings of these expressions when used non-descriptively. As such, it 
is simpler, and less precise, than the algorithm Saussure proposes for processing 
French verb tenses. In addition, there are further return steps possible which are not 
shown here, if for instance further processing is required due to specific obstacles 
                                                 
93 That being said, I would not completely reject a reasonable polysemic appreciation of certain 
lexical items – indeed, a polysemic approach can be quite functional for many nouns, verbs or 
adjectives, as stated previously – my present stance is that a polysemic view of discourse markers 
(e.g. temporal adverbs and connectives) is not the most plausible or functional one. Perhaps with 
appropriate modification, a polysemous account would work. 
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along the inference path. Finally, this outline procedure will be different if these 
expressions do not have a temporal default (as in my second sub-hypothesis), the 
procedure modeled below is built on the assumption that there is a temporal default.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL OF A GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS 
Interpretative 
processing: 
 
Input: 
Utterance 
Context: 
Temporal 
constraint(s)? 
Non-temporal 
constraint(s)? 
Linguistic processing: 
retrieval of conceptual 
reference(s), 
saturation of variables 
Output: temporal 
relation(s) 
established 
Relevant 
discursive factors? 
- 
If yes, then: 
Relevant 
temporal factors? 
- 
If yes, then: 
If no relevant 
factors are 
identified: 
Further search 
in Context for 
constraints 
Descriptive 
processing 
Output: discursive 
relation(s) 
established 
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4.1.1. English Temporal Expressions 
When will then be now? – Soon. [Spaceballs, Mel Brooks, 1987] 
In English, we will be looking in detail at the following expressions – already, still, 
yet, soon, before/after, since, next, now, then – which are all usually considered as 
temporal expressions (with perhaps the exception of next), though they are not 
necessarily placed within the same grammatical categories, as mentioned above: some 
are considered adverbs, while others are branded connectives; some are held to be 
deictic, and others not. We will focus on these expressions in particular because they 
are both the ones used most frequently in speech and writings of various forms, and, 
especially, because they are the ones most often used to fulfill multiple functions, both 
semantically and grammatically. In our procedural pragmatic view, as described above 
(sections 3.1 – 3.3), we will focus on the core meaning of these terms, which, we 
postulate, either is an instruction for the expressions’ interpretation or else contains 
one. Thus, the actual category they belong to – i.e. adverb or connective or whatever – 
is only of secondary importance, though if this actually plays a role, this angle will also 
be considered. 
We will examine each expression in turn, in a mostly descriptive perspective – 
looking at and discussing several typical examples – alternating with a more analytic 
perspective where we confront standard utterances with examples containing 
instances of non-descriptive usages. The goal is to obtain a description of the 
expressions’ meanings and usages, and ultimately, to give an adequate definition of 
their procedures, and perhaps provide an appropriate illustration of these instructions 
in the form of a likely interpretation algorithm. Many (if not most) of the expressions 
we’ll be looking at here take now (i.e. which most adequately references T0, along with 
presently, this very instant/second/minute etc.) as their cue, in their temporal forms 
at least. This may have consequences for the non-temporal usages of these 
expressions; part of our endeavor is precisely to find out if this is the case, and this in 
turn may prove important, if not essential, to discovering an algorithm (or meta-
algorithm) to adequately describe each non-temporal interpretation. 
We started out with an impression that many usages such as these were mostly 
oral, or else were common in fiction and perhaps academic texts – it appears this 
hunch is partly correct: these usages do in fact come up frequently in real everyday 
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conversation and in fiction, and are common in academic texts as well (see the online 
COCA and BNC corpuses). Exposure and observation point to the fact that these 
expressions’ non-standard usages are actually not all that rare; indeed, the only reason 
to call them “non-standard” is in the sense that their most commonly used, or their 
most conventional meaning, is trumped by a contextually salient cue that guides one 
to reach a more relevant meaning (it remains to be seen whether this alternative 
meaning is secondary or tertiary to the core semantics of these expressions). 
The thing about these non-standard usages is that we need not spend too much 
time arguing their existence; even though we have chosen not to rely extensively on 
corpus examples, dictionary definitions for most, if not all, of these words have at least 
one non-descriptive definition listed and sometimes more than a few. These 
definitions – like the Oxford Concise Dictionary’s (1996) seventh definition of now: 
“(esp. in a narrative or discourse) then, next” or Merriam-Webster’s online 
dictionary’s third definition: “used with the sense of present time weakened or lost to 
introduce an important point or indicate a transition (as of ideas) <now, this may 
seem reasonable at first>” or still Wiktionary’s second definition: “(sentence) Used to 
introduce a point, a remonstration or a rebuke” – all give specific examples of usages 
that every English speaker will find immediately interpretable.  
Even if some non-temporal usages of now or yet etc. are listed as dictionary 
definitions, for the majority of English speakers these terms have temporal meaning 
first and foremost (and possibly that is the only sense some are consciously aware of); 
and at most the fact that what we will continue to claim are non-descriptive usages are 
listed in dictionary entries means that these “enriched” or “implicated” meanings are 
rather commonplace – we could say they are “conventional implicatures” à la Grice 
(1975). Instead, we take it as uncontroversial that such meanings and usages exist. The 
correlation between non-descriptive usages and dictionary lists does not in fact apply 
to all the expressions we’ll be looking at here, e.g. already, next. But in the end it may 
just be that some expressions are on a later path to grammaticalization and therefore 
are not yet as widely used or attested. This may partially explain the shorter definition 
entries, which are often without mention of a non-temporal usage. At any rate, that 
which makes it possible to use now, yet, or then non-temporally, is also what makes it 
possible to use already, next or again in this manner.  
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4.1.2. French Temporal Expressions 
As with the English terms, the French expressions also hail from different 
grammatical categories (adverb, conjunction), and some are considered deictic while 
others are not. We have kept the same order as far as meaning-equivalence, though of 
course there are, here and there, some variations in meaning and usage as is wont in 
different languages. We will go into this with a sub-section following the analysis of 
each English-French pair/grouping; but first we will undertake a similar description 
and analysis of each term (or group of terms) as was done for the English language 
equivalents. The French temporal expressions we will be interested in are: déjà, 
encore, bientôt, avant/après, depuis, d’abord, ensuite & enfin, maintenant and alors. 
Temporal connectives and adverbs can easily – just as easily as in English – be 
used non-descriptively in French, and their usage is well documented94. The 
traditional explanation, though often augmented by argumentatively-oriented 
parameters, is an explanation for which the elements under the scope of the adverb 
are not the elements described by the eventualities denoted by the verbs’ semantics 
but rather the event which constitutes the utterance itself (or alternatively, the 
illocutionary act, cf. Rossari 1997 & 2000). This interpretation, for temporal 
expressions, allegedly stems from the conceptual proximity between time and the 
sequencing of events or reasoning. In contrast however, it should be noted that some 
temporal expressions cannot be interpreted non-descriptively, though the metaphor 
would hold. Thus, though it may be easy to understand why, for referential reasons, 
demain (‘tomorrow’) or aujourd’hui (‘today’) would not make sense in an 
argumentative context, one can ask why it is that the temporal value of adverbs like 
auparavant (‘before’), bientôt (‘soon’) or peu après (‘soon after’) cannot authorize a 
non-descriptive derivation in the sense we mean here.  
With regards to adverbs that allow a metalinguistic interpretation, one 
immediately supposes a dichotomy between those whose non-temporal part seems to 
belong to the encoded material (enfin, déjà) and those for which the non-descriptive 
interpretation stems from a pragmatic derivation (d’abord, ensuite). This would not 
be the whole story however. As argued in chapter 3, the view of conceptual/procedural 
                                                 
94 See Muller (1975), Nef (1978), Martin (1982), Zénone (1982), Jayez (1988), Franckel (1989), 
Victorri & Fuchs (1996), and more recently Mosegaard-Hansen (1997, 2000, 2003, 2004), Rossari 
(2000, 2002) and Buchi (2007). 
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expressions taken here is that of a continuum. Therefore, expressions like enfin or 
déjà, may well be halfway between conceptuality and procedurality; nevertheless, it is 
their procedural quality that allows for non-descriptive usages.  
Overall though, the general observations made in the preceding section about 
English temporal expressions also apply to French temporal expressions. In other 
words, that which makes it possible to use now or already argumentatively or 
discursively is the same mechanism that allows one to use maintenant or déjà in these 
ways. Like with English temporal expressions, French temporal expressions also have 
two or more dictionary entries, and it is equally likely for a native French speaker to 
identify, understand and use such expressions as it is for their native English 
counterparts. Stemming from this, then, the procedural information should, for all 
practical purposes, be quite similar, if not identical. Any difference in the procedural 
information (or even the algorithms) between such closely-related expressions is most 
likely due to superficial differences of each language, such as slightly different focus of 
reference, or a difference in the degree of saliency of a temporal and/or discursive 
relation. We will address this issue in the comparative sub-sections for each 
English/French pair/group of expressions. 
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4.2. Description and analysis of non-descriptive usages 
For this section, we will take a close look at the selection of English and French 
temporal expressions that are most representative of the type of non-descriptive usage 
being investigated here. The selection is non-exhaustive, and perhaps a few other 
terms could have been added to the list, while a few others could have been left out95. 
The logic behind this specific list has more to do with the fact that we will be looking at 
both English and French expressions – and if and how they may correspond to one 
another – than the grammatical category each expression belongs to, or the frequency 
with which these expressions occur in either language. Additionally, it became 
apparent while going over these expressions that though there is not always a 
corresponding96 term in both languages, there is always a corresponding function – 
that is, a specific linguistic purpose, such as contrast, or topic-switching. Throughout 
section 4.2 we will peruse the selected temporal expressions, treating the English 
term(s) first, followed by the corresponding French term(s), always with an eye on the 
roles each term may play in its language, and the respective non-descriptive usages 
each may allow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
95 Naturally, there are several other expressions left out of the present analysis, though no less 
deserving, mostly because of a presumption on my part that they are less exemplary than those 
given here. Offhand, I will mention when or while, which could both have been analyzed here, 
notably alongside since (section 4.2.11). These, and others, in French as well e.g. quand), would be 
worthy candidates of future research within a procedural pragmatic account.  
96 By “corresponding” I mean the most appropriate term, i.e. the one most commonly used to 
translate one word for another, absent any particular context. So, for instance, now is followed by 
maintenant, already by déjà and so forth. The last few subsections will be somewhat different, as 
will become obvious when dealing with the expressions given there.  
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4.2.1. Now 
Now. You're looking at now, sir. Everything that happens now, is happening now. 
– Colonel Sandurz – Spaceballs (1987)97 
It is pretty straightforward to define now as meaning ‘the present time (of the 
utterance)’, with more or less extension in time, and yet as meaning ‘up until now’ or 
‘from now onward’, and both expressions are commonly understood this way. It is 
also uncontroversial, and unsurprising, that now and yet may be used non-
descriptively, for instance in metalinguistic contexts or in indirect speech, where they 
may retain their temporal senses. But what about non-temporal usages? We will see 
below that when these terms are not used to denote the present (now), or a soon-
expected but unrealized future moment (yet), now and yet can be used in place of 
other connectives such as but, even, however, or although. It appears that there is a 
more widespread use of yet in such roles, though whether the reason for this is 
because now is an indexical and/or is perhaps more strongly anchored in time or 
because yet historically meant “in addition, further, moreover, still” as well as “till 
now” is not completely clear at this point (cf. Oxford Dictionary of English 
Etymology, 1978: 616 & 1019-1020)98.  
As will soon be illustrated, now can trigger a few other interpretations99, such as 
topic-switching or establishing a contrast of some sort, both of which are usages that 
could be called argumentative or discursive usages. So, even though at least one of the 
basic properties of now is to mark the time of utterance, it would appear that it is 
capable of handling non-temporal relations; conversely, it does not necessarily follow 
that now in its non-temporal usages is totally devoid of that basic, perhaps default, 
property. Indeed, it is an open question of whether or not now in such usages still 
contains a temporal element, and if so, how this residual temporal element 
contributes to the meaning of the utterance. With yet the situation is slightly different, 
its default reading may somewhat resemble that of now, but it cannot replace now in 
                                                 
97 The above quote is not an example of non-temporal usages of now, it is nonetheless an example 
of non-descriptive usages; in this case, the three final instances of now are used meta-
linguistically, to comment on the degree of ‘presentness’ of the situation, or rather whether the 
moment being talked about is in fact the present – and the first instance of now is temporal 
(descriptive) and is said in response to the question “when does this happen in the movie?” 
98 We will return to yet in more detail in the following subsection.  
99 Many of which are commonly listed as subsequent definitions in several dictionaries – Oxford, 
Merriam-Webster, Longman, to name just three.  
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utterances such as (26) below; this is because both terms can refer to the present time 
(of the utterance) but do not imply the same type of relation between the Event-time 
and the Speech-time. In temporal uses, now implies that the Event described is (or 
will immediately be) happening, while yet suggests an element of expectation, and an 
interval of time (it is in fact more aspectual than temporal).  
For instance, (26) and (27) clearly express temporality, but (28) and (29) express 
something besides, or instead of, temporality; in this case, they are used discursively 
and argumentatively (respectively). 
(26) I’m going out now. 
(27) Her most recent novel is her best one yet.  
(28) John doesn’t know much about hydraulics. Now Mary is a much better choice for 
the task. 
(29) Those paintings are expensive and distasteful, yet people buy them. 
If we were to use Reichenbach’s coordinates, one could describe the default reading of 
now roughly as follows: situate the time of the event E at the point of speech S, (with 
the reference point R coinciding with both in many cases). We will not dwell on this 
modelization of now here since most of the usages we will be looking at gain next to 
nothing from being placed into this coordinate system (example 28), if they may be 
rendered at all. With (27 & 29) using Reichenbach’s coordinate system proves 
difficult, since with (27) E, S and R are irrelevant for interpreting the utterance – the 
focus is on [her novel, best] is true according to the speaker; and furthermore that the 
author is expected to write another novel, possibly an even better one (again, in the 
speaker’s opinion). With (29) the coordinate system is moot since what yet does here 
is establish a contrastive relation between two clauses, and has nothing to do with 
temporality. 
Though the default procedure of now may very well be "the time of utterance", 
now can also introduce or make salient other relations, such as topic-switching or 
contrast, both non-temporal usages. Putting aside considerations of intonation and 
prosody (which of course have a variable degree of influence on utterance 
interpretation), let us accept the premise that the basic property of now is indeed to 
mark the time of utterance. But in an example like (28), is now in this and other such 
usages utterly devoid of the basic temporal property? And it is not at all extreme to 
hypothesize that when now is used as a topic-switcher or a contrastive connector these 
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two usages are still somehow anchored in the time of utterance – but then, so are 
utterances where now, or another extra-propositional temporal expression, is absent. 
The view adopted here is that now implicates a contrast in all of its usages, that is, 
when one utters now in its “standard” temporal sense, there is the idea that the 
present utterance which contains it is making a clear-cut distinction with past or 
future states of affairs, in other words the utterance “P now” (26) or “now P” contrasts 
with other propositions, as if to say “the current proposition I am expressing is to be 
considered in itself, separate from other previous utterances…”. Similarly, when used 
as a topic-switcher (28), now also establishes a type of contrast. This, however, does 
not prove that now is always thus implicitly contrastive, indeed an utterance “now P” 
can also be a continuation of a previous utterance; building upon the aforementioned 
proposition to add new information, as in a clarification of what was stated previously 
(like with example 28 above). But do we need to say now to understand an utterance 
as being about an actual, current state of affairs? Not necessarily, take for example: 
(30)  I'm going to the grocery store. 
(30’) I'm going to the grocery store now.  
In the same exact context, say a husband or wife who is putting on their coat and 
opening the front door, both these utterances can be interpreted as expressing the 
same proposition, namely “the speaker is going (or is in the process of getting ready to 
go) to the grocery store at the present time (which coincides with the time of 
utterance)”. In the given context, example (30) is sufficiently relevant as is, so why say 
now in (30’), if it is not necessary for the hearer to understand that the speaker 
intends for her to understand that he is presently in (or just beginning) the process of 
going to the store? While it is true that, in relevance theoretic terms, (30’) is slightly 
more relevant because of reduced processing costs for the hearer, this cannot be the 
whole picture – there is something more going on here. A plausible hypothesis is that 
the now in (30’) is used as a focalizer, that is, the speaker is deliberately drawing 
attention to the proposition expressed, which will thus yield specific contextual effects. 
Some of these effects could be the speaker implicating that: a) “before I 
couldn't/didn't want  to go to the store, but at present that is exactly what I'm doing” 
or b) “before I went out to see visit our neighbor, currently I'm going to the store” or 
even c) “as you can see, I'm leaving, so if you want to come along, be quick, because I 
won't wait” etc. In all these interpretations, now is a ‘focalizer’, and in interpretations 
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a) and b) now is contrastive. Example (30) does not yield such interpretations as 
strongly (or even at all, depending on the cognitive environments of both parties); 
what can be derived from (30) with the least effort and greatest effect is “I am 
informing you of what I am doing and that is P”. 
In light of this, another important point that needs to be made here constitutes a 
slight revision of what is generally taken as a default reading of now (and the same for 
yet a little further). Rather than now meaning “the time of utterance”, a more accurate 
definition would be “the time the utterance is heard and interpreted”; though it may 
seem banal to say this, it is of critical import100. Indeed, though the problem is much 
more far-reaching than we can go into here, the assignment of reference to now is a 
long-standing issue101. But as we saw just before (example 30), we do not in fact need 
now to make it evident that an utterance is being heard and interpreted when it is 
heard and interpreted. So the core meaning of now must be something more than just 
“the time the utterance is heard and interpreted” or “the present”. Being an indexical, 
part of its fundamental meaning includes, by necessity, a reference to the speaker 
uttering the term; but given that it appears to be superfluous in some (perhaps many) 
instances, the reference to the speaker of now must have another component. This 
component is that of focus – now focuses an utterance on something specific, relative 
to the speaker, and thus includes a form of subjectivity; put another way, the speaker 
is the agent of an utterance, and an expression – especially an indexical – like now 
will focus the eventuality onto the way the eventuality relates to the speaker, and how 
the speaker represents that eventuality. Just what the object of that focus is will of 
course depend on the context in which now appears. 
Thus now can adopt several different functions depending on the context of 
occurrence; now can be a temporal deictic, a discursive marker (or a connective) 
serving an argumentative function or a Discourse Marker serving a subjective (i.e. 
ego-centered or “perspectival”, in Récanati’s (2000) terms) function. More 
specifically, the basic semantic sense of now is a property common to the various uses 
in context of now. We suggest that this common meaning is that of “egocentrism at 
the moment of speech” (or “I-here-now”), that is, focusing on the speaker and/or the 
                                                 
100 Smith (1989: 173-174) inspired this specification in his discussion of now on answering 
machines or radio broadcast recordings. 
101 See Kaplan (1989), Smith (1989), Perry (1993), Predelli, (1998) and Corazza (2002) for a much 
more detailed discussion of indexicality and temporal deixis. 
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topic at hand, and the accompanying, derived, notion of contrast. When a speaker 
says now, no matter the usage, they are basically calling attention to their own 
perspective with regards to the utterance it occurs in. And, in so doing, they 
necessarily set up a contrast between the present on one hand and both the past and 
the future on the other hand (when temporal), or, they are setting up a contrast 
between two clauses (when argumentative) or, still, they are calling attention to a 
contrast between the speaker and a/several hearer/s (when discursive). Thus, in the 
following examples, now fulfills three different functions: 
(31) There’s a limo coming to pick you up now. 
(32) The president, now an old man in his seventies, had engineered much-needed 
reform in previous decades102. 
(33) “William Gibson, now the author of Pattern Recognition, has certainly more often 
illustrated that other coinage…”103  
(34) Open the door now! / right now! 
In (31) now focuses on the present temporality of the event, thus making the 
proposition unambiguously focus on the eventuality as being actual, or imminent, 
which triggers an implicature of the type “get ready to go”. The following example, 
(32), is temporal, but focuses on a past and current state of affairs, here the 
president’s age. The result is one of (implicit) contrast between the president at an 
earlier time interval and the current time interval. In example (33) now does 
something quite interesting: Jameson is writing about Gibson who was the author at 
the time the novel in question was being written – previous to Jameson’s review – so 
to say that Gibson is now the author of the book named is, from a temporal 
standpoint, a little strange. This now is instead interpreted as “most recently”, which 
albeit temporal, is not really about the present (i.e. is not descriptive), and so is yet 
another interpretive usage of now. For (34) one comes away with the understanding 
that the speaker wishes the door to be opened immediately, thus there remains an 
element of temporality, but it is not (yet) currently the case (due in part to the use of 
the imperative).  
The above examples illustrate four different usages of now used descriptively to 
describe some form of temporal relation. As can be seen from a more thorough look at 
now in these instances, there is not a single unifying temporal relation that now 
                                                 
102 Inspired by an example taken from Récanati (2000). 
103 Taken from Frederic Jameson, Sept-Oct. 2003, New Left Review online; our emphasis. 
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describes, but several closely-related ones. The following examples, in contrast, help 
illustrate how now can be used to describe relations that are not primarily temporal: 
(35) We have seen that traditional eye surgery can, if done at the outset of a visual 
problem, greatly improve visual acuity. Now laser techniques, on the other hand, 
need not be undertaken so soon, though of course…  
(36) Now now.  
(37) Those paintings are expensive and unappealing. Now, people actually buy them! 
Example (35) does not focus on the actuality of an eventuality; instead it refocuses the 
topic being discussed – traditional eye surgery – onto surgery done with the aid of a 
laser. Example (36) is a typical utterance used to calm or reassure a child (or 
conversely, to scold a child, another possible use). So, with now, a speaker can call 
attention to the present time (31), a change of topic or sub-topic (35) or simply repeat 
the word to offer reassurance (36). Finally, example (37) which can be somewhat 
ambiguous: with the comma, signaling a slight pause, a hearer can easily reach the 
conclusion that the speaker is establishing a contrast between the high cost and low 
aesthetic value of a series of paintings and the fact that people buy them. The 
implicature here wholly depends on the hearer recovering the premise that, for the 
speaker, no one would normally buy a painting that is both expensive and ugly. The 
hearer could also recover the implicature that the speaker is surprised by this turn of 
events. Interestingly, the same utterance, without the comma/slight pause could be 
taken to mean that at a previous time people did not buy them but that at present they 
do. But even in this interpretation, where there is still an element of temporality, one 
cannot miss the contrast set up between two intervals of time. 
With examples (31) to (35), another expression could have been used, with little 
to no change in meaning: for instance, “in one minute” for (31), “presently” for (32), 
“most recently” for (33), “right away” for (34), or no expression at all for (35). For 
example (36) either a whole phrase would be used, such as “no need to cry dear”, or 
else it could be substituted by another commonly heard expression with the same 
meaning – “there, there”. Finally with example (37), several other contrast markers 
like “yet”, “though” or “however” could be used. So why choose to use now, what does 
this expression add to meaning, or to the interpretation process? It is plausible that 
what now brings to these utterances – indeed all utterances in which it appears – is its 
indexical quality, namely its focus on the person saying now. It is thus, along with I 
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and here, an expression which brings a great deal of subjectivity to the interpretation 
of utterances where it appears; said somewhat differently, now forces hearers to factor 
in the speaker in utterances containing the term. 
Generally, one takes utterances spoken by speakers to be their own perspective 
by default, but with now this perspective is highlighted or accentuated, thus guiding 
hearers to a specific interpretation (one which is more specific than in an utterance 
without now being used). Examples (30) and (30’) above demonstrate that even in a 
“standard”, or “default”, reading of now there is an added element to an utterance 
which, without the term, would also express the present time. The difference between 
the two is a) (30’) is more precise in terms of temporality – thus the hearer can be sure 
that in using now the speaker is not going to the store in an hour, but most likely 
within the next few seconds or minutes; and b) there is the implicature that the 
speaker is not going to the store at a time other than the present, that is, the possibility 
of going out at a later time is excluded from the set of possible interpretations. Here 
already we can see that the notion of contrast mentioned above is indeed a basic 
component of now, even in its temporal sense. Thus it would seem that time-contrast 
trumps time-presentness with regards to now’s core meaning. If the core meaning of 
now is comprised of time-contrast and speaker-focus notions, then it is not difficult to 
understand why and how such non-descriptive (non-temporal) usages can function104.  
To sum up, now can be used to express time and a change of relevant state of 
affairs, a change of a state of affairs (minus the temporal component) or act as a 
discourse marker introducing an implicit contrast; we consider this contrast implicit 
in that the hearer retrieves, through inference, the speaker’s subjective appreciation of 
a contrast, i.e. it is their (marked) belief that a contrast is to be established between 
clauses or between situations. When now is used temporally it may be replaced (or 
used to replace) terms or locutions such as at present, this instant. When it is used 
non-temporally it may mean we have seen X and X is P, before we said X which we 
compare to Y105. 
                                                 
104 Of course, now and a few other expressions we’ll be looking at are indexicals and thus function 
slightly differently than non-indexical temporal adverbs or connectives. Yet this difference does 
not overly affect our description of these expressions. 
105 The difficulty of giving an adequate synonym or paraphrase for now is due to the complexity of 
rendering complex nuances of meaning that stem from the difficulty of dealing with an 
internal/subjective appreciation of a given proposition. 
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At this point we can sketch out an outline procedure for now, without forgetting 
that the procedure endorsed here will not resemble Grice’s working out schema 
(2008[1975]: 176), nor will it suggest that there is a hierarchy between the different 
usages beyond the fact that the default (core) meaning would be first, with regards to 
processing time (and if temporal relations indeed are the default). First of all, a hearer, 
upon processing the speaker’s utterance containing now, will attribute a temporal 
reference to the proposition accompanying now and if this is the most relevant 
interpretation they will stop. However, when now was intended in another sense of 
the word, the temporal sense will be insufficiently relevant (or completely irrelevant) 
and thus the hearer immediately goes to the next step in the procedure, and at this 
point accesses the non-temporal meanings, one of which, in accordance with the 
context, will be the most relevant, and here they stop. Schematically the procedure 
would look like this: 
Now 
Default reading: temporal egocentric indexicality: Relevant example(s): 
If now is used descriptively, it expresses one of several 
following temporal relations: 
 
a. temporal specification: the eventuality is anchored in the 
present, or the focus on the present is highly relevant 
(26), (30’) and (31) 
b. a new relevant description of a state of affairs (change 
as perceived or inferred by the speaker) 
(32) and (33) 
c. with a strong intonation, or with ‘right’ added to it, now 
expresses immediacy 
(34) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
now governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages (change of relevant topic or new 
saliency) – P now Q structure 
 
a. discursive usage: focus on a specific topic (or agent)  (35) 
b. discursive usage: the utterance fulfills a purely 
expressive role (no P now Q structure) 
(36) 
c. argumentative usage: now leads to infer a contrast with 
what precedes it  
(37) 
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4.2.1.1. Yet, another now? 
We now turn to yet, the second member of the now/yet pair. Historically, these two 
forms date at least as far back as the 12th century; though they do not appear to be 
etymologically linked, they can be taken as a pair due in part to the similar German 
nun/jetzst pair. Interestingly, the meaning of both the latter terms relate to “now”, 
though jetszt handles the meaning of temporal now while nun covers the meaning of 
non-temporal now (particularly the discursive usages). In the view taken here, yet 
takes its cue from now. This is a straightforward observation for its temporal usages, 
which can be paraphrased as “till now/up to now” (bis jetzt in German)106. First, let us 
look at a series of examples that will serve to distinguish temporal from non-temporal 
usages of yet: 
(38) Are we there yet? 
(39) She has yet to write her best novel. (in ref to ex. 27 above) 
(40) I love swimming yet I can’t stand swimming pools. 
(41) He was rich yet honest. 
The first two examples are temporal, the last two are not. But beyond merely this 
difference in temporality, there are also a few other things to be said. With both (38) 
and (39) there is an element of expectation. In (38) the speaker expects to arrive at 
their destination and is inquiring whether or not that arrival has in fact come to be, 
thereby also suggesting that the arrival at destination should already have occurred 
(according to the speaker at least). This expectation can easily be interpreted as 
impatience. Example (39) does not really communicate impatience (though it is a 
possible implicature) as strongly as (38), in this case the speaker is saying that the 
author has not written her best novel, but may perhaps do so in some indeterminate 
future, at least, that is the speaker’s expectation – driven perhaps by hope, or simple 
deduction. With examples (40 & 41), yet is non-descriptive, its meaning in these cases 
has nothing to do with time. In (40) yet is a conjunction expressing a contrast between 
two explicit clauses [love swimming] and [like pools]. In example (41), yet is not used 
so straightforwardly as a conjunction, but it also expresses a contrast, this time 
between implicit elements, namely a belief that rich people cannot be (all that) honest 
by default. Both examples could be replaced with but with both clauses from each 
                                                 
106 It is plausible that yet also – at least historically – takes its cue from now for its present-day 
commonplace non-temporal usages. 
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example in the same order; however it is interesting to note that where (40) could 
swap yet with even though/so or despite the fact (that) with no real change in 
meaning107, in (41) one would have to invert [rich] and [honest] to retain the same 
sense with even though. What yet adds to (40 & 41) in comparison with but is, again, 
an element of expectation. In (40), it is commonly expected that someone who likes to 
swim also likes, or at least tolerates, swimming pools; and in (41) it is expected that 
rich people are dishonest. Indeed, there is no contradiction with people who like to 
swim disliking pools, after all, many people love to swim in the sea rather than the 
pool (and conversely others love to swim in pools but not the sea). Likewise with (41), 
the implicature depends on the speaker’s worldview; in the absolute, nothing logically 
precludes the wealthy from being honest, or the poor from being honest, or dishonest. 
These implicatures largely depend on the speakers’ and hearers’ cognitive 
environment(s), especially with regards to their personal (subjective) beliefs about the 
world. The following examples are all instances of a contrastive usage of yet: 
(42) It is raining, yet I plan on going out for a walk. 
(43) John and Mary see each other often, yet I can’t say for sure if they’re dating. 
(44) Those paintings are ugly and expensive, yet people buy them. 
(45) He is intelligent yet short-sighted. 
(46) The sun was bright, yet cold. 
(47) The rocket shot into the sky at yet higher speed. 
(48) Mary gave John yet another reason for breaking off their relationship. 
In all of these examples yet establishes a contrast between implicit beliefs that can be 
canceled without contradiction (they are implicatures). The first two largely depend 
on the belief that rain precludes going for a walk, or at any rate that walking in such 
conditions is not desirable (42), or that two people who often see each other are likely 
to be romantically involved (43). The contrast in example (44) depends almost 
exclusively on the speaker’s subjective appreciation of artwork, and the corollary belief 
that people would not normally buy things that are ugly and/or expensive. Example 
(45) relies on the belief that in principle people of intelligence are able to think and 
look clearly at a variety of subjects, but there is no logical contradiction between being 
                                                 
107 Perhaps there is no real change in meaning, but the salience of the arguments does change: 
with “I love swimming” presented first the Speaker is highlighting their strong appreciation for 
swimming despite their aversion for swimming pools; with “I can’t stand swimming” presented 
initially the Speaker focuses on their aversion of swimming pools. 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
‘intelligent’ and being ‘short-sighted’ (in the figurative sense here, but also in the 
literal one). Finally, example (46) should be a logical contradiction since the sun, at a 
temperature of 5’505°C, is not even remotely close to ever being ‘cold’ – of course, 
here the temperature is that of the speaker’s appreciation of the ambient air rather 
than the sun’s – but then things that are bright – such as a neon light – are not 
necessarily inherently hot. Finally, examples (47) and (48) demonstrate an 
“intensifying” or “additive” usage: in (47) yet could be replaced by even, with the effect 
that the hearer interprets that the rocket’s speed is increasing (perhaps with an 
implicature that this is somehow surprising), and in (48) yet reinforces the expression 
another in such a way that the hearer interprets that a) there were other reasons and 
b) this additional reason given by Mary belies her impatience or exasperation (at 
having to give one more reason). Thus the last two examples, instead of introducing a 
notion of contrast P but Q, add scalar information to the utterances P even Q108.   
To sum up, yet can serve as a contrastive marker when used between two clauses 
or two lexical items – both with the form P yet Q – or as an intensifier, or temporally 
to signify a past of future eventuality often coextensive with the present. In both 
contrastive cases, yet may set up a contrast either directly – between the semantics of 
each term or clause, or indirectly – between implicated meanings, or between a 
semantic meaning and an implicated meaning. In its discursive usages, where yet 
serves to intensify the strength of a proposition, it does so with an implicit sense of 
impatience or exasperation. And finally, in its temporal usages, yet describes a 
temporal relation that is very often accompanied by an implicit sense of expectation. It 
seems plausible that this expectation is what allows one to interpret impatience in the 
discursive usages, and, furthermore, this expectation is frequently a component of its 
argumentative usages of contrast. We have seen that yet is an interesting expression in 
that its usages seem to be rather evenly distributed between temporal ones and non-
temporal ones – it could, from a historical perspective, be considered an expression 
more than halfway through the process of grammaticalization. This is perhaps due to 
it being part of the now/yet pair which in English evolved differently than the German 
nun/jetzt pair. Given its close (etymological) ties with now, perhaps yet could be 
regarded as an indexical as well, at least for its temporal usages (this does not really 
affect its non-descriptive usages either way). The procedure behind yet is rather 
                                                 
108 We will return to the notion of scalarity in section 4.4. when dealing with already and déjà, 
and again in sections 4.5. and 4.8. 
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similar to that of now: a hearer interpreting yet will follow essentially the same type of 
processing. Roughly, its outline procedure would resemble this: 
Yet 
Default reading: aspectual-temporal usages 
Relevant example(s) 
a. E occurred/was true before S and up to and including S  (27) 
b. E was expected to occur before S  (38-39) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that yet 
governs relations between clauses or propositions rather 
than events  
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative: yet establishes a contrast with the 
preceding clause 
P yet Q, where P and Q are propositions  
(42-44) 
b. argumentative: yet establishes a contrast with the item  
P yet Q, where P and Q are clauses, or expressions 
(45-46) 
c. discursive: yet is used as an intensifier, accompanied by a 
comparative expression  
(47) 
d. discursive: yet adds an element (e.g. an argument) to P  (48) 
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4.2.1.2. Contrasting now and yet 
Historically, now (the ‘present’) and yet (‘up to now/the present’) seem like two sides 
of the same coin, as the Germanic jetzt – nun pair suggests. It is therefore no real 
surprise that both the descriptive and non-descriptive usages remain somewhat 
similar in meaning and function. In the above sub-sections we saw that though both 
may be used temporally and non-temporally, the non-descriptive usages for now have 
meanings that are less clearly defined, where now seems quite apt at handling 
discursive situations, but is much less clear-cut in argumentative instances (such as 
contrast). Yet, on the other hand, is more readily usable in argumentative usages, 
where relations of contrast are precise, but seems unable to handle discursive 
relations (like topic switching). This may be because now (like there, also used 
discursively) is a strong indexical, whereas yet is more of a connective, in its current 
state of evolution – though arguably it could also be considered an indexical (if an 
indirect or derived one) since its meaning when used temporally is largely dependent 
upon now. More specifically, if now is situated at the Speech-point, then yet can 
describe an eventuality that is expected or potential – an utterance like “Bob hasn’t 
shown up yet” expresses that a man named Bob is expected by the speaker to be 
present and that this eventuality does not obtain at present. Can now and yet be 
considered opposites, regarding their ability to express expectation? Let us take a 
closer look at this pair by contrasting a few examples: 
(49) Bob is here now. 
(50) Bob is not here now. 
(51) Bob is here yet. 
(52) Bob is not here yet. 
With the first two examples, the speaker is only describing that [Bob, here, now] is 
true (49) or false (50). Example (51) is interesting in that it takes on the meaning of 
still, describing that [Bob, here, now] is true at S and was so beforehand (for an 
indeterminate lapse of time), while (52) makes the claim that [Bob, here, now] is 
untrue at S, but implicates that this situation will be true afterwards (in an 
indeterminate lapse of time). In both cases, there is an implicated sense of expectation 
– in (52) the speaker expects Bob to arrive, while in (51), the speaker is implicating 
that Bob is expected to be leaving; or, put another way, the speaker is implicating that 
Bob’s continued presence is unexpected. When contrasting examples (49-50) with (51-
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52) it is clear that the latter two have this sense of expectation, while the former do 
not. Is this to say that now cannot implicate expectation? Let us compare the 
following two utterances, in reply to a question about Bob’s presence at the 
interlocutors’ location. 
(53) Bob isn’t here now. But I didn't know he was expected. 
(54) Bob isn’t here yet. ?But I didn't know he was expected. 
Example (53) is a bit strange, it would appear that the person saying (54) is expressing 
somewhat contradictory information. With (53) there is no such oddity. But in the 
following two interrogative utterances, an element of expectation does seem to be 
present in both cases: 
(55a) Is Bob here now? 
(55b) Is Bob here yet? 
We observe in the above two examples that, with yet, the implicature that Bob is 
expected is stronger than in the utterance containing now. But, when going back to 
examples (50) and (52) above it seems that the element responsible for this 
expectation is the interrogative form. That is, now is unmarked for expectation, but 
can accommodate this sense in the interrogative; meanwhile yet possesses this 
meaning of expectation regardless of whether we are dealing with an assertion or a 
question. This is no doubt due to the core meanings of each term – now (when 
temporal) refers to the present, while yet refers to a period preceding (leading up to 
now) or succeeding (continuing on after now) the present.  
(56a) They’ve got a ways to go yet. 
(56b) They’ve got a ways to go now.  
What is interesting here is the orientation of the time of the eventuality; in (56a) the 
journey undertaken by the subject ‘they’ began before the moment of speech – and the 
sense is that there is still quite a bit of distance to cover. In (56b) ‘they’, may or may 
not have begun their journey before the moment of speech, but what is highlighted 
here is that there is a current, present (i.e. at S) eventuality which complicates their 
journey. This is the crux of the difference between the two terms in their temporal 
usages – yet describes a time previous to, and going up to S (and possibly continuing 
after S), while now really focuses on S and all that occurs at S and after S – sometimes 
there may be an implicit reference to a time before S, and this can be seen when now 
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is used to contrast the present with the past. Let us now have a look at a few non-
temporal instances of now and yet, where a difference other than the notions of time 
or of expectation appears. 
(57) Al’s an outspoken green activist, yet he owns an SUV. 
(58) ?Al’s an outspoken green activist, now he owns an SUV. 
In example (57), the contrast between P and Q highlighted by yet is straightforward. 
In (58), this idea of contrast is much harder to elicit; though not impossible, the 
hearer must put in more effort to arrive at this interpretation. They could just as easily 
interpret (58) simply as a temporal statement, though the idea that a green activist 
who owns a large gas-guzzling vehicle is hypocritical, or at least weird, comes across. 
 (58’) Al’s an outspoken green activist, now I know for a fact that he owns an SUV. 
When the phrase “I know for a fact” is added, (58’) becomes acceptable, and is easily 
interpreted as introducing a contrast (while adding the phrase to (57) yields no 
palpable change). Interestingly, with yet the contrast also carries an overtone of 
criticism – by the speaker’s exposing Al’s contradictory behavior. But with (58’), the 
critique seems less accessible, almost as if the speaker is merely pointing out two facts 
about Al – a juxtaposition of two co-existing facts. In this case the speaker does not 
make explicit the critique, they merely suggest it. A similar interpretation can be 
obtained using meanwhile: 
  (58’’) Al’s an outspoken green activist, meanwhile he owns an SUV. 
No doubt both now and meanwhile shift the focus onto two temporally simultaneous 
eventualities, and let the hearer interpret the contradiction, without the speaker 
overtly endorsing it. Example (58’’) would be quite strange with the phrase “I know for 
a fact” – perhaps due to its temporal component. On another note, we have also seen 
that now can be used in some cases as a topic-switcher, and it appears that, in 
identical utterance contexts, yet is less capable of doing so: 
(59) We have seen that traditional eye surgery can, if done at the outset of a visual 
problem, greatly improve visual acuity. Now laser techniques, on the other hand, 
need not be undertaken so soon, though of course… 
(60) (…) ?Yet laser techniques, on the other hand, need not be undertaken so soon, 
though of course… 
In (59), any residual temporality of now is perceived as a time during the utterance (a 
speech at an ophthalmologists’ conference), but what is more interesting is the use of 
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now here to change the topic (or sub-topic) from traditional surgery to laser surgery. 
With (60) though the utterance is not incorrect per se, it does come across as subpar, 
probably because, again, with yet there is a notion of expectation not present in now – 
for instance, that laser techniques are the expected means of performing this surgery – 
which would make such a presentation irrelevant; in addition, the phrase “on the 
other hand” carries a sense of contrast, and this, added to the notion of contrast 
inherent in yet, makes the utterance redundant (lowering the overall relevance even 
more). With (59) there is no such problem since “contrast” is not so explicit in now. 
Furthermore, were (60) not redundant, the understanding of yet in this case would 
not be a change of topic, but rather an outright opposition or contrast. Therefore, yet, 
in this case would keep the hearers’ attention on the previous utterance (on traditional 
surgery) for a certain continuity leading the hearers to consider the second utterance, 
in direct relation (i.e. in contrast) to the preceding one. This is not to say that now in 
(59) eliminates continuity completely, but it is not the same type of continuity: now 
marks a switch in gears, indicating a change between the preceding state and the 
succeeding state, while yet holds the preceding utterance in the hearers’ minds. 
Overall, these two expressions are not polar opposites, nor are they 
synonymous. Though they may have descriptive and interpretive usages that seem 
quite close in meaning, there is always a nuance which makes there usages distinct, 
and disallows any straightforward substitution without some loss of meaning. 
Temporally they are more distinct, but with the contrastive usages they differ 
significantly with regards to relevance: unlike with now, interpreting a contrast which 
yet introduces requires little inference to retrieve the relation between clauses or 
lexical items. This is not to say that there is no inference at all in this case, just that for 
now more effort is required to process the contrast, counterbalanced by the greater 
payoff. When yet is used temporally it may be used in place of again, still. When it is 
used non-temporally it may introduce contrast close to the contrast we that can be 
found in but, even, however, nevertheless, still, though109. 
  
                                                 
109 These multiple uses of yet can be intuitively explained by the fact most (if not all) of these 
terms encode the idea of ‘contrast’ albeit with varying nuances. 
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4.2.2. Maintenant 
Much has been said about the French present-time indexical maintenant, proposing a 
variety of ways to look at this term110. We will of course look at maintenant in the 
same light as we did now in section 4.2.1., and propose a relatively similar analysis. 
The temporal and non-temporal usages of maintenant are not too dissimilar from 
those of now (and, to a lesser extent, yet) – one difference being that maintenant 
covers usages that are distributed over the two English expressions. In French, some 
scholars have proposed that maintenant, when used in such ways, can be considered 
distinct lexical items – maintenant1 and maintenant2, for instance (Nef 1973; Zénone 
1981) – each with their own usage. As has been stated previously, this is not the 
approach adopted here, and we will not retain this distinction, preferring instead to 
view the different usages of maintenant as contextually motivated pragmatic 
enrichment of some sort. Let us have a look at two classic examples taken from the 
literature (for instance, Nef 1973), such as the following: 
(61) Ils se voient souvent. Maintenant, on ne sait pas s’ils sont amants. 
(62) Bien sûr, t’es majeur. Maintenant, moi, je t’interdis de le faire. 
These two examples are clearly non-descriptive and demonstrate an argumentative 
and a discursive usage of maintenant (respectively). There is no real justification for 
deciding that these instances of maintenant be labeled ‘2’ or ‘3’ (as opposed to 
maintenant1, the normal, or default, temporal usage); it is equally, if not more, 
plausible that these non-descriptive usages are just contextually dependent variations 
of meaning of one and the same expression. More importantly, much like English now 
(or yet), these two types of non-temporal usage also seem to function the way they do 
because of an underlying notion of contrast.  
( 61’) Ils se voient souvent. Mais on ne sait pas s’ils sont amants. 
( 62’) Bien sûr, t’es majeur. Mais moi, je t’interdis de le faire. 
As is apparent above, maintenant is easily commutable with mais (‘but’), though of 
course there is a loss of some of the meaning carried by non-descriptive maintenant 
(as was the case with now or yet). Interestingly, one could also substitute maintenant 
with à present (‘presently’) a decidedly temporal expression, also with some loss of 
                                                 
110 Notably Nef (1973), Zénone (1981), Frankel (1989), and more recently Saussure (2011). 
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meaning111. This temporal reading of maintenant inherently contains an element of 
contrast, simply by the fact that what is (temporally) present, cannot also be the past 
or the future simultaneously (akin to was said of now in the previous subsection). A 
few other temporal usages include: 
(63) Je sors faire des courses maintenant. 
(64) Le président, maintenant septuagénaire, était l’instigateur de nombreuses réformes 
nécessaires dans les décennies précédentes.  
(65) Ferme la porte maintenant! 
Whereas each of these usages is temporal, each one carries a particular additional 
sense or nuance. Example (63) denotes that the action described is taking place in the 
present moment of speech112. Meanwhile (64) refers to the current state of affairs, i.e. 
the president’s age, and highlights the lapse of time when the actions (reforms) 
undertaken occurred, that is, decades earlier, when the president was not yet in his 
seventies. As for (65), this utterance describes, thanks in part to the imperative tense 
and accentuation (exclamation mark in its written form), that the action should occur 
immediately. So, as with now, maintenant can describe several temporal relations, 
depending upon the context. 
In contexts where it is salient for the hearer that referring to time is not what the 
speaker means, maintenant can take on argumentative or discursive usages such as 
(61) and (62) above.  
(66) C’est ce que je pense, maintenant tu fais comme tu veux. 
(67) Il est sorti il y a une heure, maintenant peut-être qu’il s’est perdu en chemin. 
(68) C’est vrai que Jean est bon en maths, maintenant Marie, non seulement elle bonne 
en maths, mais en plus elle explique très clairement les choses. 
(69) Al est un fervent écologiste, maintenant il conduit une voiture de sport.  
Example (66) expresses a novel consideration of a state of affairs (after an assertion), 
where maintenant is easily commutable with mais or, even better, mais bon. The 
utterance in (67) is quite similar to (66) but is less of a discursive usage – mais bon 
does not fit this utterance as easily – and instead seems more of an argumentative 
usage. Example (68) does not function as a tropic-switching marker, but rather as a 
focalizer, retaining the same topic (choosing a suitable tutor to teach math), but 
                                                 
111 With en ce moment (‘at this time’) however, the substitution does not  work this way, probably 
because the locution is more strongly temporal. 
112 This example follows the same logic as example (30), with now, in section 4.2.1.1. 
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drawing all the attention on a specific agent, here Marie, who (in the speaker’s 
opinion) is better qualified. Given below is the outline procedure for maintenant, 
altogether not that far from what was proposed for now (and yet) above: 
Maintenant  
Default reading: temporal egocentric indexicality: Relevant example(s) 
If maintenant is used descriptively, it can be used to express 
one of several following temporal relations: 
 
a. temporal specification: the eventuality is anchored in the 
present, or the focus on the present is highly relevant  
(63) 
b. a new relevant description of a state of affairs (change as 
perceived or inferred by the speaker)  
(64) 
c. with a strong intonation, maintenant can express 
immediacy  
(65) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
maintenant governs relations between clauses or 
propositions rather than events 
 
Maintenant allows non-temporal usages (change of relevant 
topic) – P maintenant Q structure 
 
a. argumentative usage: maintenant leads to infer a contrast 
with what precedes it  
(61-62) 
b. argumentative/discursive usage: maintenant expresses a 
new consideration of a state of affairs  
(66-67) 
c. discursive usage: focus on a specific topic (or agent), often 
sentence-initial  
(68-69) 
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Similarities/Differences 
It seems that the argumentative usages of French maintenant are principally found in 
English yet, rather than in now; but by no means does this exclude the possibility of 
using now in this manner. Discursive usages of maintenant, on the other hand, are 
more easily rendered by now. Interestingly, there is another expression – cependant – 
which is often a close approximation of non-temporal yet, particularly to express the 
contrastive sense. While the temporal usage of cependant is closer to temporal now or 
maintenant, with the meaning of meanwhile, originally the term was used to express 
simultaneity but evolved over the years to arrive at the now commonly used and 
understood non-temporal contrastive usage113. It would appear that cependant and 
yet share a similar evolution from strongly (even exclusive) temporal meanings to 
their current non-temporal meanings. In addition, when cependant and yet are used 
temporally, they tend to be in formal or antiquated utterances, suggesting that their 
default meaning has shifted from temporal to argumentative/discursive. Furthermore, 
yet is a very versatile expression: it can be translated by either déjà – Est-ce qu’on est 
déjà arrivé? (ex. 38) – or encore – Bob est encore là. (ex. 51) – when used temporally; 
often cependant will be a good choice for argumentative (contrastive) usages (ex. 44); 
finally, it can be translated by encore again, but this time for discursive usages (ex. 
48). Correspondingly, now and maintenant share many if not most temporal usages 
and a non-descriptive one or two; those non-descriptive usages covered by 
maintenant but not by now are handled by yet. We will draw upon the assumption 
that a procedure for now and maintenant (and even ahora in Spanish or jetszt/nun in 
German) would be quite similar. Any differences between them would quite likely 
amount to an unrealized (but potential) usage. When looking over the examples from 
the two preceding subsections, it should be clear that now and maintenant do indeed 
share many features; there is no doubt of the equivalence of their temporal readings, 
and even the non-temporal ones find echo in each other (with the nuances mentioned 
previously).  
                                                 
113 Source for the etymology of cependant: http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/cependant 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 4.2.3. Then 
Randy: What a jerk! You should report that guy to the manager. 
Earl: He is the manager. 
Randy: Oh, then he already knows… - from Earl “O Karma, where art thou?” 
episode, 12.01.06  
In section 4.2.1, we looked at now and yet as a pair, but now could also be paired up 
with then; this pairing is just as viable: together now and then form the principal 
temporal proximal/distal pair of expressions (in French, maintenant could be paired 
up with alors). As the primary deictic counterpart to now, then picks out a time other 
than the present, either previous or subsequent to the time referred to – unlike yet 
however, then cannot be coextensive with the present, it lacks the aspectual element 
yet possesses. From this perspective, then is measured in relation to an explicit or 
implicit now – where there’s a now, there was or will be a then.  
Roughly, then can be understood as meaning “a time other than the present” or, 
more simply, “not-now”. Additionally, it is less controversial to talk of then used non-
temporally than it is for now, perhaps because the most well-known non-temporal 
usages of the expression are well-documented – and are arguably just as “standard” as 
the temporal readings. This is probably due to the long-standing use of then in logic 
and mathematic formulae. When used in this way, then signals a consequence, as in a 
deduction, i.e. P then Q. But we will see that then in fact has several temporal and 
non-temporal usages, as the examples below illustrate: 
(70) Life was much easier then. / Life will be much easier then114.     
(71) Turn the dial, then push the button.   
(72) First comes the president, then the vice-president, then…     
(73) A: Mary says the movie starts at eight. B: Then we should get going.  
(74) If you’re feeling sick then you shouldn’t ride the rollercoaster.   
The first example demonstrates the use of then to situate a state of affairs in the past 
or future, and so remains clearly temporal; we notice the utterance with future 
reference seems to be somewhat dependent upon some unspecified condition, but this 
may be more because of the future aspect rather than being due to then itself.  
                                                 
114 There is also the case where then is used as an adjective, roughly meaning past, which is simply 
an outgrowth of the standard temporal adverbial usage (e.g. The then President of the USA). 
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(70’) Life was much easier in the past. / Life will be much easier in the future.   
Example (70’) confirms the temporal quality of then in such cases; it would be difficult 
to substitute then with a different term – besides yesterday or tomorrow with an 
enlarged scope where each term encompasses (much) more than a single day. 
Example (71) is a clear instance of temporal ordering – one action must occur before 
the other – but begins drifting towards something else, namely, causal ordering.  
(71) Turn the dial, then push the button.   
(71’) Turn the dial, after (you’ve done) that push the button.  
As (71’) illustrates then still retains an element of temporality, but it also contains an 
element of what we can call seriality. The order here is temporal, in that one must 
(according to the instructions) first turn the dial, before pushing the button. Then thus 
introduces a subsequence, that is, Q must be done after P. 
(71’’) ??Turn the dial, but before (doing) that push the button. 
An utterance like (71’’) would not capture the same meaning as then (and would be far 
from optimally relevant in itself, especially in a set of instructions), not because the 
element of seriality disappears, but rather because of an additional component carried 
by then: a focus on the subsequent clause. Indeed, in usages of this type – P then Q – 
it is Q which is deemed more relevant to the information conveyed in such utterances. 
This focus also appears in another type of non-temporal usage, such as ‘deductive’ 
then. But with example (72) then seems to do the opposite: 
(72) First comes the president, then the vice-president, then…   
In this utterance, then does not put the focus on Q, nor does it focus on P; in this case, 
then is used simply to indicate succession in a series or list of objects. Example (73) 
below is non-temporal, with then marking a deduction or an inference on behalf of 
speaker B; though it could be argued that a small element of temporality remains in 
this instance, it is only of secondary importance, and due more to other contextual 
elements.  
(73)  A: Mary says the movie starts at eight. B: Then we should get going.  
(73’) A: Mary says the movie starts at eight. B: In that case we should get going. 
In both (73) and (73’), speaker B with then or in that case highlights, or focuses on the 
action of going to the movie. It is an example of inference or deduction, though 
perhaps less strongly so than (74): 
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 (74) If you’re feeling sick then you shouldn’t ride the roller coaster. 
This example is a more formulaic version of the previous one, with if and then clearly 
marking the deduction of a practical consequence, which is derived from the first 
clause (the antecedent, introduced in this case by if), and here temporality is 
completely absent, as far as the utterance’s primary (i.e. optimally relevant) meaning 
goes. It becomes apparent that there are, with argumentative usages of then, two types 
of consecution: 1. simple succession, of a sequential type (example 72) and 2. 
consecution as a logical relation, of the type P connective Q where P is the antecedent 
or the premise and Q the consequent or result (73-74). It seems that even in its 
discursive usages then conveys this notion, though to a lesser degree: 
(75) Then it hit me. 
(76) Then come on over, neighbor! 
(77) Fine. Then it’s settled.  
(78) Whip for about a minute, then gradually stir in the eggs and milk. 
(79) Well okay then. 
All of the above examples display some type of consecution, with the exception of (79), 
where then seems purely discursive (note however that this utterance still displays 
that the speaker has made an inference of some type). Examples (75-76) contain type 1 
consecution, and (77-78) type 2. In all but the temporal usages, then clearly shows its 
consecutive nature. Recall that in these cases, the (semantic) relation of PQ is the 
most relevant one, since the non-descriptive – argumentative or discursive, and not 
principally temporal – usages of then are, in these contexts, the most salient ones.  A 
tentative procedure for then would look somewhat like this: 
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Then 
Default reading: temporal indexicality of non-present time: Relevant example(s) 
a. reference to a time situated in the past or the future  (70) 
b. temporal succession – P then Q, or (P) then Q  (71, 75, 78) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that then 
governs relations between clauses or propositions rather 
than events 
 
non-temporal usages: non-temporal succession (a, b)  
a. serial usage: P then Q (then R etc.) where P and Q can be 
expressions, clauses or propositions 
(72) [(71)] 
b. argumentative usage: causal order, then causally links 
the antecedent to the main clause  
(73-74) 
c. discursive usage: “in that case”, “according to X”, can be 
used as a hedge  
(76, 77, 79) 
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4.2.4. Alors 
It is common knowledge that in French alors can serve several functions. These 
functions or usages have been amply discussed by semanticists and pragmatists, 
though without reaching a consensus. Indeed, several researchers have proposed 
explanations for the usages of alors, often complex and sophisticated, and end up 
multiplying the rules and exceptions that seem to govern this expression. Their 
observations and intuitions remain valid, however a precise element is missing, and it 
is that alors is a procedural expression. Thus we propose that what can best explain 
the function of alors, is a slightly modified semantic base for this expression. 
Argumentative usages include expressing a consequence or highlighting an alternative 
perspective. Discursive usages include linking narrative elements in a conversation, 
starting a conversation or feelings of surprise or impatience. 
A number of authors (e.g. Ducrot (1972), Zénone (1982), Frankel (1986), Jayez 
(1988), Rossari & Jayez (1997), Rossari (2002), Mosegaard-Hansen (1997, 2002)) 
have proposed detailed analyses of alors, and propose between 2 and 4 different 
usages. For our purposes here, we will count three (given in a non-hierarchical order): 
1. a temporal usage (referring to a time other than the present), 2. an argumentative 
usage (consecutive relation between P and Q), and 3. a discursive usage (all other 
usages)115 116. The following examples are representative of these usages: 
(80) Je sortais de chez moi l’autre soir, j’ai vu alors une étoile filante. 
(81)  Sa voiture n’est pas là, alors il doit être parti… 
(82) Alors, tu viens? 
(83) Et alors?! 
Example (80) straightforwardly refers back to a past event “the other night”. Here 
alors the hearer will most likely not interpret a relation of consecution – though the 
speaker did in fact go out before seeing the meteorite, they could have seen it from a 
window, or he could have gone out and not seen it – in other words, the fact that the 
                                                 
115 Mosegaard-Hansen (1997: 172-184) counts four usages, the temporal one (although very rare 
in her corpora) and three others: alors as marking 1. Reorientation of topic, 2. foregrounding 
particle and 3. a result/consequence usage. We think the discursive usage neatly regroups both 
topic-switching and foregrounding, and the resultative usage is our argumentative usage. 
116 Italian allora also has several non-temporal usages as in “hypothetical if-then constructions 
(…) an inferential marker (…) an interaction structuring marker” (Bazzanella & Miecznikowski 
2009: 111-112). 
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speaker went outside does not imply that he saw the shooting star, and his going out is 
not a necessary condition for the meteorological phenomenon. Example (81) expresses 
the deduction that since someone’s car is not in the parking lot, that person is (most 
likely) not in the vicinity. Example (82) is a common conversational expression of 
impatience, the speaker here is waiting on the addressee to go somewhere. And (83) is 
best rendered as ‘so what?’ in English, and expresses defiance or at the least 
disagreement with something said previously (by another speaker, or the same 
speaker in a previous instance).  
We shall now turn to other approaches to salvage relevant observations useful 
for our analyses, modifying them where necessary and rejecting that which we 
consider inadequate for a procedural understanding of alors. We have seen that, for 
several authors, alors has several usages; the number varies according to the study or 
approach but we will retain/conserve three usages here (in no particular order): 1. a 
temporal usage (not necessarily the default usage), 2. an argumentative usage (a 
relation of cause and consequence between P and Q) and 3. a discursive usage (we 
regroup herein a few similar usages, functions which are neither principally temporal 
or principally argumentative). 
Some authors associate alors with a temporal element in all its uses (for instance 
Jayez 1988), but we argue that if there is a temporal element in argumentative and 
discursive usages this is not because of alors’s inherent meaning. We propose rather 
that the notion of consecution is specific to the argumentative usage but not to the 
other two. When alors is temporal as in the example below: 
(84) C’est alors que je l’ai vu. 
where alors is equivalent to ‘at that time’, there is no causal consecution, since the 
function here (and in other similar contexts) is to focus the hearer’s attention on a 
precise/particular moment; such a moment is thus made (more) salient. Of course, 
there are two types of consecution at work here: 1. consecution as simple succession, 
of a sequential type and 2. consecution as a logical relation, of the type P connective Q 
where P is the antecedent or the premise and Q the consequent or result. Perhaps the 
problem resides in the fact that consecution is a relation of logical implication and that 
alors in certain cases introduces a relation of implicature. Since temporal expressions 
share with other pragmatic markers the capacity to relate discursive elements to each 
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other, sometimes by directly guiding, sometimes merely suggesting to the hearer 
which course to take, it should come as no surprise that alors (and the other 
expressions treated here) function this way.  It is however interesting to note that it 
can handle both temporal and logical consecution, whereas other terms cannot (donc).  
In the following examples, where does the consecution (in the second sense) 
originate? It comes from alors, there where the hearer cannot interpret a consecution 
without this connective: 
(85)  La voiture de Jean n’est pas là. Alors il n’est pas chez lui. 
The above utterance can be interpreted as “I am hereby presenting you with the result 
of my reasoning”. 
(85’) La voiture de Jean n’est pas là. Il n’est pas chez lui. 
In this utterance we could interpret the speaker as meaning “I am presenting you with 
the fact that Jean isn’t home” which allows one the possibility of inferring the 
speaker’s reasoning. We can see with these examples that the antecedent serves as the 
premise for the proposition “he isn’t home”, in other words, there is consecution (Q is 
the consequence of P) in utterances both with and without alors. Can we conclude 
then that consequential relations can occur without alors (or donc or other like 
terms)? If we say yes, this leads us to the idea that alors is not in fact necessary in 
these cases. So, which is it? Compare still two more example pairs below: 
(86)  Jean sortit un pistolet, alors il tira sur Paul. 
(86’) Jean sortit un pistolet, il tira sur Paul. 
(87)  Peter est anglais, alors il est courageux. [example taken from Moeschler 2002] 
(87’) Peter est anglais. Il est courageux. 
The second example of this last pair is somewhat problematic: here consecution is not 
so easily inferable without alors, therefore alors is required in this case for the speaker 
to communicate the link they wish to establish between [being English] and [being 
brave] in the most cost effective way. Furthermore, in (87’) one just as easily 
interprets the consecution either way: P  Q or Q  P. Thus, alors is a necessary 
connective in some cases – and in these cases the role of alors is to directly guide the 
hearer to the correct path of inference. In the other cases, where alors is not absolutely 
necessary, it serves to minimize processing effort when processing the direction of 
cause-consequence is too costly (thereby making the utterance more relevant). 
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 In the French literature117 on alors there is frequent comparison to donc, which 
is a former temporal expression, now restricted to a marker of explicit consecution. 
We will not make an attempt at an exhaustive comparison here, and instead focus on 
the implicit vs explicit marking of consecution. The below examples highlight the 
more restricted contexts imposed on donc compared to alors:  
(86’’) ?Jean sortit un pistolet, et donc il tira sur Paul. 
(87’’)  Peter est anglais, donc il est courageux. 
In the first example (86’’) “et” was needed to make the utterance more easily 
interpretable, without the “et”, (86’’) would have been a costly utterance to interpret. 
Moreover, donc, an otherwise non-temporal expression (in contemporary French), 
yields a temporal reading in this case, akin to et après or ensuite, with but a minimal 
element of consecution. In (87’’) donc conveys an interpretation similar to (87), with 
one notable difference – the inference that Peter is brave because he is English is 
presented more objectively than with alors. Zénone for instance gives two criteria for 
subjective interpretations (possible with alors, but not with donc), paraphrased here: 
1. there must be an enunciator (not necessarily the speaker) who endorses the 
consequence and 2. alors does not attest the veracity of its antecedent(s); it does not 
take this into account since the enunciator endorses the consecution and thus it is true 
for the enunciator (1982: 134-135, my translation). Presumably, for donc, there need 
be no enunciator, and the veracity of the antecedents must be known. Rossari & Jayez 
(1997: 254-259) discuss the level of (epistemic) commitment alors and donc (and 
other causal connectives) may have in various contexts; briefly resumed the idea is 
that alors marks a greater degree of epistemicity than donc, i.e. it is more subjective as 
a marker of consecution. Still other researchers (most notably Mosegaard-Hansen 
1997, 1998a) highlight this subjective/objective distinction between the two terms; our 
own observations of the non-temporal usages possible with alors also point in this 
direction.   
Within the framework of procedural pragmatics “le rôle du connecteur, par 
l’intermédiaire des instructions qui lui sont rattachées, est d’amener l’interprète à 
opérer un lien entre les deux propositions et à constituer ainsi un contexte dans lequel 
l’énoncé complet sera pertinent” (Luscher, 1994: 191). We suggest that it is not always 
                                                 
117 See for instance Zénone (1982), Franckel (1986/1987), Gerecht (1987), Jayez (1988), Rossari & 
Jayez (1997), Mosegaard-Hansen (1997), Moeschler (2002). 
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necessary for the hearer to have alors be present for them to infer a relation of 
consecution, since their mind can, with some effort, infer such a relation on its own. 
However, we propose that alors facilitates this type of inference, and, in so doing, 
makes the utterance more relevant, since the hearer need supply less effort to obtain a 
similar result. In this case, there is no need for the hearer to guess whether the 
speaker’s intention was to communicate that Q is a consequence of P, the speaker 
points this out clearly, by using a connective that contains the appropriate instruction.  
Above we evoked the idea that alors could make a context more salient and 
relevant, and the “subjectivization” effect is an example of this phenomenon. Thus 
alors’s explanatory value takes on both an internal and an external dimension with 
regards to the relations between P and Q that it allows the hearer to interpret. The 
value is ‘external’ in the sense that alors sets up a relation between states of affairs; it 
is internal in that the speaker’s subjective reasoning and perspective is responsible for 
the establishment of these relations. To sum up, there is but one alors, a procedural 
one, which is interpreted with different values according to the interpretive path 
selected by its procedure in context.  
Alors 
Default reading: temporal indexicality of a non-present 
time: 
Relevant example(s) 
a. a new relevant description of a state of affairs (change 
as perceived or inferred by the speaker) 
(86) 
b. a new relevant interpretation of a  state of affairs (84) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
alors governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative usage: alors causally links the 
antecedent to the main clause, via subjectively-motivated 
inference 
(81), (85), (87) 
b. discursive/expressive usage: marking the speaker’s 
attitude – expressing impatience, defiance 
(82-83) 
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Similarities/Differences 
It would appear that the differences between then and alors are superficial. The 
French equivalent of English then, alors, appears to function in a way quite similar to 
its English counterpart both descriptively and non-descriptively; though the temporal 
references may diverge slightly, both terms pick out a time before or after the present. 
Both then and alors can be construed as expressing, in their temporal forms, “a time 
or moment other than the present, in the past or the future” or, to put it very briefly, 
‘not-now’.  Non-temporal usages of alors also closely resemble English then – both 
argumentative and discursive usages can be found with alors. A notable difference in 
the argumentative usage that marks a logical deduction can be seen below: 
(88)  Peter est anglais, alors il est courageux. 
(89) ?Peter is English, then he is brave. 
(90)  Peter is English, therefore he is brave. 
Where (89) is strange, suggesting that then is somewhat more restricted than alors in 
such contexts. Interestingly, if the utterance in (89) above were tweaked so as to be an 
“if…then” clause, the oddness disappears: 
(89’) If Peter is English, then he is brave. 
Additionally, if the utterance were split into two, spoken by two different 
interlocutors, the deductive relation is also possible: 
(89’’) A: Peter is English. 
B: Then he is brave. 
Why exactly this is the case for then and not so for alors is something of a curiosity 
(with alors the utterances are just as interpretable if used in an “if-then” clause, or 
split into two statements by two speakers). A plausible explanation is that alors is 
farther along the grammaticalization path than then, where more specific contexts are 
required to obtain the relevant interpretations (in this case, then resembles donc with 
regards to restricted contexts of appearance).  
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4.2.5. Already 
“Where are the bagels? Did the skinheads eat all the bagels already?”                                              
- Celebrity (1998, Woody Allen) 
The expression already is a temporal and aspectual adverb used to express a variety of 
meanings, from temporal precedence to attitudinal exasperation. The above quote 
contains a standard temporal usage of already, namely one that questions whether a 
state of affairs was the case previous to the speaker’s utterance. But this same 
utterance also carries another, implicit, sense, partly responsible for the humorous 
effect. This other usage, that of “surprising” already, is what creates the irony of the 
situation given the elements. The following examples broadly illustrate the possible 
interpretations already can have: 
(91) I’ve already seen this movie. 
(92) It’s already four o’clock.  
(93) No need to add sugar to strawberries, they’re already sweet. [example taken from    
Michaelis 1996] 
(94) Eight dollars is already a lot of money for a movie ticket.  
(95) Alright already! / Enough already! / Tell us already!  
In (91) we can see that what is being communicated is simply that the eventuality 
referred to [I, see, movie] was the case at a time previous to T0, with no other easily 
interpretable sense. With example (92) already expresses that the state of affairs – the 
actual time – is currently the case, and furthermore (92) also clearly carries an added 
attitudinal element: surprise, or even exasperation, with the proper intonation. The 
surprise stems from the fact that the speaker of (92) did not expect for the time to be 
four o’clock so soon. In example (93) the element of precedence is of a different 
nature, namely that the sweetness of strawberries is an inherent quality of the fruit, it 
is used argumentatively to persuade the hearer that more sugar is needless. 
Temporality still appears to function in (93), though on a very different level; clearly 
the fact that strawberries are naturally sweet holds at a time previous to the utterance, 
but this previous state of affairs is of a different scale than the one in (91). Example 
(94) is yet another type of usage where temporality is not the primary concern, it is 
even less present than in the previous example.  
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What is occurring here is that already is used to describe a state of affairs against 
the backdrop of a scale of values – in this particular case the price of movie tickets is 
placed along a scale going from ‘inexpensive’ to ‘expensive’ (arguably from ‘free’ to 
‘way too much’).  The utterances in (95) are all discursive usages, which clearly mark 
that the speaker is agitated in some way – for instance, impatience or exasperation. 
Again, the three short utterances in (95) still retain a tenuous temporality, in that the 
exasperation felt and communicated by the speaker was prompted by an eventuality 
that preceded the communicated emotion. However, this clearly is not what is most 
strongly communicated with such utterances. 
To sum up, example (91) corresponds to the basic temporal usage; in such 
utterances the primary informative intention is aspectual (temporal), that is, the 
speaker aims to communicate the eventuality described by the proposition P has a 
specific aspectual value that it is relevant to communicate. This usage could be called 
the “chronological” usage, simply because it signals the focus of P according to a 
temporal logic. Utterances like (92) are instances of “precocious” already which 
remain a usage where the aspect or the time is still quite present; the only criteria that 
distinguishes this use from the preceding one is precisely the idea of precocity that a 
hearer may interpret from such an utterance. An utterance like (93) can be considered 
an argumentative usage of already, where the focus is on an (often inherent) aspect or 
quality that pre-exists the current state of affairs. The speaker appeals to reason by 
pointing out such qualities, and this helps in arguing for a specific point (often to 
persuade the hearer of something). The type of proposition expressed by utterances 
like (94) carries an element of “scalarity”. What is meant by the “scalar” usage is the 
idea that already is used in some cases to express that an eventuality is to be 
evaluated along a scale. It should be noted that in fact already is inherently scalar in 
its temporal usages as well – so that even in the chronological or precocity usages, 
already carries a scalar element. This is visible in its temporal usages (91-92) where 
the speaker is saying that the eventuality described occurred earlier than the moment 
of speech, and also earlier than expected by some relevant interlocutor. The timescale 
can be schematized as earlier than – present / relevant point in time – later than, 
where both earlier and later can both be further broken down into smaller degrees118. 
Finally example (95) is illustrative of the “purely” discursive usage of already; such 
                                                 
118 This harks back to McTaggart’s B-series of time. 
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usages are relatively fixed, and mainly serve the purpose of expressing the speaker’s 
attitude or emotion about an eventuality. Below is an approximate procedure for 
already: 
Already 
Default reading: temporal (aspectual) usages: Relevant example(s) 
a. reference to an eventuality previous to the time of 
utterance 
(91) 
b. reference to an eventuality previous to the time of 
utterance, with focus on the precocity of its occurrence  
(92) 
If not relevant (enough)  
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
already governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
a. argumentative usage: already focuses on a preexistent 
quality of an object (thing, person, activity etc.)  
(93) 
b. scalar usage: already functions so as to expand a scale or 
degree to include an element no initially considered a part of 
the scale  
(94) 
c. discursive (expressive) usage: marks the speaker’s attitude 
–  expresses impatience, exasperation  
(95) 
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4.2.6. Déjà 
The French equivalent of already, déjà, functions quite similarly, though déjà has two 
particular usages not found with English already (which we will describe in more 
detail in subsection 4.4.3). As the French counterpart to the English aspectual adverb, 
déjà naturally is at work in similar contexts and can be used to signal a temporal 
relation, like in (96) and (97) below:  
(96) a. Paul vit déjà en Espagne. 
b. Paul a déjà vécu en Espagne. 
(97) a. Paul part déjà. 
b. Paul est déjà parti. 
In both (96) and (97) déjà unambiguously refers to a temporal relation, whether it 
refers to the present (96a & 97a) or the past (96b & 97b). For the utterances in (97), an 
element of surprise is also present, and this is especially obvious with an additional 
contextual indication, such as an interrogative intonation. Like its English counterpart 
already, déjà is often used to signify something else, something non-temporal, as in 
the following examples (98)-(101). We will analyze each of these examples one by one 
and bring out their similarities and differences: 
(98)  Mes parents aiment la Floride : déjà, c’est au bord de la mer et la vie n’est pas 
chère…  
(99) A : M’man, m’man, j’peux aller faire du vélo ? B : Mange déjà ta soupe.  
(100) a. Un Kub Or c’est déjà de la cuisine.  
b. C’est déjà pas mal.  
(101) a. C ’est quoi son nom déjà ?  
b. C’est déjà quoi son nom ?  
In a decreasingly temporal order, the usages these utterances exemplify are: the 
chronological usage (96), the precocity usage (97), the argumentative usage (98-99), 
the scalar usage (100) and what could be called the reminder usage (101).  
The chronological usage corresponds to the most “pure” temporal usage; in such 
utterances the primary informative intention is aspect-temporal, that is, the speaker 
aims to communicate that the process (event) described by the proposition P has a 
specific aspect-temporal value that is relevant to communicate. We called it 
“chronological” simply because it signals the focus of P in a temporal logic. We can 
thus rewrite it this way: P is true / has occurred at least once before the moment of 
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speech. Example (96) above is quite typical of this: “I already live in Spain.” Is 
equivalent to saying [live, Spain] is true of the speaker before the moment of speech. 
Without already/déjà, the utterance “I live in Spain” would simply be understood as 
stating that [Paul, live, Spain] is true in the present and gives no indication as to when 
this eventuality actually commenced. With already/déjà one understands that [Paul, 
live, Spain] is an established fact (for the speaker at least).  
The precocity usage of déjà remains one where the aspect or the time are still 
quite present; the only criteria that distinguishes this use from the preceding one is 
precisely the idea of precocity that a hearer may interpret from such an utterance. We 
define this usage as follows: P is true / occurred before or at the moment of speech 
and sooner than expected (by either party, or both). Example (97) “Paul is already 
leaving. [Paul is leaving already]” means that [Paul, leave] is true at S or [Paul, be 
gone] is true before S, which would also be the case for the utterances that do not 
contain already. However, the very presence of already activates an implicature, that 
of the precocity of proposition P. And when these utterances do not contain déjà the 
implicature is absent (or at least much costlier to process), and this usage remains an 
aspectual-temporal one given that the implicature that P is precocious is measured 
temporally. 
The argumentative usages (98) and (99) both make use of déjà’s aspectual-
temporal component of previousness to introduce propositions that have a distinctly 
argumentative purpose. In (98) déjà could be replaced with premièrement (‘first of 
all’) with almost no change in meaning. While in (99), déjà would more aptly be 
substituted by pour commencer (‘to start’). 
(98)  Mes parents aiment la Floride : déjà, c’est au bord de la mer et la vie n’est pas 
chère…  
(99) A : M’man, m’man, j’peux aller faire du vélo ? B : Mange déjà ta soupe.  
Both these examples (and similar utterances) basically add strength to the speaker’s 
arguments, either by establishing that the proposition déjà has scope over is an 
important point (98), or else a required (without being a necessary entailment) pre-
condition (99) for subsequent action. 
The scalar usage of these terms was our starting point for their study, and the 
idea that already is inherently scalar (in all its usages) stems from our observations of 
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this non-temporal usage. This particular usage has been described as the “comparative 
use” Mosegaard-Hansen (2000: 165-66) or of “relative degree” (Tahara, 2004: 310). 
The term scalar is more adequate since the idea that this usage “compares” objects or 
classes of objects is insufficiently descriptive of what is actually going on. And, though 
there is of course a notion of degree in scalarity, Tahara’s “relative degree” stops short 
of actually describing a scale on which eventualities may be measured (temporally or 
no). We define this scalar usage as follows: P is reevaluated upward, by lowering the 
lower/inferior limit of a set to include P. The utterances in (100) perfectly illustrates 
this principle: 
(100) a. Un Kub Or c’est déjà de la cuisine.  
b. C’est déjà pas mal.  
the value of déjà here is completely non-temporal and gives the speaker’s assessment 
of what can be considered true cuisine (100a) and, more vaguely, that an eventuality is 
better (or worse, in other circumstances) than initially thought by the speaker, the 
hearer, or both (100b). But this reevaluation is constrained by that which constitutes 
the norm, according to the interlocutors, for the given state of affairs (encyclopedic & 
contextual knowledge); this is why we claim that what déjà does is in fact expand the 
lower limit of a set, until the object in question is included in it.  
Mosegaard-Hansen’s explanation that the hearer achieves the value intended by 
the speaker by mentally browsing a value scale of (the relevant) objects (2000: 166) is 
quite compatible with our perspective. Tahara’s definition, on the other hand, that this 
usage expresses a “relative degree of meaning according to which only a partial result 
is obtained at S…”119 only partially describes déjà’s function. Thus, when a speaker 
says “Four kilos is already big for a newborn” (example taken from Tahara, 2004), 
they express that at the moment of speech [4kg, newborn] is true and that this would 
be a partial result. This cannot reasonably be called a “result” (partial or otherwise), 
and though the idea of a “relative degree” is more adequate, it remains insufficient. 
Indeed, saying “[4kg, newborn] is true” can be considered in relation to (i.e. relative 
to) the “normal” or “expected” weight of newborns. But this would be the case even if 
the utterance did not contain déjà – “4kg is big for a newborn”. The claim that déjà 
performs the function of simply putting two objects or states of affairs in relation 
                                                 
119 “…degré relatif [signifiant] qu’un résultat partiel est acquis dès le  moment considéré” (Tahara 
2004: 310) 
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misses the mark. Instead, what this type of expression does here is act upon the scale 
of possible (conventional) weight for newborns, in this case by displacing the lower 
boundary so as to include a value normally considered out of bounds. 
 The final usage déjà can convey, the ‘reminder’ usage, is exemplified by the 
utterances in (101). This type of usage is somewhat more formulaic, since it is always 
expressed in the interrogative and is always a request for information. 
(101) a. C ’est quoi son nom déjà ?  
b. C’est déjà quoi son nom ?  
This type of utterance is an instance of a discursive usage, where the speaker signifies 
that they knew, or should know, the addressee’s name (or age, or whatever). There is a 
face-saving aspect at work here, with the speaker claiming or pretending that they 
know the information. This usage is thus a re-request for information, meaning the 
information was requested at least once before.  
That which is most basic and most common among these different usages will 
constitute the semantic nucleus of the procedure – the starting point for the 
interpretive procedure. The semantic nucleus of déjà possesses three characteristics: 
1. an utterance with déjà is anchored and centered on the speaker (thus sharing a 
characteristic common to indexicals); 2. the expression itself is non-truth-conditional, 
given this, and given that the information brought by déjà is extra-propositional, it is 
the reflection of the speaker’s perspective; 3. it is inherently scalar (like many other 
temporal expressions, as we shall see later on), situating an event or state of affairs 
along a scale, whether temporal or not. With these three traits in mind (cognitive 
environment), the term is interpreted in context; this is where the first calculation is 
made, the variable(s) is/are saturated according to all the relevant input and the 
output gives the hearer the “correct” interpretation of déjà. Schematically: 
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Déjà 
Default reading: temporal usages: Relevant example(s) 
a. chronological usage, when déjà simply describes an 
aspectual relation with a previous eventuality  
(96) 
b. precocity usage, when déjà describes an aspectual 
relation, and additionally that the eventuality in question 
occurred sooner than expected  
(97) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that déjà 
governs relations between clauses or propositions rather 
than events  
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative usage: where déjà is used to signify an 
important element in an argument, or a pre-condition for an 
argument  
(98-99) 
b. scalar usage: when déjà serves to expand the scale of 
objects or eventualities the proposition qualifies  
(100) 
c. discursive usage: a formulaic usage used to re-request 
information  
(101) 
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Similarities/Differences 
Already and déjà are both considered aspectual-temporal expressions120. Over the 
course of our analyses, it has become clear that some of the non-descriptive usages 
described for these and other expressions (see also still, encore and toujours in 
following sections) can be derived at least partly because of this aspectual component. 
Furthermore, such expressions can represent the speaker’s subjectivity on some level, 
thanks to the same focalization mechanism that the (descriptive) aspectual-temporal 
usages possess. From that perspective, already and déjà are both – much like 
now/maintenant – fundamentally subjective, since they are strongly dependent upon 
the utterance and, of course, the speaker (somewhat like indexicals in this respect).  
These two expressions function very similarly – with only one notable exception: 
the use of déjà to mean again in the context of a speaker reiterating a request for 
information, as in (101). It also appears that the extent of scalarity these two 
expressions can convey are not the same – déjà’s scalar usages are much more 
versatile than those possible with already. It seems that their equivalents function this 
way in other languages as well121. The typical scalar usage of déjà from (100) crosses 
over to English with no difficulty, and no significant change in meaning: 
(100) Un Kub Or c’est déjà de la cuisine.  
(100’) A Kub Or is already fine cuisine.  
Here the upper limit of what constitutes fine cuisine is lowered so as to encompass 
something that would not normally be considered such; of course we tweaked the 
translation, since with a straightforward “cooking” for French cuisine, the scalar usage 
seems a bit forced: 
(100’’) ?A Kub Or is already cooking.  
This is no doubt due to potential confusion prompted by the progressive verb form, or 
that the scale is more difficult to recover – cooking is just cooking, but fine cuisine is 
something more. However, given the right circumstances, the scalar usages of already 
easily cross over to déjà and vice versa. As already mentioned above, the discursive 
                                                 
120 See Traugott & Waterhouse (1969) and Auwera (1993) for already, and Martin (1980) and 
Mosegaard-Hansen (2003) for déjà. 
121 For Spanish ya see Koike, D.A., (1996). “Functions of the adverbial ya in Spanish Narrative 
Discourse”, Journal of Pragmatics Vol. 25, No 2: 267-279. Italian già also boasts equivalent non-
descriptive usages (see Baranzini & Manzotti 2008). 
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usage in (101) re-requesting information (or feigning to), does not carry over into 
English with already: 
(101) C ’est quoi son nom déjà ?  
(101’) ?What’s his name already?  
(101’’) What’s his name again?  
Instead, it is again that conveys this precise sense, which could also work in French 
for a similar result using à nouveau – in this case, however, the syntax and perhaps 
the wording would be different – an utterance like “c’est quoi son nom à nouveau?” 
would be considered rather unusual by most native French speakers122.  
At any rate, already and déjà are expressions that are both temporal and 
aspectual; we know of various non-descriptive usages where the same focalization 
mechanism that the aspectual-temporal usages possess are used to represent the 
speaker’s subjectivity. Let us add that, for us, already and déjà, are fundamentally 
subjective, since they are strongly dependent upon the utterance and, of course, of the 
speaker himself (somewhat like indexicals in this respect). That being said, the 
subjectivity (subjective marker or reference point) that contributes to the aspectual-
temporal focalization is quite minimal with regards to already and déjà’s non-
descriptive usages; in the appropriate contexts, aspect and temporality trump the 
other interpretations. Conversely, when we are dealing with usages where aspectuality 
and temporality do not play a decisive role – perhaps none at all – the speaker’s 
subjectivity will be more manifest – this is, for us/me, one of the functions of already 
and déjà in such cases: to signal to the hearer that there is an additional element to 
take into account, one that is extra-propositional and non-truth-conditional. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 “Rappelle-moi son nom, à nouveau” would be a preferable formulation, though still somewhat 
rare. 
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4.2.7. Still 
A Chihuahua is still a dog, and Pluto is still a planet. [Alan Stern in Earthsky 
Interview, Space Feb. 18th 2010]. 
In its aspectual-temporal sense, this expression usually means that an eventuality is 
continuous – either ongoing (action) or unchanging (state) – at the moment of speech. 
When it is used non-temporally – often sentence-initially – still indicates an 
opposition or contrast between what precedes still in the discourse and what is 
presented in the utterance where it appears. It may also be used in an additive 
manner, where still adds emphasis to a comparison. There is also an element of 
expectation in still, similar to that present in already, whether temporal or not, 
though in this case the polarity seems to be reversed. That is, rather than the 
expectation being one of the eventuality occurring sooner, the expectation is instead 
that the eventuality is/was occurring later than expected, or, put it another way, that it 
was expected that the eventuality have run its course before the moment of Speech.  
Let us illustrate with a few examples: 
(102) Their car was still in the driveway. 
(103) Their car was in the driveway still. 
(104) Still, their car was in the driveway. 
(105) Their car is in the driveway, still, they could have left on foot. 
The first three examples have a structure of this type: still [car, be, in driveway], but 
the first two are temporal, with example (102) not containing the element of 
expectation, whereas (103) does have the element of expectation (or surprise). 
Example (104) is straightforwardly non-temporal, and simply means “in addition” (to 
a previous argument, not visible in the example). And example (105) is a non-
temporal usage that conveys a contrast between the implicatures of the antecedent 
and the implicatures of the consequent. In the first three utterances, [car, be, in 
driveway] is the proposition that is expressed, with still modifying the proposition – 
again, extra-propositionally – in such a way that the proposition takes on a different 
value (or relevant interpretation) each time. In (105) the structure remains similar 
though still in this particular case modifies [car’s owners, leave home, on foot], while 
[car, be, in driveway] is taken as the relevant background information for the 
argumentative inference the utterance prompts for – in the P connective Q format. 
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From another angle, we observe that still and yet have a similar component – 
that of a state of affairs that is current at the time of speech and which has been 
actualized in a time previous to the time of utterance: 
(106a) He is there still. 
(106b) He is there yet. 
The two utterances are very similar with regards to the temporal reference described, 
with only a slight difference due to (106b) being slightly more formal or passé. In 
certain contexts, both still and yet seem equivalent in their contrastive usage, as 
shown below in (107a-b): 
(107a) She knew it was hopeless, still she trudged on. 
(107b) She knew it was hopeless, yet she trudged on. 
In (107a) the utterance retains a temporal shading while focusing on the contrast 
between P and Q, while in (107b) the temporal relation is almost invisible – it is 
indirect and derived from other contextual elements if at all relevant. That still bears a 
stronger temporal element in (107a) is more evident with the addition of and to each 
expression, as shown below: 
(107c) She knew it was hopeless, and still she trudged on. 
(107d) She knew it was hopeless, and yet she trudged on. 
Where here interpreting still as having a contrastive usage over a temporal one – “she 
continued to trudge on” – is more costly, while with yet the cost remains constant. The 
final non-temporal usages we will examine for still are given in the two examples 
below: 
(108) The Geiger counter registered still greater amounts of radiation. 
(109) A dwarf planet is still a planet. 
In (108) still has the sense of even, but this usage is constrained by its cotext, since it 
does not appear without a scalar term such as “more” or “greater”. Thus the “additive” 
sense may come from the comparatives “more” and “greater”, rather than still itself 
(likewise with yet) – here still acts an intensifier for this additive sense. Moreover, still 
conveys an implicature that the amount(s) referred to go beyond what was 
expected123. And (109) is a scalar usage, with the inverse polarity of already, raising 
                                                 
123 Interestingly, a near-perfect synonym for still in these two utterances would be yet, conveying 
the same sense of increase (108), or a similar scalar effect (though the syntax would be different, 
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the upper bound of what is considered a planet, i.e. dwarf planets, despite not having 
cleared the neighborhood around their orbits, remain planets. Put another way, the 
criterion for being a planet which dwarf planets do not possess – the ability to clear 
the neighboring orbital space – is waived so as to continue considering them “real” 
planets, like for instance this section’s opening quote concerning Pluto. So, all told, 
still (besides its motion adverb usage) can be used to temporally focus on an 
unchanging state of affairs, with or without an added sense of 
surprise/impatience/annoyance; or still can be used non-temporally to establish a 
contrast between two clauses or two utterances, or, still, to mean “additionally”, 
“even”, or finally, to include an object within a scale by modifying the scale’s limit 
upwardly. 
The procedure for still first branches off into temporal (aspectual) and discursive 
meanings, with a further branch splitting off (i.e. further constraining the sense so as 
to obtain a much more specific meaning) at subsequent points. One such branch is 
where still is in the utterance or sentence – its syntactic location. If still is sentence- or 
utterance-initial then it is extremely unlikely to be a temporal reading. In actuality, the 
first switch/nexus is one step up, being perhaps an altogether different algorithm, or 
perhaps a more general cognitive process, which chooses from prosodic and 
syntactical cues whether still is to be understood as being in the noun and adverb 
category, and then whether it should be construed in its temporal and motion sense. 
The outline procedure for still is given on the next page. 
  
                                                                                                                                                          
with yet occurring sentence-finally – “A dwarf planet is a planet yet”. It is difficult to pinpoint what 
the difference in meaning between these two terms actually is, since both implicate an element of 
expectation in addition to acting as intensifiers. 
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Still 
Default reading: temporal usages Relevant example(s) 
a. the utterance describes/focuses on an aspectual relation 
which continues  
(102), (106) 
b. the utterance describes/focuses on an aspectual relation 
which continues, and highlights an aspect of subjective 
surprise, impatience or annoyance  
(103) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that still 
governs relations between clauses or propositions rather 
than events  
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. discursive usage: still is used to add emphasis with 
meaning close to that of even  
(104), (108-109) 
b. argumentative usage: still is used to set up or highlight a 
contrast between two clauses or utterances  
(105), (107) 
c. scalar usage: still displaces upper bound of a scale  (109) 
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4.2.8. Encore & toujours 
These two aspectual-temporal expressions have received some attention in the French 
literature124, within a variety of approaches – some semantic, some pragmatic, some 
polysemic approaches, others monosemous accounts – and can be considered 
counterparts to the English expression still (and always, albeit only in its 
aspectual/temporal uses). The descriptions and analyses given below are far from 
exhaustive, hereafter is an outline of some of these expressions’ usages.  
4.2.8.1. Encore 
This expression is closely related to déjà (supra 4.3.3.), and is almost a mirror-image 
in certain instances. Just as the expressions already and déjà function in similar ways, 
so too do still and encore. Encore (like still and yet) contains an element of 
expectation much like already, except that the polarity is inverse; where déjà can 
signal that the speaker is surprised that X occurred sooner, encore can signal that the 
speaker is surprised that X is still occurring at S or that X is occurring later than 
expected. An additional usage where the polarity is reversed is with pas encore (‘not 
yet’), which simply refers to an eventuality that is not the case at the moment of 
Speech, but is expected to be at some point in the future125. 
(110) a. Elle dort encore. 
       b. Elle dort encore? 
(111) Tu t’es encore trompé de chemin. 
(112) a. Quoi, encore? 
 b. Quoi encore? 
In (110) we are dealing with a straightforward temporal usage, where encore indicates 
that an eventuality, here [dormir], persists at the moment of speech. The difference 
between (110a) and (110b) is simply that in the latter there is an implication of 
surprise at the eventuality being referred to. Example (111) is also temporal, though 
here the sense is that of repetition (rendered as again in English126), the speaker is 
                                                 
124 For instance Martin (1980), Victorri & Fuchs (1996), Mosegaard-Hansen (2003, 2004), Buchi 
(2007) to name just a few. For a more detailed account of encore and toujours I refer the reader to 
these works whose analyses are more detailed than those given here. 
125 Here, we will leave aside cases of negation, but see Martin (1980) and Franckel (1989) for a 
more detailed analysis. 
126 The English expression encore used as a request for a musician or orchestra to ‘play some 
more’ music is an outgrowth of this sense of French encore. 
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telling the addressee that they have taken the wrong path once more. This utterance is 
better defined as being aspectual rather than temporal, given that repetition is 
commonly construed as being aspectual; like déjà, encore can easily be placed in a 
category of aspectual markers rather than temporal markers. The pair of examples in 
(112) are interesting because they have the exact same wording, with only a comma to 
distinguish them, and yet have different meanings. The utterance in (112a) conveys 
that the speaker is amazed, annoyed or impatient that an eventuality is occurring 
again. While (112b) roughly means “what now?”. In (112a) the meaning of again is 
explicit, with the sense of surprise or annoyance being implicated, while in (112b) the 
foremost meaning is annoyance, with the sense of again being implicated. Both these 
usages are emphatic and most often accompanied by strong intonation or are found in 
in the interrogative. Encore has still other usages: 
(113) a. Encore un flic! [example taken from Victorri & Fuchs 1996] 
         b. Il manque encore un peu de sel. 
(114) C’est bien d’avoir une voiture, encore faut-il savoir conduire.  
The above utterances both convey a sense of ‘addition’, which can be either discrete, as 
in (113a), or continuous, as in (113b)127. In (113a), the speaker is expressing surprise at 
the presence of yet another policeman, implicitly judging the number of policemen 
present to be too much as it is. In (113b) the speaker is informing the hearer that some 
dish lacks salt, and can thus be interpreted as an implicit request or command to add 
yet more salt. With (114), the sense of addition is closer in meaning to [c’est bien X, 
encore faut-il Y], a lexicalized expression128. For Victorri & Fuchs, example (114) is a 
‘restrictive’ usage, rather than an ‘additive’ one; it seems more relevant to claim that 
the clause after encore [savoir conduire] is expanding upon the fact that the hearer 
possesses a car, something which does not guarantee the vehicle’s actual use. So the 
speaker is saying something like “there is one more thing you need before driving your 
car”, either a license (if the hearer has none), or skill (if the hearer has a license 
                                                 
127 Called a “quantifying use” for Mosegaard-Hansen (2002: 33-34), or a “quantitative 
supplement value” in Victorri & Fuchs’ terms – the observation that additive encore can be 
discrete or continuous is from them as well (1996: 65). Victorri & Fuchs also list another 
quantifying value – called the “reinforcement of a progression” value – which occurs in the very 
specific context of a comparative or a verb that marks increase (ibid). In my view, its function 
being so similar to the “quantitative supplement” value, does not justify a separate category.  
128 For Victorri & Fuchs (1996), and Mosegaard-Hansen (2002), this and other lexicalized 
expressions like encore que/si are considered “modal” uses of encore, expressing concession or 
restriction. 
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already). This utterance is only restrictive in the sense that the speaker is pointing out 
a missing element for the hearer’s (assumed) future action. The next set of utterances 
departs from the notion of addition or expansion only slightly: 
(115) Vingt francs c’est encore trop cher pour toi.  
(116) C’est encore plus loin que ce que je pensais. 
We can see from the above two examples that encore, like déjà, is also a scalar term129; 
the polarity is inverse, but the basic scalar function is the same. The encore in (115) 
would most likely be rendered by still in English and the one in (116) by even, but 
more importantly, the scalarity of each is one where the scale is extended beyond the 
initial limit. In (116) the destination referred to is further than was thought/perceived 
initially, so as to prompt the speaker and hearer to redouble their efforts until they 
have reached their final stopping point. In (115), what is being referred to is the 
hearer’s stinginess with money, so that the modest sum of twenty Francs is, by 
enlarging the scale of what is considered expensive, now included in the set of 
“expensive amounts of Francs”. 
  
                                                 
129 Called the “notional” value in Victorri & Fuchs (1996: 65) who describe such cases being at the 
limit of categorical inclusion. The term is different but the general idea is the same, something not 
normally included in a given category is shoehorned in, thanks to such terms.  
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4.2.8.2. Toujours 
Perhaps these observations on toujours could have been placed alongside encore 
above, given their proximity in meaning; at any rate toujours does not always mean 
always – it is frequently used in the sense of encore (‘still’)130, both temporally 
(aspectually, to be precise), indicating the continuation of an eventuality, and non-
temporally, for instance, indicating a contrast with what precedes it.  The following 
two examples illustrate how toujours is used to mean encore: 
(117) Marie l’aime toujours. 
(118) “les pères sont toujours des hommes” [a French car commercial] 
In (117), the literal meaning ‘she loves him always’ does not make complete sense in 
French, due to the use of the present tense with simple past or future tenses, toujours 
would mean always (although with the imparfait the sense is also similar to encore). 
The most adequate translation into English is ‘she still loves him’, and it is precisely 
this sense a native French speaker would interpret. What is interesting is that there 
can be some temporal overlap between encore and toujours; clearly, here, the speaker 
is describing a person who loved another from a previous point in time up until the 
present, and in this sense, both terms overlap, if we consider that Marie loved her 
husband continuously. But encore and toujours do not mean exactly the same thing. A 
notable difference between the two terms is the sense of expectation that is stronger in 
encore than in toujours. With (110) above encore carried that sense of expectation, 
while in (110’) it is harder, but not impossible, to infer: 
(110’) a. Elle dort toujours. 
        b. Elle dort toujours?! 
It appears that the main difference is not in the element of expectation per se but 
rather in the expectation that the contrary is expected – possible with encore, not so 
with toujours. To make the element of expectation, accompanied with an expressive 
sense of exasperation, something must be added, as in (110’’) below: 
(110’) Elle est toujours en train de dormir! 
Making the durative sense explicit with the periphrase “en train de” (coupled with an 
                                                 
130 And interestingly encore can be used to mean always or repeatedly, as in “Quoi? Sa voiture 
est encore là?”, clearly expressing exasperation in this case. We have seen that sometimes encore 
mirrors déjà, and so does toujours in cases where its interpretation is close to encore. 
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exclamation point), helps make the speaker’s exasperation more tangible; this is no 
doubt due to the fact that “en train de” removes most of the remaining durativity 
usually conveyed by toujours.  
Example (118), is taken from a French car commercial, and the literal sense of 
‘fathers are always men’ is insufficiently relevant in itself – instead (118) is interpreted 
as “…fathers are still men”. But even this interpretation is insufficiently relevant 
without inferring something about the desires of men, and men who are fathers, 
regarding cars. In the commercial, fathers are shown to appreciate cars which look 
sporty and/or classy – the usual stereotype about men and cars in general – but which 
have the added bonus of having lots of space to drive their children around – 
something which men who are not fathers could take or leave. Toujours functioning 
like encore/still, challenges the notion that fathers want or need cars that are 
exclusively functional and family-oriented, because fathers retain the (stereotypical) 
desires they have as men. The following example has a somewhat different function: 
(119) Toujours est-il que… 
where it signals an objection or contrast with something said previously, much like 
utterance-initial still. This usage with toujours is always in the form of ‘toujours est-il 
que’, and so remains somewhat limited. But the possibility of an argumentative usage 
is there, due to the commonly understood secondary meaning of the term encore. 
Another instance of discursive or argumentative toujours is one that stays close to 
encore (or even déjà) in its scalar function, as exemplified below: 
(120) a. Un pingouin c’est toujours un oiseau. [taken from Mosegaard-Hansen 2004] 
        b. C’est toujours ça.131 
This can be seen as a counterpart of sorts to (100a & 100b) “Un Kub Or c’est déjà de la 
cuisine”, “C’est déjà pas mal”, where the scalarity is inversed: instead of lowering the 
quality of what is deemed sufficient or good (as in 100) for inclusion in a specific class 
of objects, toujours extends the value in (120) to include something that would not 
normally have been considered sufficient or acceptable for inclusion. A further usage 
of note is one where the expressive force is at its strongest: 
                                                 
131 This is an example taken from Buchi (2007: 110), “Ça fait pas une fortune, mais c’est toujours 
ça”. I modified it to evacuate the mais (‘but’) so as to really focus on toujours. Buchi also calls this 
a scalar term due to its “relative degree” (see also Tahara 2004), and also sees the parallel between 
déjà and toujours; also of interest, she notes that this is quite an old usage, dating back to the 13th 
century (Buchi 2007: 115). 
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(121) Tu peux toujours essayer!132 
Where the speaker is practically defying the hearer to do X, especially in the context of 
a heated dispute. As Buchi (2007: 117-118) rightly points out, this particular usage is 
always in the imperative and/or accompanied by modal pouvoir – the English 
translation of (121) would run along the same lines: “You can always try!”. For Buchi 
these examples would be glossed as “on the off chance” (‘à tout hasard’), also an 
acceptable reading of the English version. A final non-temporal reading is one named 
a “thematic” (Buchi 2007: 119-120) or “connective” (Mosegaard-Hansen 2004: 39; 50-
51) usage, by which is meant that a given topic or referent within an enumerative 
discourse unit is reprised further along in a subsequent clause or utterance, as in (122) 
below: 
(122) Dans un autre ordre d’idées, pour lutter contre l’usure des pistons et des cylindres 
(…) Delahaye réalise un dispositif spécial assurant un graissage supplémentaire au 
début de la mise en marche de la machine. Toujours pour réduire l’usure, l’emploi 
de… [example taken from Buchi 2007: 119] 
Here the topic “l’usure” (‘wear and tear’) is reprised, or rather, the discourse continues 
with the same general subject – an explanation of automotive mechanics – and 
toujours serves to refocus the reader’s attention onto wear and tear, a relevant sub-
topic within the discourse. Overall, it seems that toujours, in most of its non-
descriptive usages, functions according to a basic core sense of continuity, imposing a 
sense of ‘retention’. When aspectual, as in (117), toujours retains and makes manifest 
a temporal reference for the hearer; when scalar (120), toujours is used to keep an 
object within a class of objects not normally deemed to belong there; when it is 
‘thematic’ as in (122), toujours retains a topic (i.e. maintains its relevance) in the 
hearer’s short-term memory (i.e. the immediate context). For its expressive usage, 
(121), it is unclear what exactly toujours retains, unless it is the idea of keeping the 
hearer from doing something by making it manifest that despite an infinite number of 
tries, nothing useful will come of their action. The outline procedures are given for 
both encore and toujours on the next page. 
 
 
                                                 
132 This example was also addressed by Buchi (2007: 117), which she calls an “assertive” usage; 
this utterance is actually quite common, often said by a scolding elder to a misbehaving child, or 
between angry peers. 
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Encore 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. aspectual usage indicating that an eventuality is still 
true at the time of reference, sometimes with an element of 
surprise  
(110a), (110b) 
b. aspectual usage indicating the repetition of an 
eventuality, sometimes with an added element of surprise  
(111), (112a) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
encore governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. discursive usage: encore marks the speaker’s 
irritation/annoyance  
(112b) 
b. argumentative usage: encore is used to mean 
‘additionally’, or bring additional information by 
introducing a new clause  
(113a - 113b), (114) 
c. scalar usage: encore displaces upper bound of a scale  (115-116) 
 
Toujours 
Default reading: temporal usages  
Relevant example(s) 
a. aspectual usage indicating the continuation of a state of 
affairs or an eventuality  
(117) 
If not relevant (enough)  
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
toujours governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
a. discursive usage: toujours is used to indicate that an 
eventuality remains true despite apparently contradictory 
information  
(118) 
b. discursive usage: refocuses attention to specific topic 
mentioned previously, marks continuation of topic  
(122) 
c. argumentative usage: always used with que, toujours is 
used to indicate an contrast  
(119) 
d. scalar usage: toujours displaces upper bound of a scale  (120) 
e. expressive usage: marking speaker’s attitude toward 
hearer or proposition  
(121) 
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Similarities/Differences 
Still133 and encore, and toujours, do not always match up in meaning or usage, but 
there is of course some overlap between at least one sense – the primary temporal 
(aspectual) usage of all three functions similarly (based on ex. 102 above): 
(102a) Their car is still in the driveway. 
(102b) Leur voiture est encore dans l’allée.  
(102c) Leur voiture est toujours dans l’allée.  
All three utterances describe the state of affairs [car, be at place X] as having been true 
in the past and continuing through the present (moment of speech). Note that (102c) 
can also mean that [car, be at place X] is always true – the literal meaning of toujours 
– if the context corroborates the utterance; in this case the car in question will have 
been at place X as far back as memory serves and will continue on into the foreseeable 
future. Regarding the non-temporal usages of these expressions, we can say that they 
do sometimes match up, given the appropriate context, but most of the time a 
translator would have to treat them on a case by case basis and greatly rely on the 
context. For instance the encore in (112a) “Quoi, encore?” is best translated by again 
(“What, again?”) while the one in (112b) “Quoi encore?” would most likely be 
translated as “What now?”. Incidentally, if a discursive reading is given to (102b), 
encore would best be translated by again. But even between encore and toujours there 
are instances where swapping one for the other would not convey the same implicated 
meaning, among scalar usages for instance. A variant utterance with encore in place of 
toujours would also have a scalar reading in (120’a), but in (120’b) something is lost: 
(120’) a. Un pingouin c’est encore un oiseau. 
        b. ?C’est encore ça. [in a scalar reading]  
As with already/déjà and still, the fact that encore and toujours are aspectual markers 
is undoubtedly the source of some of their non-descriptive usages – e.g. continuity 
and scalarity. This variability in meaning, and the translation of this meaning, is 
greatest with these expressions’ discursive usages. We shall return to this 
consideration in the conclusion. 
 
                                                 
133 It may be the case that the type of pairing possible for encore and toujours is better reflected 
by still and yet rather than still and always. 
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4.2.9. After/Before 
We will not address the obvious ambiguity between space and time for these 
expressions, as in ‘The dog lay before his feet’ or ‘The cat ran after the mouse’. Here 
the etymology of these two terms is spatial beyond a doubt, however, there is no 
ambiguity for them, when used it is contextually salient which usage is being 
conveyed. A case could be made for their actually being two distinct versions of each, a 
spatial one and a temporal one – and perhaps this is the case – but given the stance 
taken here, of monosemy and contextual enrichment, there is no reason that either 
term could not be the same lexical item with distinct contextually-motivated usages. 
Perhaps in this case, the grammaticalization of after and before has simply run its 
course. 
4.2.9.1. After 
After means the period of time following the moment of reference, but can equally 
mean spatially following or behind something, or even establish an order, as in Q after 
P, or that what follows P is of lesser importance (as in a hierarchy of government 
officials – see sct. 4.2.4. on then, above). Example (123) is a straightforward 
descriptive usage of after, where [He, see, speaker] is temporally located later than 
[speaker, see, him]; the focus is on the clause the speaker places after after.  
(123) He saw me after I saw him. 
(124) a. Sheila takes after her mother. 
b. They named Sheila after her grandmother. 
(124a) illustrates a solid non-temporal usage that is quite common, where “take after” 
is interpreted as “resembles”. Of course, here we encounter a difficulty not seen with 
most other expressions, since in this case “take+after” is a standard phrasal verb with 
a specific meaning. The same can be said of (124b) where “name+after” is also a 
phrasal verb: it is deemed a fixed expression with a very specific, performative, 
meaning. The form “call+after” could also have a similar meaning – where “call 
someone” is understood as referring to someone with a name, but as distinct from 
naming which is more formal or official. (His name’s Robert but we call him Bob). 
This distinction can be seen below: 
(124’) ??They called Sheila after her grandmother. 
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In such utterances after is not optimally relevant if understood temporally, since in 
our world grandmothers are named long before their grandchildren, except perhaps in 
a very tortuous reading where “named” is understood as “called out her name”, and in 
this far-from-relevant case, one could understand after chronologically. The spatial 
sense of after is also irrelevant, even nonsensical; there is no logic to this reading. 
Therefore, the hearer of this utterance must search for another, non-temporal, 
meaning for after to completely make sense, i.e. be relevant. In this particular case, as 
this is a common expression, the hearer understands that Sheila the younger was 
given the same name – Sheila – as her grandmother. Here after is used to mean “in 
imitation of” or “in allusion to” X. Though I do not have the intention of thoroughly 
discussing phrasal verbs and the implications for this thesis, an additional point 
against considering “name+after” as a completely fixed form is an example such as: 
(125) A painting after impressionist art. 
(126) Sheila is a woman after my own heart. 
Where there is no act of naming or calling, but one of considering that, in (125), a 
painting was done in imitation of impressionistic art, or in accordance with 
impressionist principles. Example (126) will be understood as the speaker saying that 
Sheila is a person whose moral, esthetic or/and intellectual principles coincide with 
the speaker’s, and thus here, after has the sense of “in accordance with, in proportion 
to X”. Examples (123-126) above all have a component of meaning which includes 
some degree of imitation or resemblance. Thus, after carries the same core meaning 
whether it is found in a fixed form (“name after”) or not. But there are also two other 
ways after may be used non-temporally: 
(127) Sheila asked after her grandmother. 
(128) Sheila asked after her dollhouse.  
Again, a temporal or spatial reading would be irrelevant, and the meaning is not the 
same as our preceding examples, there is no sense of imitation or resemblance. In this 
case, after signifies “about”, with Sheila inquiring for instance into the well-being or 
whereabouts of her grandmother in example (127), or into the condition or location of 
her dollhouse. Typically this type of usage indicates a degree of concern for a person or 
thing, and seems to be restricted to the “ask+after” verb phrase. The final examples 
depart from any sense of resemblance or concern: 
(129) After all their problems, they managed to remain happily married.  
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(130) You dare go to the pool, after what the coach said to you? 
Naturally, a temporal interpretation is recovered in these two cases, there’s no 
disputing that; however, the function of after here is to point out that the clause 
following after is a precondition or cause for the principal clause. In such cases, after 
has the sense of something akin to “despite” (129) – after Q, P – or “given Q” (127) – 
P, after Q. So, like with other expressions, though an amount of temporality may 
remain perceptible in a given usage, the focus of the relation described has little to 
nothing to do with time, and is therefore considered non-temporal, as is the case with 
after in (129-130). For the final usage – the serial usage of after – we return to 
example (2), and a variant (2’): 
(2) ?First comes the president, afterwards the vice-president, afterwards the 
secretary of state… 
(2’) First comes the president, after that the vice-president, after that the 
secretary of state… 
In an enumeration similar to the type possible with then, in (2’) after that (or after 
him/her/them), introduces the following member on a list of people, functions or 
objects much better than in (2). This is likely due 1. to afterwards being a much less 
versatile expression, whose temporal reference is much too strong to allow for a 
straightforward list, and 2. the addition of that or a pronoun facilitating a non-
temporal reading. The usages common to after are given after the discussion of 
before:  
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4.2.9.2. Before 
One could suppose that before is simply the mirror image of after, but that would only 
be partially correct. Insofar as the interpretation is either the standard spatial or 
temporal one, then before is indeed the primary antonym of after.  
(131) They stood before the altar. (spatial) 
(132) I saw him before he saw me. (temporal) 
These two examples can be considered typical and standard descriptive usages of 
before (of spatial and temporal before respectively). There is also one instance (or set 
of instances) of a non-descriptive usage where before mirrors the meaning of after: 
(133) ‘I’ before ‘E’, except after ‘C’. 
(133’) ‘E’ after ‘I’, except before ‘C’. 
(134) We value freedom before happiness.  
Where the meaning is that of precedence, for instance when ranking two or more 
things. In these cases as well, before is the natural counterpart to after. When looking 
at other non-descriptive usages, this may not a priori be the case, though with the four 
succeeding examples, we would be hard put to claim unequivocally that before and 
after do not in fact have opposite and connected meanings: 
(135) Death before dishonor! 
(136) I would go to jail before going to church. 
These two examples signal a preference for a certain idea or state of affairs. Where the 
first clause or item in a list is shown to be preferred to the second, or subsequent 
clauses/items. So with (135), an old warrior’s code, the hearer interprets that the 
speaker values honor more highly than their life, or that an honorable life is the only 
one worth living. In (136), the speaker signals their preference, all things considered, 
for jail over church, in the sense of rather, much like the non-descriptive usage of 
sooner seen above, and also conveying the implicatures that the speaker is anti-
clerical, distrustful of religion etc. 
Interestingly, we can invert the order in the clauses of the above two examples, 
and replace before with after, and still have a very similar, if not completely identical 
meaning: 
(135’) Dishonor after death! 
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(136’) I would go to church after going to jail. [in a non-temporal sense] 
Though these usages are not attested, they would be perfectly interpretable, given the 
right context. It seems that the only instances where before is not an adequate 
opposite of after is in the case of examples (124, 126-127, 129) which rendered as 
below, would be practically meaningless: 
(124’’) ?Her grandmother was named before her. 
(126’) ?I am a man before Sheila’s heart. 
(127’) ??She asked before her grandmother. 
(129’) ?Before all their problems, they managed to remain happily married. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these very specific usages of after do not stem 
from the before/after spatio-temporal dichotomy of precedence/preference vs. 
subsequence/resemblance. Likewise, there are a few usages for before, which have no 
direct link to spatial or temporal precedence or preference, such as the following: 
(137) She was guilty of a most heinous crime before her country. 
(138) Before such considerations, the committee had no strong counter-arguments. 
(138’) The committee had no strong counter-arguments before such considerations. 
Examples (137) and especially (138) are both instances of an argumentative usage; in 
(137) the sense of before is close in meaning to ‘with regards to her country’s 
mores/laws’ rather than any spatial or temporal sense; (137) may seem to be a 
discursive usage, but is categorized as an argumentative one since the phrase ‘before 
her country’ is used as a specification of the main clause (though perhaps it is both). 
As can be seen from (138) and (138’) the position of before changes nothing as to its 
argumentative usage; in both cases, before is understood as meaning ‘taking into 
account X’. A final non-temporal example is one where before is not used to signal 
preference, or highlight an argument: 
(139) Like a tree bending before the storm.  
where before is used as a manner adverb, expressing that [the storm] is the cause for 
the tree’s bending – but recall our brief discussion of Saussure’s non-necessary causal 
relations etc.; here, clearly, what makes the tree bend is the wind, but the wind (and 
its strength) depend on the storm. At any rate, here before can be understood as 
‘under the influence of X’.  
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After 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. after indicates that the eventuality referred to 
occurred at a time later than either the moment of 
Speech or else a relevant perspective point. 
(123) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
after governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. discursive usage: after indicates a relation of 
similarity  
(124-126) 
b. discursive usage: after is used to mean ‘about’, where 
the speaker expresses concern or curiosity for an object 
or eventuality  
(127-128) 
c. argumentative usage: after introduces a (often 
contrastive) precondition for the principal clause  
(129-130) 
d. serial usage: after expresses subsequence in a list of 
items, most often accompanied by ‘that’ or a pronoun 
(2’) 
 
Before 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. before indicates that the eventuality referred to 
occurred at a time previous to either the moment of 
Speech or else a relevant perspective point  
(132) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
before governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. serial usage : before indicates precedence in a list of 
items  
(133-134) 
b. discursive usage: before indicates preference  (135-136) 
c. discursive usage: before expresses a form of causality 
– influence of an eventuality over another  
(139) 
d. argumentative usage: before introduces a (often 
contrastive) precondition for the principal clause  
(137-138) 
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4.2.10. Après/Avant 
The French equivalents of before and after – avant and après – do not cover quite the 
same range of non-descriptive usages their English counterparts do. At first sight, 
avant has but one non-descriptive usage, while après has a few. We will see that upon 
closer inspection both yield a few interesting non-descriptive usages.  
4.2.10.1. Après 
This expression, in addition to signifying a temporal relation of subsequence, may also 
be used argumentatively in certain contexts. The first example (140) is an ordinary 
temporal usage of après, the second (141), is a temporal-serial usage: 
(140) J’irai le voir après avoir mangé. 
(141) Branchez l’ordinateur, après allumez-le. 
Where nothing other than an expression of an eventuality or a place/object being 
situated further in time (140). The usage in (141) is typical of instructions, and retains 
an amount of temporality, but as a byproduct; in such cases, après simply indicates 
that one action succeeds another by causal necessity. Like with avant above, après can 
be used to describe an order such as one of military rank, as in (142): 
(142) a. Le lieutenant vient après le capitaine dans la hiérarchie. 
       b. Le capitaine vient après le lieutenant dans la hiérarchie. 
(143) Le chiffre 2 vient après le chiffre 1. 
Interestingly, the polarity of après (or avant in a similar utterance) depends entirely 
on whether the speaker means the rank of lieutenant is inferior to that of captain 
(142a), or whether they mean the rank of captain follows that of lieutenant in 
superiority (142b). Thus (142a) means ‘the lieutenant comes after the captain in 
importance’ while (142b) signifies ‘the rank of captain follows the rank of lieutenant, 
and is thus more important’. Likewise, (143) points out that the numeric value of 2 is 
greater than that of 1. In an utterance similar to (143’) below but with a slightly 
modified context, such ‘double-polarity’ is also possible: 
(143’) Le chiffre 1 vient après le chiffre 2 dans le compte à rebours. 
In the specific context of a countdown, 1 can come after 2, so there is no incongruence 
in the utterance – like with the utterances on military ranks, the context and speaker’s 
intended meaning will accommodate après both ways. The example below is also non-
 
 
 
 
157 
 
temporal though in this case it expresses something other than an order: 
(144) C’est ce qu’elle m’a dit, après, je ne peux pas savoir si c’est vrai.  
The utterance in (144) is an argumentative usage which crops up frequently in 
conversations or debates. Its meaning is close to but or however and is used to 
introduce a contrast with the preceding clause. As such, this non-descriptive usage of 
après is almost identical to the non-descriptive usage expressed by maintenant. 
Finally, there are still two other non-descriptive usages of après, as illustrated below: 
(145) Jean est toujours après ses enfants. 
(146) Et après?  
Examples (145) and (146) are both familiar discursive usages. The former is 
understood as meaning that Jean either is always actively taking care of his children 
(to the point of exaggeration), or else that he is always harassing them (i.e. punishing 
them for the slightest reason). The latter example is a common phrase used to mark 
exasperation or even anger and roughly translates as “what’s it to you?” or “so what?”. 
Both utterances have in common a sense of excess; most likely the meaning of (145) is 
possible, and accessible, through a spatial sense of après, while the après in (146) 
takes its cue from the temporal sense. These two usages are somewhat formulaic, and 
as such appear in restricted contexts, such as a criticism (145) or a disagreement (146). 
In a different context, say husband and wife building a bookshelf, with one reading the 
instructions, the other asking “et après?” cannot mean “so what” or “what’s it to you?”, 
at least not unless they are somehow angry with each other. For (145), the context 
(besides being used to criticize) is that après must co-occur with être or else crier for 
the harassment sense. With manger or courir the temporal or spatial reading would 
prevail. Further research would no doubt uncover other constraints with regards to 
these and other usages of après, but we shall leave them aside for the present. 
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4.2.10.2. Avant 
Like its English counterpart before, avant is used to convey a relation of anteriority 
with relation to the moment of speech, and often simply mean earlier as in examples 
(146-149). It is also used to express the spatial relation of one object being to the front 
of another, or else the front part of something. Its unique non-temporal usage can be 
seen in the following examples: 
(146) Je l’ai vu avant qu’il me voie. 
(147) Le lieutenant vient avant le capitaine. 
(148) Le lieutenant vient avant le capitaine. 
(149) Le chiffre 1 vient avant le chiffre 2. 
The utterance in (146) simply conveys a temporal relation, namely that the speaker 
saw someone before that person saw them. In this case all that is said and meant is 
that one action occurred at a times previous to the second action described in the 
utterance. Example (147) is temporal if it refers to the lieutenant physically coming to 
a place before the captain. Interestingly example (148), ostensively the same wording, 
does not carry this sense, in a context where one describes not the physical action but 
is instead listing ranks. The two latter utterances illustrate that what avant signifies 
here is a relation in a hierarchical order, or of value. So for (148) the rank of lieutenant 
precedes the rank of captain, but is not superior in rank (in fact the reverse is true). 
Similarly, in (149) the number 1 precedes number two, that is its numerical value 
comes first, but again, without expressing superiority, as 1 is not greater than 2. Like 
with après in (143’), numeric polarity can also be reversed, given the appropriate 
context: 
(149’) Le chiffre 2 vient avant le chiffre 1 dans le compte à rebours.  
Thus temporal anteriority passes straightforwardly to a serial description, often 
denoting hierarchical precedence. Unlike its counterpart après, avant does not have a 
discursive (contrastive) usage, with the form Q avant P, no doubt because it is easier 
to implicate deduction with a term that signals succession than it is with an expression 
signaling precedence. In order to obtain an argumentative interpretation for avant, 
one needs the adjunct que, otherwise the processing effort is too costly, and the effects 
too weak. The outline procedures for après and avant are given on the following page:
 
 
 
 
159 
 
Après 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. temporal usage: après signifies that an eventually 
was posterior to another  
(140-141) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
après governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. serial usage: après indicates the next step in a series 
of actions  
(142-143) 
b. argumentative usage: used to introduce a contrast 
between P and Q in a way quite similar to maintenant  
(144) 
c. discursive usage: après is used to express a form of 
excess, or else anger/exasperation  
(145-146) 
 
Avant 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. temporal usage: avant signifies that an eventually 
was anterior to another  
(146-147) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
avant governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. serial usage: avant signifies that a person or object 
precedes another in an order  
(148-149), (149’) 
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Similarities/Differences 
There is some strong correlation between the English and French versions of these 
expressions in their temporal and serial usages. However the discursive usages of 
before signaling preference or influence or after’s discursive usage pointing out 
resemblance, are absent from French. Interestingly, the argumentative usage of the 
English after does have a French equivalent, but the argumentative usage brought 
about by before, signaling contrast, would use the French spatial term devant or face 
à instead. 
(129’) Après tous leurs problèmes, ils ont pu rester heureux en mariage.  
(138’’) Devant / Face à de telles considérations, le comité n’avait pas de contre-
arguments forts. 
Why this is the case is  not readily apparent, since in both languages other expressions 
exist in each instance; therefore it cannot be that in English there is no other term for 
a specific relation while in French there is. For the English utterance in (129) despite 
could be used, and the French malgré would work perfectly for (129’). For the use of 
before in (138) rendered as devant in (138’’), it becomes obvious that the spatial 
meaning seems to be behind the contrastive usage in French, as opposed to English  
temporal before. Another discursive usage with after, expressing resemblance with 
after (125-126), can be given an equivalent sense in French, but only if one adds d’ to 
après:  
(125) A painting after impressionist art. 
(125’) Un tableau d’après l’art impressioniste. 
Without the d’, après cannot focus the interpretation onto one of resemblance, 
needing the d’ seemingly to indicate the provenance of the thing the object takes after. 
Then again, in English, the phrasal verb to take after may have facilitated this 
derivation for after for English speakers. Finally, there is a usage in English – the 
discursive usage expressing preference for before (135-136), which finds no direct 
counterpart in avant.  
(135) Death before dishonor! 
(135’) Plutôt la mort que le déshonneur! 
In this case a translation of plutôt que is more felicitous to maintain the same 
meaning, or else a periphrase. 
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 4.2.11. Since 
Since thou are not sure of a minute, throw not away an hour. – Benjamin Franklin  
In its temporal form since is usually understood to mean “after”, “ago” or “at a later 
time”; thus it is clearly temporal when it establishes a time interval for an eventuality 
beginning in the past and leading up to or continuing throughout the present, this is 
most obvious when it precedes dates as in “since 2001/May/Wednesday”. Otherwise, 
in sentence-final position, it picks out an interval subsequent to the eventuality, such 
as “she (has) reconsidered since”. When since occurs sentence-initially, without a 
specified date, it may express a causal relation, albeit sometimes ambiguously as in 
“Since you asked, the weather is nice”, otherwise it unambiguously expresses some 
form of causality or consequence with structures of the type P since Q or Since Q, P. 
The following examples illustrate this: 
(150) Sheila has been acting strangely since you arrived. 
(150’) Sheila has been acting strangely (ever) since. 
(151) Since you’re up, can you get me a beer? 
In example (150) both P [Sheila, act, strange] and Q [you, arrive] are explicit. In 
example (150’), either P or Q is unmentioned in the utterance itself, though they will 
have been mentioned in a preceding utterance of the same piece of discourse, such as 
“The second you arrived, Sheila’s behavior changed.” Utterances like (151) have the 
form since P, Q, where the antecedent and resultant clauses are given together after 
the expression – so it is not necessary for since to formally appear between two clauses 
to point out a relation between them though the effect is precisely that. Temporal 
since can appear in several positions in an utterance, sentence-initially, sentence-
internally or sentence-finally, as the following examples below illustrate: 
(152) Since 1999 Paul has been doing research. 
(152’) Paul has been doing research since 1999. 
(152’’) It all started in 1999. Paul has been a researcher since. 
Therefore, the position of since in a given utterance will not be a reliable indicator for 
whether it is used temporally or not. What matters is the clauses actual content – in all 
cases the scope since has is similar. Though since is used temporally in all three 
utterances, there is a slight difference in meaning each time. This is mainly a question 
of focus where the speaker stresses one aspect over another. More interesting are 
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ambiguous utterances like the following one: 
(153) Since you asked, the weather is nice. 
Where since can be understood either temporally or non-temporally; in one case, the 
speaker is informing the hearer that the [weather is nice] is true now, whereas it was 
not when the hearer first asked about the weather – thus in its temporal reading here 
since highlights a change in a state of affairs. While in its non-temporal interpretation, 
since is used to mean “given that” and [the weather is nice] is true now (and may have 
been so before), and the speaker is in a position to inform the hearer of this state of 
affairs – the hearer may be absent from the speaker’s locus (i.e. a telephone 
conversation) or else may be visually impaired or hindered in some other way. The 
non-temporal reading could also be understood as sarcasm or mockery on the 
speaker’s part if, for instance, both interlocutors are in the same place and the weather 
is manifest to both. Remark that in (153’) the ambiguity is absent, due to the use of the 
present tense: 
(153’) Since you’re asking, the weather is nice. 
With the past tense removed, the potential reference to a point in time when the 
eventuality began has been eliminated, thereby blocking a temporal reading, given 
that (153’) would be odd if interpreted as being temporal (due to the present 
continuous tense). 
(154) The glass broke since it fell off the table.  temporal/causal ambiguity 
(154’) The glass broke because it fell off the table.   
(155) ??The smoke alarm went off since there’s smoke.  
(155’) The smoke alarm went off because of the smoke. 
(156) Since there’s smoke the alarm will ring. 
(156’) Because there’s smoke the alarm will ring. 
The causality in since found with utterances where the term is best approximated by 
‘given that’ points to a deep link between causality and temporality; since simply 
exploits this link with its non-temporal usages. Indeed, there is no mystery 
surrounding the notion that for eventuality A to cause eventuality B, A must precede B 
in time, though time is not the focus of utterances of this type. As Comrie (1976) puts 
it: “1. The caused event must happen at a time after the causing event. 2. The caused 
event must be wholly dependent on the causing event, to the point that one could infer 
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a counterfactual – that the caused event would not have taken place had the causing 
event not taken place first.” This element is what is behind the non-temporal usage of 
since, where temporality itself is but a ‘side effect’ of the relation of cause and 
consequence134. The causal relations possible with non-temporal/argumentative since 
highlighted in utterances directly stem from the temporal relation (the second 
temporal usage) of subsequence; the shift from temporal to non-temporal 
subsequence takes little processing effort. An additional plausible explanation for 
since’s causal function may be found in its similar structure to if P then Q… since P, 
(then) Q… with if P then Q  an utterance proposes a potential causal relation, while 
with since P, (then) Q the causal relation is actual. 
Since 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. Since marks a starting point in the past (< time of 
speech) for a durative eventuality  
(152) 
b. Since is used to mark a relation of subsequence 
between two clauses  
(150), (153) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
since governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative usage: since functions as a causal 
operator with a meaning resembling ‘given that’ or 
‘because’  
(151), (153-154), (156) 
 
  
                                                 
134 Leech & Svartnik (2002: 107-110) put since (as well as because and as) in a class of “Reason 
and consequence” (rather than “Cause and Result” which also includes because (of), on account of, 
out of) saying that “Cause and reason are overlapping notions (both answering the question 
Why?), but the difference between them is that cause concerns the events themselves, while reason 
concerns the way a person interprets the events, and acts upon this interpretation”. I agree with 
the basic idea here; though in the case of since as opposed to causal because, since deals with what 
can be reasonably assumed to be a cause of something. Leech & Svartnik (2002) make no mention 
of ‘inference’, but this is clearly what is going on in such cases.  
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4.2.12. French equivalents of since: depuis & puisque 
In French, there is no direct equivalent for since that covers both the aspectual-
temporal and argumentative/discursive usages we saw previously. For temporal 
usages of since (i.e. example 150) French will use depuis, as in (157) below; for 
argumentative or discursive relations since (i.e. examples (151 and 153’) is best 
translated by French puisque as can be seen in (158) and (159).  
(150) Sheila has been acting strangely since you arrived. 
(157) Sheila se comporte étrangement depuis que t’es arrivé. 
(151) Since you’re up, can you get me a beer? 
(158) Puisque t’es debout, peux-tu me prendre une bière?  
(153’) Since you’re asking, the weather is nice. 
(159) Puisque tu le demandes, le temps est clément. 
(159’) Depuis que tu le demandes, le temps est clément. 
Note that these two expressions both derive from the same root expression puis – 
de+puis and puis+que – whose original meaning is that of temporal posteriority. The 
explanation for this shift in meaning lies in the specialized usage each term developed 
over time. Substituting one term for the other is sometimes possible, as in (157’); at 
other times, the switch yields a very strange utterance (158’): 
(157’) Sheila se comporte étrangement puisque t’es arrivé. 
(158’) ??Depuis (que) t’es debout, peux-tu me prendre une bière?  
Remark that (157’) has shifted from an aspectual-temporal to a causal reading – in 
English the same utterance would most likely use because. For example (158’) 
however, the shift to a temporal interpretation seems nonsensical. This is due to the 
second clause being dependent on a circumstantial condition rather than on an 
aspectual one; that is, it is because the speaker’s addressee is already standing up, and 
therefore, it is less costly for that person to walk over to the cooler and get a beer, as 
opposed to the speaker who is seated. The duration of time the addressee has actually 
been standing does not factor into the speaker’s request, it is the fact that the 
addressee is standing which is most salient. The utterance in (153’) however retains an 
aspectual condition, thanks to the progressive “are asking” and so can take either a 
causal puisque (159) or a temporal depuis que (159’) in its French translation, 
depending on what was meant. 
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At any rate, since French has two specialized terms for describing temporal and 
causal relations, the most relevant of the two will be selected according to the 
speaker’s intention, thereby avoiding any cases of ambiguity that could arise with 
since. We will not give a sketch for a procedure for either of these terms, given their 
straightforward orientation as either temporal (depuis) or causal (puisque), and as 
such, they go beyond the scope of the present research. That said, depuis and puisque 
can, in principle, be pragmatically enriched, but in such cases they will not shift from a 
temporal usage to a causal one, or vice versa.   
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4.2.13. Next 
The expression next is one which can easily be construed as either a spatial term or a 
temporal one. Its etymology points to its origin as being originally a spatial term, 
whose meaning was later expanded into the temporal domain and by analogy can also 
be used to express something that is neither temporal nor spatial. Arguably, it is 
difficult to include next in a list of “temporal expressions”, given that it, compared to 
the other expressions in our list, does not appear to be fixed in spatiality, temporality 
or an ordinal relation. It may be that this expression is at a particular point in its 
evolution where it can indiscriminately be used to describe several types of relation. 
When underspecified, that is, without taking the context into account, next can easily 
be used to point to spatial, temporal, or ordinal relations:  
(160) The person standing next to you. 
(161) I’ll see you next week. 
(162) The next item on the shopping list. 
The first example, (160), is clearly one describing a spatial relation, where next could 
easily be replaced with besides. Example (161) signals temporality, quite obviously 
because of the expression “week” which gives a more or less specific time interval – 
here “week” could be replaced with “month”, “year”, “decade” etc. Interestingly, 
utterances like “see you next minute/hour/day/night” do not seem to work. We will 
come back to this further along. Finally, example (162) is an instance where next’s 
function is to indicate an ordinal or serial relation – one could see this as an n+1 
relation where n is the “point of origin”; of course this point of origin is displaced in 
each successive use of the very same utterance (until reaching the final item on the 
list). Next can thus be ordinal, if used in a context where a speaker enumerates a list 
using first, next, finally… but is quintessentially serial in that its use is, in every 
context, one where the following item is being indicated by it. This is valid even if the 
listed item is the final one, though of course, one will tend to use a term such as finally 
or last the longer the list is.  
 The meaning of next, then, is mainly concerned with immediate adjacency, and 
the context will specify the type of immediate adjacency – whether it is of the spatial, 
temporal or serial sort. The two most important notions for the possible 
interpretations of next are the concepts of ‘adjacency’ and ‘succession’ which appear to 
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be present in just about every reading of the expression, in almost every context. For 
the spatial interpretations of next ‘adjacency’ is understood as physical proximity or 
‘nearness’. For temporal interpretations, it is the idea of ‘succession’ as temporal 
proximity. For serial interpretations, it would appear both ‘adjacency’ and ‘succession’ 
play a role, the idea being that of a word just under another (adjacency) and at the 
same time, following a word in order and importance (succession). 
(163) One moment I was in free-fall; the next, I found myself stuck in a tree. 
(163’) One moment I was in free-fall; the next thing I knew I was in a hospital bed. 
(164) First students paired up according to their English proficiency. Next, they took 
turns asking questions about their holidays and hobbies.  
(165) The next step in the process is… 
(166) Next. [said by a clerk in just about any situation where people are waiting] 
The above examples all convey a sense of succession, retaining a temporal aspect that 
is either explicit (163 & 163’) or else derived as a secondary consequence of one 
eventuality taking place after another (164 & 165). In (163) next is anaphoric reprising 
‘moment’ directly; in (163’) next is also used anaphorically, though indirectly. Then in 
(164-166), next slides away from a straightforward temporal usage, instead focusing 
on the eventuality that follows. Naturally, there is some temporality in these 
utterances, more so in (164) than in (165) or (166), but it is the sense of ‘second’ or 
‘following’ which carries the most weight. Example (166) especially highlights this – 
the focus here is exclusively on the person awaiting their turn to undertake some 
transaction with the clerk – the clerk is simply signaling to the person whose turn it is 
that their wait is over. Again, any temporal properties are secondary to what the clerk 
means by their utterance of next. 
(167) Next to impossible. 
(168) Miami, my next favorite city to New York. 
With (167) the shift away from temporality is completed, with next meaning ‘almost’; 
this sense of almost is derived from a spatial reading of proximity. The last example 
(168) is another excellent instance of next being used non-temporally, with the 
meaning of ‘my second favorite city’, that is New York is #1 and Miami #2; this is a 
hierarchical interpretation.  
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Next is a versatile expression, whose meaning can be spatial, temporal or serial, 
depending on the context. Previously, we saw that then, after/après and before/avant 
could have interpretations of seriality, and this is even more the case with next (and 
d’abord, ensuite and enfin below). One could argue that for next seriality is the true 
default meaning. Seriality is best defined as the establishment of a series of things 
(akin to placing objects within a set) without an inherent hierarchy or causality in the 
way the objects of the series are presented – though of course any hierarchy or 
causality inherent in the relations between the series’ objects themselves will be 
manifest. Demonstrating that seriality is the default sense of next may be quite 
difficult; instead, it may prove more useful to imagine the default sense of next as 
essentially pertaining to a notion of immediate adjacency. Its procedure could 
resemble this: 
Next 
Default meaning: immediate adjacency of x: 
Relevant example(s) 
ς = spatial context, that is the elements under next’s scope 
deal with space 
 
τ = temporal context, that is the elements under next’s scope 
relate to time in some way 
 
φ = serial context, that is the elements under next’s scope 
simply relate objects in a series with no causal, temporal or 
spatial orientation 
 
If x: ς Then next is spatial (160), (167) 
If x: φ Then next is serial (162-166), (168) 
(If x: τ Then next is temporal) (161)? 
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4.2.14. D’abord, ensuite & enfin 
In this section we will mostly focus on enfin which boasts the greatest range of non-
temporal usages, while d’abord and ensuite are much more restricted. The three are 
assembled here together because the trio functions severally as markers of seriality – 
such as an enumeration or list – where the order most often depends on the speaker’s 
own value judgment for the items (objects, eventualities) referred to. We will thus 
discuss the three together to start, before moving on to briefly focus on ensuite – as 
the most literal and direct translation for next – and finally focusing on enfin135. The 
following example is an utterance-type that a speaker may produce to justify a reason 
for taking a specific action or not: 
(169) Je ne sortirai pas. D’abord je suis fatigué, ensuite aller au restaurant est la 
dernière chose qui me ferait plaisir. Enfin, il y a un match à la télé ce soir. 
This is a clear example of an argumentative usage – here each adverb introduces an 
argument whose conclusion is given from the start “Je ne sortirai pas”. With the 
following examples, the argumentative aspect is largely absent: 
(170) Tout d’abord, j’aimerais remercier les organisateurs pour leur efficacité et 
leur sympathie. Ensuite, je voudrais dire merci à toutes les personnes qui 
ont préparé le gala. Enfin, je vous remercie tous d’être venus aussi 
nombreux. 
(170’) Premièrement, j’aimerais remercier les organisateurs pour leur efficacité et 
leur sympathie. Deuxièmement, je voudrais dire merci à toutes les 
personnes qui ont préparé le gala. Finalement, je vous remercie tous d’être 
venus aussi nombreux. 
(170’’) Tout d’abord, je vous remercie tous d’être venus aussi nombreux. Ensuite, 
j’aimerais remercier les organisateurs pour leur efficacité et leur sympathie 
Enfin, je voudrais dire merci à toutes les personnes qui ont préparé le gala. 
As the above utterances illustrate the trio functions more as a set of serial connectives 
rather than temporal ones, there is no real difference between (170) and (170’) as far 
as any temporal relations are concerned. Indeed the two types of serial markers can be 
mixed and matched with no change in meaning. When contrasting the utterance in 
(170) with that in (170’’), it becomes obvious that the speaker could choose any order 
they wish, according to their personal inclinations, the way they may have written this 
down, or even the way the ideas occur to them as they come.  
                                                 
135 For a much more thorough discussion of d’abord, ensuite and enfin see Saussure & Morency 
(2013). Other research includes Gerecht (1987), Turco & Coltier (1988), Nøjgaard (1992), Reyle 
(1998) and Rossari (2000). 
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(171) D’abord, mets la clef dans la serrure. Ensuite, tourne la clef vers la droite pour 
débloquer le verrou. Enfin, retire la clef et ouvre la porte. 
In order for there to be a temporal order with these expressions, the contextual 
constraints must be of a causal type, as with (171) above. The temporal meaning is 
derived because the causally-linked steps in the above instructions take time. In this, 
and similar cases, temporality is implicit and must be inferred. This is yet another 
indicator that seriality is more fundamental than temporality to these expressions’ 
core meaning. Serial expressions like these are the linguistic equivalent of the more 
fundamental category of order – ranging from a group of eventualities listed 
straightforwardly to a hierarchy of a particular order. Thus these expressions 
indifferently allow for the actualization of one or the other of these possibilities 
according to the context and the need to saturate the variables for relevance. The 
working hypothesis is that the primary semantic content for these expressions 
concerns pure enumeration, since it is the least semantically determined content. 
Taken individually, each of these terms can be used descriptively to express seriality, 
but not necessarily temporality. D’abord, by itself would seem incomplete, as if 
someone began enumerating a list but was unable to continue (for whatever reason). 
With ensuite and enfin however the picture is different; each can appear in isolation 
and be perfectly relevant, whether they are being used descriptively or not. Besides the 
serial usage mentioned above, ensuite is most often used to express a temporal (172) 
or spatial (173) successive relation: 
 (172) Ensuite? 
(173) On entre par le grand portail, ensuite c’est la cour fleurie. 
Though ensuite may be used non-descriptively, there are no argumentative or 
discursive usages to speak of, other than those that accompany its serial usages. With 
enfin however we have an expression which, besides the (default) serial usage 
described above, also has a few other discursive and argumentative usages: 
(174) Il est malade, enfin c’est ce qu’il prétend.  
(174’) Il est malade. C’est ce qu’il prétend.  
The enfin in (174) is used to signal a reformulation, where the speaker adds that the 
source of the information given in the first clause [il est malade] needs to be 
considered against a backdrop of other information [c’est ce qu’il pretend] – in this 
particular case to stress that the truth of the principle clause does not depend on the 
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speaker. The function here is to mark an opposition between what is claimed in the 
first clause, and what the speaker believes about the truth of that clause. Without 
enfin, as in (174’), the utterance would also work but in this case the argumentative 
pretense is absent (and though correct it come across as somewhat odd). The 
utterance in (174) could also be said with maintenant marking the contrast between 
the two clauses. Another type of reformulation, resembling self-correction is shown 
below: 
(175) Il est con, enfin, il n’est pas très futé.  
(175’) ?Il est con. Il n’est pas très futé.  
With (175) enfin is also used to reformulate something said in the first clause, but here 
the sense betrays hesitation on the speaker’s behalf, as if they had said something they 
wish they had not, or used the wrong words. The function of the enfin in (175) is to 
correct what was said previously, and can thus also implicate a notion of regret on the 
speaker’s behalf as well (regret that they were so outspoken, in this instance). We can 
see with (175’) that the absence of enfin removes this notion of self-correction, and is 
even redundant – the second clause merely being a euphemism for what was said in 
the first. The above two usages can be considered argumentative, though the second is 
already shifting towards a discursive one. The three final examples illustrate purely 
discursive usages, where anyone hearing them would not respond to them in any 
argumentative way, as they indicate the speaker’s attitude towards a state of affairs 
more than anything else. 
(176a) T’es enfin prêt à y aller!  
(176b) Ah, enfin!  
(177) Mais enfin! 
The utterance in (176a) indicates that an event is occurring, for instance after waiting 
a certain amount of time (often understood as a long and impatient wait). The 
discursive usage in (176b) is a condensed version of (176a), where the focus is mainly 
put on the speaker’s impatience, or rather the explicit mark of their past impatience 
(since the wait is now over). Finally (177), slides away from impatience to exasperation 
to resignation – it is a discursive usage that almost exclusively marks the speaker’s 
attitude, having nothing to do with a contrast (mais) or finality (enfin). 
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Enfin 
Default reading: serial usages Relevant example(s) 
a. indicates that what follows enfin in a serial order is either 
the most important or least important item in the list, 
according to the speaker’s intentions 
(170), (170’’) 
b. serial order listed according to temporal logic, indicating 
that what follows enfin is the last eventuality to occur 
(171) 
c. serial order listed according to spatial logic (173) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
enfin governs relations between clauses or propositions 
rather than events 
 
non-serial usages:  
a. argumentative usage: lists arguments for a conclusion, 
expresses an opposition, or a reformulation  
(169), (174-175) 
b. discursive usage: expresses impatience or annoyance  (176-177) 
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Discussion: seriality  
The notion of seriality, which I propose as the most plausible explanation for why 
next, (and then in some of its usages) and d’abord – ensuite – enfin function as they 
do, bears a little elaboration. The objective in section 4.2.14 was precisely to suggest 
that either there is no temporal basis for the semantics of these expressions, or else 
that this basis is functionally inactive – in both cases seriality is the semantic nucleus 
proposed, and the term “temporal” for these expressions is confusing. The notion that 
these expressions have a temporal semantics is grounded on the fact that that which 
comes first is temporally anterior to what follows, either regarding eventualities or 
else to discourse. However, the adverbs first/premièrement and 
secondly/deuxièmement are not considered temporal despite the fact that there is 
nothing more natural than presenting that which comes first before that which comes 
second.  
In French, we can clearly distinguish between two types of serial adverbs: simple 
order – including d’abord, ensuite and enfin – and ordinal adverbs of manner – 
premièrement, deuxièmement etc. – and it is possible to mix the two types easily. In 
English on the other hand, it is more difficult to so clearly present two distinct lists of 
serial adverbs; there is no unequivocal counterpart to d’abord. Thus to begin with 
does not seem significantly preferred over first in an enumerative series containing 
then or next (counterparts to ensuite); to begin with is preferred to introduce an 
argumentative proposition. Additionally, if there is no straightforward 
correspondence for d’abord, ensuite136 and enfin in English (as there was for 
now/maintenant, already/déjà etc.) it is probably because of this lack of distinction; 
finally, and more importantly, this distinction between serial adverbs and temporal 
ones is clearer in English. Recall our example from chapter 1, reproduced here: 
(1) First comes the president, then/next the vice-president, then/next the secretary of 
state… 
(2) ?First comes the president, afterwards the vice-president, afterwards the secretary 
of state… 
where (1) is perfectly natural for a non-temporal list, while (2) is somewhat odd in this 
                                                 
136 Next is the best candidate as an equivalent for ensuite, both having a meaning that can be 
derived into seriality (succession) or adjacency. Consequently, ensuite’s procedure would be 
similar to that of next. 
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capacity. Such serial expressions, in English and French, correspond to a fundamental 
category of order, which covers a range of eventualities going from pure listing to 
hierarchical ordering. These expressions allow one to realize either one of these 
possibilities depending on the context and relevance. Of course, a temporal 
enumeration is but one actualization of this. To conclude, seriality is a plausible 
explanation for many of the usages presented in this thesis, regardless of whether the 
expressions can be considered serial adverbs/connectives or not (see sections 4.2.3, 
4.2.9, 4.2.10 and 4.2.13 above). 
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4.2.15. Soon  
Soon is a temporal expression whose different interpretations may all stem from a 
conception of a small interval or short lapse of time; it denotes a time period close to 
now, just subsequent to or just preceding now, or else an interval just following or 
preceding an event situated in the past or future. Soon may also be used non-
descriptively, and in these cases it can be used to mean ‘quickly’ or ‘willingly’, but only 
in very specific contexts. Examples: 
(178) John will soon be here.  
(178’) John will be here sooner than you think.  
(179) Soon the thunderstorm will pass and you may go outside again.  
(180) He had soon seen what he needed to know. 
These first three examples illustrate standard temporal usages of soon, with (178) and 
(179) expressing that the eventuality described is to occur in a short, future lapse of 
time – anticipating the now when the eventuality is occurring. With (180) the 
utterance describes a past situation where the eventuality is qualified as having taken 
little time to occur – here we are moving away from a straightforward temporal sense, 
and soon could easily be replaced with ‘quickly’. In other words, in (180) soon is used 
as an adverb of manner rather than one of time, though of course this sense is derived 
from the sense describing a short lapse in time. The following utterances move still 
further from a ‘pure’ temporal sense. 
(181) Not a minute too soon! 
(182) I would as soon walk than run. 
In (181), a common English expression, soon again carries a meaning closer to 
‘quickly’ or ‘fast’ with the overall sense of the utterance being “just in the nick of time”. 
Soon can function as a counterpart to later with a sense synonymous to earlier. The 
example in (182) is a type of utterance sometimes heard when the speaker wants to 
show a slight preference for one thing over another – given the current options. There 
are not all that many non-temporal usages for this term. In fact, soon becomes more 
versatile when taken in its comparative form, sooner, which can be used non-
temporally to mean “rather” (it will mean “before” when used temporally) or mark 
preference: 
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(183) I’d sooner die than betray my family.  
(183’) May I die sooner than betray my family. 
One could argue that the temporal sense is still existent here, but the overall meaning 
of the utterance would not be captured merely by saying that the speaker of (183) said 
that they will be dead before betraying their family. In this type of example, soon or 
sooner are used to indicate the speaker’s preference, or desire. Of course, for 
soon/sooner to have this meaning, they must be accompanied with a conditional 
marker (and comparative expressions as or than): 
(183’’) ?I am dying sooner than betraying my family. 
(182’) ?I walk as soon as run. 
Without a conditional marker, these two examples may not completely lack the notion 
of preference, but the hearer would be hard-pressed to interpret them this way – at 
any rate, if these examples could be considered acceptable productions, they are much 
less relevant without would or may. The usages of soon and sooner can be sketched 
out as follows: 
Soon/sooner 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. soon is used to express a short interval between the 
moment of Speech and a future eventuality’s occurrence  
(178- 179) 
b. sooner is used to express that the (short) interval between 
the moment of Speech and a future eventuality will occur in 
less time than expected  
(178’) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that 
soon/sooner governs relations between clauses or 
propositions rather than events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative usage: both soon and sooner are used to 
express the speaker’s preference for a certain state of affairs 
(over another)  
(182-183) 
b. discursive usage: used to express immediacy  (180-181) 
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4.2.16. A brief word on bientôt 
The French counterpart to English soon, bientôt, more or less covers the same 
temporal relations, pertaining to times when the eventuality described will occur in 
the near future. However, in comparison to soon, bientôt appears to have only one 
non-descriptive usage, and it is always the product of a contrast between the future-
time orientation of the term and the past-tense form of the utterance’s action verb. We 
could add that there is of course some variation in its usages, even when temporal, but 
we will not concern ourselves with that here. But bientôt appears to be descriptive 
when used with the anterior future or present perfect tenses: 
(184) J’ai bientôt fini de manger. [I will soon be finished eating.] 
(184’) J’aurai bientôt fini de manger. 
(184’’) Je vais bientôt finir/avoir fini de manger. 
These utterances basically move the reference time, or interval, forward, that is, to a 
time frame where the act will have been completed. However, this claim is somewhat 
tenuous, given that what bientôt does is modify the scope of the past tense, retaining 
its future time reference. Hence, bientôt is not, in fact, all that non-descriptive; rather, 
in (184) and similar utterances, it modifies the past tense passé composé in such a way 
that it becomes non-descriptive137. 
                                                 
137 See Saussure (2003: 200-203) for a discussion of the (processing) strength (or force) of 
temporal adverbials compared to verb tenses; the former being stronger, it is they who impose the 
relevant constraint in utterances. 
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Similarities/Differences 
After comparing the English and French terms soon and bientôt it is apparent that 
there are not any real similarities, beyond their straightforward temporal usages. For 
the English version of “j’ai bientôt fini” one would need to resort to using futurate will, 
as soon does not have the same effect on the past tense that bientôt has in French. And 
contrarily, bientôt cannot be used to indicate the speaker’s preference towards a 
particular state of affairs; a native French speaker would simply use a verb indicating 
this. Nevertheless: 
(185) I finish work soon. 
(186) Plutôt mourir que trahir ma famille. 
These two examples do however indicate that, in English soon can be and is used with 
the present tense with a similar effect as using bientôt + passé composé, as in (181). 
Likewise, a usage showing preference exists in French, but with plutôt instead of 
bientôt; we surmise that plutôt, from plus+tôt, ‘earlier/sooner’, became a term used to 
indicate preference specifically akin to English rather, leaving bientôt with the 
temporal usages. Despite the difference in evolution of these lexical items, it is 
interesting that in both languages the notion of ‘earlier’ – no doubt because of the 
element of precedence contained in its semantics – led to expressions indicating 
preference. In English, this occurred via a non-descriptive usage of a temporal 
expression; and in French this is possible via an expression especially tailored to this 
sense, itself a once-temporal expression that has now evolved and become fixed in its 
current meaning. 
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4.2.17. Again 
Thank you, come again! 
It is straightforward to see that again, a bit like yet, is a temporal item that can easily 
be taken for a non-temporal expression. Many examples of again – even the temporal 
usages – focus on the notion of repetition, and the non-descriptive usages where 
again means “in addition” or “besides” directly stem from this iterative sense. 
Historically138 the word stems from a spatial term whose meaning is akin to “against” 
or “opposite”, but its standard temporal meaning comes from eftsoons meaning “soon 
afterward, a second time, repeatedly”. Interestingly, none of again’s non-descriptive 
or descriptive usages come from the spatial terms it is composed of. The “come again” 
taken from the above quote can simply mean “return to this place once more” or – 
without the “thank you” and in the interrogative – it can signify that the speaker has 
not understood something previously stated: “What? (Could you repeat that?)”. 
 As we will soon see again is a very versatile expression with seven different 
usages, most of which are non-temporal; again is another good candidate for being an 
expression whose temporal sense may not, in fact, be the default one. 
(187) It was nice seeing you again. 
(188) Not again! 
(189) Again and again139. 
These utterances exemplify (more or less) temporal interpretations of again – in (187) 
and (188) the sense of ‘another time’ is the most prevalent one, with an added sense of 
exasperation or dismay in the latter (implicated contextually). Understanding the 
temporal quality as ‘another time’ or ‘repetition’ carries with it the presupposition that 
the eventuality referred to occurred at least once before (otherwise again would not be 
used). The potential dismay of (188) is derived from the repetition of an eventuality – 
the more the eventuality occurred in the past, the more likely it is that the utterance 
convey dismay (usually aided by the speaker’s intonation). The utterance in (189), by 
repeating an expression that means ‘repetition’ is used to mean ‘often’, with no 
redundancy whatsoever.  
                                                 
138 Etymology of again (cf. etymonline.com): again (adv.): late O.E. agan, from earlier ongean 
“toward, opposite, against, in exchange for,” from on + -gegn “against, toward,” compounded for a 
sense of “lined up facing, opposite,” and “in the opposite direction, returning.” 
139 Again can sometimes be translated by encore in French, such as in this example (see also 
section 4.2.8 above). 
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(190) What’s his name again? 
(190’) Come again?  
In (190) a common expression, the notion of ‘repetition’ is present as well, though 
rather than the idea of ‘another time’ it seems more appropriate to interpret this 
utterance as a request for information ‘once more’, as if the speaker knew the 
information previously but for some reason cannot recall it at present140. The (also 
common) expression in (190’) can also be considered a request for information, but 
this time the utterance shifts away from a purely temporal reading to a discursive one 
– “come again” is often used to simply mean “what?!”, where the request for 
information is trumped by the attitudinal expression of “surprise” or “annoyance”.  
The next set of examples move away from straightforward temporality; indeed, 
here again does not describe temporal relations at all:  
(191) Again it could just be me.  
(192) She might like you, (and) again she might not.  
(193) It costs nearly half as much again.  
In the first two utterances again moves away from describing temporal relations yet 
maintains the idea of ‘repetition’ albeit in a different form. With (191) this is more 
obvious, where the sense of again is close to ‘besides’ or ‘in addition’ – it is not too 
difficult to see how one can get at these meanings from the notion of repetition – but 
with the added sense that the speaker is taking full responsibility for the utterance. 
But in (192) again is used to mean ‘on the other hand’, where there is not a real sense 
of repetition – however the two clauses that make up the utterance are themselves a 
repetition [she might like you] and [she might not (like you)]. So the meaning seems 
to be derived from a contrast set up from repeating a clause almost identically. This 
sense of contrast most likely stems from the historical sense of ‘opposite’ present in 
again in the past. Finally in example (193) again is not temporal, and any sense of 
repetition is contained in the notion of addition; here the meaning is quite complex, as 
again is used to mean ‘half the same price, added to the original price’ or said another 
way ‘50% more’. Thus, the sense of repetition can be understood as a sort of 
mathematical operation: there is a base price for object x, one must repeat half its 
value, and add that to the base price to obtain the actual price of x. 
                                                 
140 This correlates to the ‘repeated request’ discursive usage of French déjà (see sct. 4.2.6). 
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The core meaning of again: another/additional x, (where x is often time) when 
again is used temporally, it means that the eventuality currently being described or 
mentioned existed/occurred at least once before (close to already in a way) “Nice to 
see you again”. When again is not used temporally, it can mean that the object(s) 
currently being described or mentioned is/are the template for further computation 
(?), it often refers to quantities of things as in “Take 200g of sugar for the batter, half 
again that amount for the icing”, or it can mean the event/thing described is one of 
two (or more) options as in P again Q “She might like you, and again she might not”. 
The outline procedure for again may look something like this: 
Again 
Default reading: temporal usages  Relevant example(s) 
a. temporal usage: again is used to signal that an eventuality 
occurs more than once, also conveying the notion of 
repetition, or when again is repeated it means ‘repeatedly’  
(187-189) 
b.  temporal-discursive usage where again is principally used 
to signal a request for information previously known (or 
claimed to be previously known)  
(190) 
If not relevant, e.g. contextual factors make it clear that again 
governs relations between clauses or propositions rather than 
events 
 
non-temporal usages:  
a. argumentative/discursive usage: again is used stress the 
speaker’s commitment to the proposition under its scope  
(191) 
b. argumentative usage: again is used to indicate that a 
contrast exists between two clauses, with the sense of ‘on the 
other hand’  
(192) 
c. discursive/expressive usage: again is used to convey an 
emotional outburst of the speaker  
(190) 
d. discursive usage: again is used mathematically, having the 
sense of addition in fixed utterances with quantities  
(193) 
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4.2.18. A brief word on compound expressions 
Fixed compound expressions – like then again or so then – function according to the 
same principles as the individual expressions we have looked at so far; the difference 
is simply that each individual item of such fixed expressions influences or modifies the 
sense of the other expression(s) to obtain a new (compositional) meaning. For 
instance, a compound expression like then again can be used to mean several things: 
(194) I might go for a swim, then again, it might be too soon after lunch. 
(195) Go see if John gets here at noon, then, again, at two p.m. and yet again at four.   
(196) Yeah I saw him, yet, again, we never spoke. 
Where then again can easily mean ‘on second thought’, ‘on the other hand’ or ‘upon 
(further) consideration’ via the sense of each of its components. The input from then is 
the sense of “that time/case” added to the input from again, meaning “once/that 
many more”, which yields the final fixed sense of the expression (note that again can 
have this sense on its own in certain contexts). Notice that again following then is not 
necessarily the compound expression, as (195) shows; here, each expression is used in 
its temporal sense. Notice also how yet again as a fixed compound expression is a 
temporal usage – with no known argumentative or discursive usages, except when 
considered two separate expressions, as in (196).  
(197) Aren’t they back by now? 
*Aren’t they back by yet?  
Aren’t they back yet? 
The main effect of adding by to now is to add an element of expectation not so easily 
accessible to now on its own. As the utterances in (197) illustrate, adding by to yet 
yields nothing useful, and is even odd, since yet already has this component of 
meaning. Another common adjunct to some of these expressions is and, a procedural 
expression in its own right, though how it modifies them is not so easily detectable. 
Let us look over the following examples: 
(198) a. And now, for something completely different.  
b. ?And yet, for something completely different.  
c. ?And then, for something completely different. 
The first example, the standard segue between sketches in Monty Python’s Flying 
Circus, clearly indicates a shift in attention or focus from one subject to another, the 
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way now would indicate the same thing without the “and” component – and at the 
same time it is also clearly temporal. The only difference is that and maintains some 
continuity with what precedes; with now alone  The next two utterances are bizarre, 
and their meaning is not easily apparent, it is as if their individual temporal 
orientations – subsequence for then, prospectiveness for yet – clash with that of and. 
But if we add something to the utterance with yet, for instance: 
(198’) And yet, for something completely different, call us toll free to order… 
The oddness disappears, and one can easily grasp the notion of continuity with what 
preceded – via and – and the contrast to be considered with that – via yet. For the 
utterance containing and then one must add a verb to the utterance for it to be an 
acceptable one: 
(198’’) And then came something completely different.  
If we look at these same three compound expressions in a different context, as in: 
(199) And yet, I’m not sure that X. 
(199’) And now, I’m not sure that X. 
(199’’) ?And then, I’m not sure that X. 
We notice that once again the utterance with and then also produces an oddity, unless 
we add again i.e. ‘then again’, in which case example (199’’) works just fine. What can 
be seen from the utterances in (198) and (198) is that and does not really affect the 
sense of the expression to which it is added, unlike with again or by above. After going 
over these combinations in different contexts, it becomes clear that and then seems 
hard-pressed to mean anything other than temporal subsequence situated in the past 
(i.e. before the Speech-point). And now is a little more flexible: in each case a distinct 
cut-off point is made salient – the Speech-point, whether past or present. Finally, and 
yet, of the three combinations, is the one that most clearly expresses non-temporal 
relations, though what was said previously and what is to follow are both part of its 
meaning: it expresses a clearly argumentative slant to the clauses it introduces. It only 
appears odd in the second example of the first set, until we add a little more 
information. In the other examples we can easily change the tense from a past to 
present or future orientation, the argumentative connotation/meaning remains. The 
sense of now, yet or then is not modified from a temporal one to a non-temporal one, 
or vice versa. This is no doubt due to the meaning of and which does not carry 
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overtones like by or again. The next adjunct term we will quickly address is just, again 
applied to now, yet and then.  
(200) a. I saw him just now [recent past] 
 b. ??I saw him just yet 
 c. I saw him just then [recent past] 
(201) a. I won’t shake your hand just yet [immediate/foreseeable future] 
b. I won’t shake your hand just now [immediate future] 
c. ?I won’t shake your hand just then 
As we can see from the above examples, in the past tense set of utterances (200) just 
yet yields an impossible utterance, but poses no problems for a past temporal usage 
with now and then; while with the future tense set (201) it is just then which is strange 
(but not impossible). One of the more salient meanings of just, that of immediacy, 
adds this sense to now and then for the past tense and to now and yet for the future 
tense. The former are interpreted as referring to the immediate past (i.e. recently), 
while the latter are understood as referring to an immediate future (i.e. soon). As we 
noticed in the respective sections on now, yet and then above (4.2.1 and 4.2.3), there 
is a sense of futurity in temporal yet and a sense of the past in temporal then. These 
meanings are only adapted as to their immediacy with just; but with now, whose 
temporal reference is the present when used descriptively, just adds a sense of 
immediacy like with the other two terms, but also one of past or future. Of course, this 
is due to the influence of the tense of the utterance where it appears – nevertheless, 
just now does not, cannot, refer to the present, but to a time close to it – before or 
after. Incidentally, just is also used with after and before with the same sense of 
immediacy added to them. 
The same basic principles quite naturally also apply to French compound 
expressions. Here we will only look at three; but of course there are several others. 
Maintenant que (now that), alors que141 (so that) and others which take on the added 
que are (almost) always transformed into fixed non-temporal – often quite 
argumentative – expressions. The following utterances do not have the que adjunct, 
but de and tout instead: 
                                                 
141 There are other possible English counterparts for this term, such as whereas or while, that 
instead convey a contrastive meaning; and there is at least one temporal sense, where alors que 
means something akin to while or when (used as expressions of simultaneity).  
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(202) D’après lui, on aurait mieux fait de tourner à gauche.  
(203) Elle s’appelle Juliette, d’après sa grand-mère. 
When de is added to après, a non-temporal usage results, an argumentative one, as in 
(202), with the sense of “according to X”, or a discursive one, like (203) where d’après 
corresponds to the discursive usage after may have indicating a relation of similarity 
or identity (‘named after her grandmother’). The term de can also be added to avant – 
d’avant – but here it merely has the temporal usage meaning ‘from before’ and is less 
versatile than d’après. With tout both avant and après end up with a non-temporal 
usage: 
(204) Avant tout, j’aimerais remercier le maire pour son accueil…  
(204’) Après tout, le maire nous a bien accueilli.  
In (204) avant tout means ‘to begin with’ or ‘first of all’ and is a serial usage on a par 
with d’abord, with the notable difference that avant tout implicates that the clause or 
utterance which follows, being under its scope, is the most important in the 
series/enumeration. The utterance in (204’), can be seen, and is sometimes used, as a 
synonym of enfin, and has the sense of ‘all things considered’ or ‘after all’; as such it is 
an argumentative usage commonly used to conclude a series of arguments. In both 
cases tout makes the temporal usages both avant and après much less accessible. 
This section was useful in demonstrating the added versatility of compound 
expressions – already quite versatile expressions can take on ever more 
meanings/usages, and complicate the procedural picture somewhat. The procedures 
for these compound expressions are naturally influenced by the adjunct expression, 
but in principle will have less versatility in their usages since the adjunct functions as a 
constraint – i.e. its procedure constrains the other expression’s procedure. We will 
leave these compound expressions at this stage, and turn to our final section. 
Nonetheless, compound expressions undoubtedly merit a much more thorough 
investigation into how they function, both separately and conjointly, and a procedural 
approach would seem more than adequate way of doing so.  
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4.3. Non-descriptive usage of a modal operator, and a verb tense 
This final section is reflection on the same type of process that has been described so 
far, only this time pertaining to tenses used non-descriptively rather than temporal 
adverbs or connectives. As stated earlier, much work has been done in Romance 
languages, and in French in particular – for instance studies of the imparfait, passé 
compose, the plus-que-parfait (Sthioul 1998b, 2000a, 2000b, Saussure & Sthioul 
1999, 2005 and Saussure 1998b, 2003) which we will not go into here. More recent 
work has been done on non-descriptive phenomena at the tense, aspect and modal 
interface, notably the futur épistémique or putatif (Morency & Saussure 2006; 
Morency 2010; Saussure & Morency 2011); we will come back to the French future 
épistémique in the next sub-section. First, we will briefly focus on the case of the 
assumptive usages of will, or epistemic will, where ‘will’ is used to describe something 
other than a future state of affairs. 
4.3.1. Epistemic or assumptive will 
Accepting that will can be epistemic is much less an object of debate than the use of 
the simple future in French for the same purpose; indeed, traditional grammars 
(Thomson & Martinet, 1996, Declerck, 1991, 2006) and linguists (for instance Palmer, 
2001) alike admit the relatively common use of will in an assumptive142 sense – where 
the speaker presents the proposition as a likely assumption, for present, past actions 
and of course future actions. For instance: 
(205) [person cannot be reached on the phone] She’ll be in the shower. 
(206) [keys and Bob cannot be found] He’ll have forgotten to leave the keys. 
(207) They’ll have enough time to catch their train. 
Thus, we will focus only upon the way this usage functions. Naturally, we will also 
briefly look into the possibility of using be going to epistemically. A few opening 
remarks: first of all, what follows here is but the beginning of an inquiry into the 
function of epistemic will, thus the results presented here should not be considered 
totally conclusive. Second, the observations made on assumptive will hold regardless 
of whether the term will is spelled out completely or is used in its contracted form 
I/you/we/they + ‘ll – the choice of one over the other is mostly a prosodic 
consideration. 
                                                 
142 “Assumptive will” is Palmer’s (2001) name for the epistemic usage of will. 
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4.3.2. Will, modal and temporal auxiliary 
It is a well-known fact that the use of the auxiliary will is one of the ways of expressing 
futurity in English, and is the closest thing to a “proper” future tense in English143. 
Although it is not the only way of expressing future time in English utterances, it is the 
one with the least constraints. But this should not lead us to consider English will as a 
purely futurate expression, any more than the fact that its epistemic, volitional or 
habitual uses should lead us to consider it a purely modal expression. For our 
purposes here we need not get into the debate about whether the future tense exists or 
is, in fact, “merely” a type of modality; nor even whether will is temporal first and 
modal second, or the opposite. Rather, I take it as uncontroversial that this is indeed 
the case – akin to Declerck's (2006) view that the future tense exists, even though 
“there is always an element of epistemic modality in the meaning of the future tense: 
no use of will is purely temporal” (2006:103)144. Thus, I consider will as an auxiliary 
expressing both temporality and modality, similarly to Declerck; furthermore, I 
propose that it is the procedural nature of this auxiliary verb that enables the hearer to 
interpret one usage or the other. 
4.3.3. Prediction and predictability 
A common view among researchers and grammarians (Coates, 1983; Declerck, 1991, 
2006; Leech & Svartvik 2002; Nuyts, 2001) – no matter what their position on will’s 
status as being modal, temporal or both – is that there exist at least two epistemic 
modal uses of will, that of prediction and that of predictability. In Declerck’s words, 
“Prediction concerns an assumption about the actualization of a situation in the 
future” whereas “Predictability is a more strongly epistemic notion that concerns the 
speaker’s assumption of the strong plausibility of a conclusion. This conclusion 
usually concerns the past or present, seldom the future ” (104). In both cases, will is 
used in an assumptive sense, and the focus on a past, present or future situation is 
what separates the former from the latter. In Morency (2010), I argued that it is this 
focus on a past or present state of affairs which makes the epistemic usage of the 
French futur simple possible, and here, I note that the phenomenon is decidedly 
                                                 
143 See Declerck 2006 for a thorough discussion of this notion. 
144 Such a view fits a conceptual/procedural continuum better than the strict dichotomy view; see 
Nicolle (1998, 2007) for a discussion of will and grammaticalization. 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
similar for the predictability usage145. Accordingly, assumptive will is when the 
utterance expresses the speaker’s attitude and degree of belief (x is probable, likely) 
toward a proposition describing a contemporary (will + infinitive) or past state of 
affairs (will + have + past participle). As stated earlier, it is the verifiability and 
explanatory value of such an utterance which makes it relevant for the hearer’s 
interpretation of will in its assumptive sense. Thus, 
(208) She’ll (already) be at the party. 
is, like examples (205-207) above, an assumptive use of will, where the speaker 
expresses their confidence in the probability that the proposition [she, be at the party] 
are the case and verifiable. In addition, the explanatory value of (208) could be “let’s 
go to location x, rather than waiting for her here”. What is needed to distinguish 
between “pure” future and prediction is quite straightforward; consider the following 
examples: 
(209) According to the radio, the highway will be closed tomorrow. 
(210) The highway will be backed up tomorrow, because of the holiday. 
In (209) the radio reports a scheduled state of affairs for the following day, whereas 
(210) is a speaker’s prediction based on encyclopedic knowledge (of the world of 
traffic). To distinguish between prediction and assumptive will, it needs only be 
manifest that the state of affairs denoted is not situated in the future. In example 
(210’), the absence of temporal tomorrow does just that: 
(210’) The highway will be backed up because of the holiday. 
But the same operation in (209) yields an odd utterance: 
(209’) ?According to the radio, the highway will be closed (now). 
where, if one wishes to refer to the present they would say “according to the radio, the 
highway is closed”. Given the sense of will with respect to futurity and epistemicity it 
is unsurprising to find that these usages are very close; once again we claim that the 
idea of a continuum is the most satisfying explanation for these different 
interpretations. To further stress the point that will need not be associated with the 
future tense per se, but often for prediction, let us turn to a few utterances where a 
progressive form is used, such as the following: 
                                                 
145 I also proposed the Future Epistemic Future for French, but will not dwell on either the 
English or French prediction usage. Instead, we will focus on predictability, and this is what is 
meant when speaking of assumptive will. 
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(211) You know Bob, he’ll be standing around, doing nothing (as usual) 
Here, the progressive [be standing] highlights that this state of affairs is a habitual one 
(reinforced by the ‘as usual’ in the sentence-final position). If it is well known that Bob 
is in the habit of standing around, it is not too implausible to make a prediction of this 
eventuality. Even absent a phrase like ‘as usual’, the progressive tense carries this idea 
of habit, stemming from its durative aspect. For instance, compare the following two 
utterances, one with a progressive tense, one without: 
(212) a. The sun will rise in the east 
 b. Paul will sing. 
 c. I will / I’ll sing. 
(213) a. The sun will be rising in the east 
 b. Paul will be singing. 
 c. I’ll be singing. 
The utterance in (212a) is the closest one can get to an “absolute” future time 
reference, with the least amount of prediction – this is possible since sunrises are 
always true, and are cyclical, recurring events. In (212b) the speaker predicts that Paul 
will sing sometime in the future, or else they are “volunteering” Paul for it (i.e. in 
response to the question “who would like to sing?”). In (213b) it is possible that the 
speaker is either making a prediction (if Paul is not, in fact, singing at present) or 
expressing their belief that such is the case (that Paul is already singing). Note 
however that the present progressive tense makes the prediction less uncertain, i.e., it 
is expected that Paul will sing, because it is a planned event. In contrast, with (213a), it 
is absurd to assume that the sunrise was a planned event, so in this case, the utterance 
conveys that the speaker is expressing their belief that there is a sunrise currently 
occurring, but which they cannot directly witness (e.g. they can only see the shadows 
on the cave wall). Finally, with (212c) and (213c), we have a volitional usage for will, 
where the speaker’s communicative intention is to convey that they are either 
volunteering to/promising that they will sing, or else, that they have a (sufficiently 
strong) desire to do so in (212c). With (213c) the expression of desire or the act of 
volunteering/promising is implicit, since, again, with the progressive form, hearers 
interpret that the act of singing is a planned event, and so is much closer to being 
certain. Let us return to assumptive will with some more examples.  
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(214) He will realize his error on his own.   [non durative sense] 
(215) He will be realizing his error on his own.  [durative sense] 
In (214), again, the speaker is most likely predicting, due to the non-durative aspect of 
the utterance. But (215) is clearly a prediction about the present, due to the 
progressive tense, and due to the impossibility for the speaker to actually know what 
the subject of their utterance is thinking, and hence, whether they are or are not in fact 
conscious of their error. Said differently, we are dealing with a subjective element as 
well as the “presentness” of the state of affairs, modified by the epistemic stance. But 
the present continuous tense is not alone in facilitating an epistemic reading, other 
factors can also play a role: 
(216) A: My sink is stopped up. 
B: Call Bob, he’ll know a plumber. 
(217) A: I can’t reach John on his cell phone. 
B: *His train will go through a tunnel. [in the epistemic reading] 
(218) ?His train will be in a tunnel. 
(219) ?He’ll be in the shower. 
(219’) He’ll be in the shower again. 
(217) seems more acceptable if we replace “a” with “some”, which of course helps to 
mark the indeterminate aspect of the state of affairs, as seen in (220) below. This does 
not seem necessary for (216), although it may reinforce the effect (see 221). Adding 
again in (219’) also makes for a more easily accessible epistemic interpretation. 
(220) His train will be in some tunnel. 
(221) Call Bob, he’ll know some plumber (or other). 
This effect appears to focus on the fact that the speaker is guessing rather than 
deducing the eventuality described, unlike the same utterances containing must in 
place of will: 
(219’’) He must be in the shower. 
(220’) His train must be in a tunnel. 
We will not go into a comparison of must and will here, but both belong to a set of 
modal operators used for presenting utterances as guesses, deductions and 
predictions146.  
                                                 
146 See Klinge (1993) for a thorough comparative analysis. 
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4.3.4. Epistemic be going to 
We will now briefly sketch out our appreciation of be going to as permitting or 
inhibiting an epistemic usage. Some researchers claim that an epistemic usage of be 
going to is simply not possible (Celle, 2004), while others admit this usage, provided 
the utterance “is based on present evidence or knowledge” (Declerck, 2006: 350). So 
far we are undecided on this, as we further exploration of these types of utterance are 
required; but, in principle, there is no reason that an assumptive usage could not be 
possible with be going to. Consider the following: 
(222) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] ?That’s going to be the mailman. 
(223) [person cannot be reached on the phone] ?She’s going to be in the shower. 
Both these examples seem bizarre, particularly (222) and the explanation may be 
provided by Declerck whose examples ((224-226) below) appear to work quite well: 
(224) There’s going to be a row in a minute. 
(225) We’re going to bump into that van. 
(226) You’re not going to like this review of your book. 
The reason seems to be that, as Declerck points out, these utterances occur in 
situations where “there are signs in the present of what is going to happen” (350), in 
other words, the oddness of examples (222) and (223), is due to the fact that the 
speaker has no perceivable evidence or knowledge on which to base their judgment.  
Now this is interesting, because it does not seem necessary for assumptive will to 
function in similar situations. So far, there is no conclusive explanation for this 
phenomenon, but a plausible supposition is that this is so because be going to 
necessarily must have evidence of a more concrete source than will. Declerck claims 
that for (226) and other utterances with stative verbs that refer to non-intentional 
situations, “be going to is automatically interpreted as expressing this sense of 
predictability.” (351). A further point of interest is the fact that in occurrences where 
assumptive be going to seems to not function so well, like in example (222) above, 
phonologically reduced gonna147 works just fine: 
(227) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] That’s gonna be the mailman. 
The claim made here is that this is due to a current shift in oral American English 
                                                 
147 See Nicolle’s research (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2007, 2008) on be going to for more on this 
expression’s usages and constraints. 
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towards replacing will with gonna. In conversation, gonna is used more frequently 
than in British English, while with will it is the opposite, though corpus studies do not 
specify the type of usage (future or assumptive usage). There are as yet (and as far as 
we know) no clearly-given reasons for this possibility; we hypothesize that it may be 
because the expression gonna simply takes up the epistemic and futurate roles of will, 
but there is another explanation that seems equally plausible based on the intuition 
that gonna is taking its cue from gotta. Gotta itself, the slang contraction of has/have 
got to, can easily replace deductive must, as we can see below: 
(228) [The lights are on] She must be home. 
(229) [The lights are on] She’s gotta be home. 
(230) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] That’s gotta be the mailman. 
More research on gonna, gotta and other contracted slang forms (i.e. hafta, oughta) 
needs to be done to have a better grasp on their functions and limitations. The above 
examples represent a good starting point. We will conclude this section with the 
approximate procedure for will given below: 
Will 
Default meaning: qualifies a state of affairs that is not true 
at S, but is predicted to be so at T+n 
Relevant example(s) 
ε = modal context, that is the elements under will’s scope 
deal with mood  
 
If x: ε Then will is modal – low to high degrees of certainty, 
with the higher end of the scale occupied by volitional uses 
(208-211), (212b), 
(213-216), (220-221) 
Modal usage: when will is used to express a subjective 
prediction based on the speaker’s knowledge will is used 
epistemically (this is the ‘assumptive’ usage) 
 
Volitional usage: will is used to express a desire or promise  (212c), (213c) 
τ = temporal context, that is the elements under will’s scope 
relate to time in some way 
 
If x: τ Then will is temporal – very high degree of certainty (212a) 
Temporal usage: will is used to express that a non-actual 
eventuality obtains in the future 
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4.3.5. French epistemic future tense  
In French using the future tenses (both the simple future and anterior future) to mark 
an epistemic modality about the proposition expressed has been the object of several 
studies148; such a usage is known under a variety of names – “conjectural future”, 
“hypothetical future”, “putative future” or “epistemic future”. All of these focus on a 
common fact: the use of the future tenses to express the speaker’s judgment, thus a 
subjective one, about an eventuality whose certainty is not proven at the time of 
speech. What Declerck stated about the English future tense is equally applicable to 
French: “there is always an element of epistemic modality in the meaning of the future 
tense” (Declerck, 2006:103). 
(231) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] Ce sera le facteur. 
It is clear that here (just as with similar examples in English) that the proposition is 
not about an eventuality happening (soon to be happening) in the future, but instead 
it is about one that has just happened. In this context, it is mutually manifest to both 
speaker and hearer that the phenomenon referred to concerns the present/immediate 
past. Like with English assumptive will, the simple future tense in French can be (and 
is in this case) used to express a modal stance – the speaker considers the eventuality 
[be the mailman] as (very) likely. 
In principle, if and when a speaker makes use of an epistemic marker in their 
utterance, there is some additional information that needs to be interpreted; this 
additional information – the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition expressed – 
has a slightly higher cost, especially if it is implicitly marked, as in (231) above. When 
made explicit, such as in example (232) below, the hearer also recuperates the idea 
that the speaker thinks it likely that the mailman is behind the door, albeit with more 
distance: 
(232) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] C’est probablement le facteur. 
And in (233), the speaker is claiming outright that the mailman is indeed behind the 
door: 
(233) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] C’est le facteur. 
The usual hypothesis is that the speaker, when using a modalized utterance, either 
                                                 
148 For instance: Damourette & Pichon (1911-36), Nef (1984), Martin (1987),  Rocci (2000), 
Dendale (2001), Celle (2004), Borillo (2005) and Morency (2010). 
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explicitly (232) or implicitly (231), they do not, or cannot, fully endorse the 
proposition [mailman, be here] as true. In Saussure & Morency (2006) we proposed 
that the speaker in fact projects themselves into the future, a time when their 
proposition could be verified149. Thus the futur épistémique implies understanding the 
utterance as expressing the projection of the speaker’s future self – thus prompting a 
recalculation of S as S’ representing the potentially verifiable moment when the 
proposition is confirmed or dismissed150. With the future anterior epistemic usage the 
idea is the same; here, the past participle constitutes the resultant state, which serves 
as the supposed conclusion to an indirect (inferred) perception of the eventuality’s 
cause. We will skip the anterior future usage here and instead focus on prediction and 
predictability. 
The idea that prediction is an integral part of future tenses almost goes without 
saying, but how does this interface with epistemic usages? In other words, how does 
one differentiate between a future tense prediction and an epistemic one? Just like 
with will, the notions of prediction and predictability enter the equation. Recall what 
was said in the previous subsection: “Prediction concerns an assumption about the 
actualization of a situation in the future” whereas “Predictability is a more strongly 
epistemic notion that concerns the speaker’s assumption of the strong plausibility of a 
conclusion. This conclusion usually concerns the past or present, seldom the future ” 
(Declerck, 2006: 104). Again, it is the focus on a future (prediction) or a past or 
present eventuality (predictability) which constitutes the defining distinction. Take for 
instance the following examples, at first sight, all temporal usages: 
(234) Le soleil se lèvera à l’est. 
(235) Ce verre se cassera au contact du sol.  
(236) Le soleil asséchera les rivières et les lacs. 
(237) Le toast tombera du côté beurré.  
(238) L’autoroute sera fermée.  
(239) Je partirai en voyage cet été.  
Example (234) is trivial, and thus expresses an eventuality deemed certain. For (235), 
common knowledge of the laws of physics also make the utterance perfectly 
predictable, so long as the glass is made of glass and not some other material capable 
                                                 
149 See Morency & Saussure (2006: 58-62) for a more detailed discussion of verifiability with 
these usages. 
150 See also Rocci (2000: 269-270). 
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of resisting shattering upon impact, or that the carpet is not particularly thick etc. 
However, the eventuality described in (235) depends more on contextual cues and so 
the prediction’s reliability is more variable. Example (236) seems to present a riskier 
prediction – when uttered by a climatologist warning of global warming, one 
understands that the statement is plausible, without being completely certain 
(perhaps the calculations are erroneous, or that the future described can be avoided 
somehow). The utterance in (237) describes an equally probable eventuality – except 
for the slim chance that the buttered side of the toast is slightly heavier and thus more 
likely to fall face down – and the prediction is therefore riskier, and is closer to 
expressing an opinion, and so, a modality. At last, example (238) is a prediction 
similar to that in (237), except that (238) is potentially more subjective – particularly 
if manifest that it is the speaker’s speculation, thus marking the utterance as (more) 
dependent on the speaker’s appraisal. Given this, we propose a scale of predictions 
going from the most objective to the most subjective – at each stage the body of 
background knowledge is lesser. For the hearer of these utterances, in (234) the 
realization of the prediction does not depend on the speaker at all; while in (238), it 
does, since the speaker is the principal source of the information. Likewise, in (239), 
the utterance is highly subjective, and can also be considered a prediction, but given 
the speaker “je”, we easily interpret such utterances as more than just predictions, 
they are expressions of a desire. Volitional usages have the strongest degree of 
subjectivity, and not only is the speaker the principal (perhaps only) source of the 
information, the speaker is making manifest that this is a desired action to be 
undertaken.  
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Similarities/Differences  
Throughout section 4.12 we have seen how will and the French simple future tense 
can both be used to express an epistemic stance through predictability. The way the 
future can be expressed in each language is somewhat different, even given that both 
languages can use other means to do this (i.e. present continuous in English, or 
present tense with future time adverbs in both). Nevertheless, it is clear that in both 
cases the very nature of the future, and how it is expressed, is already astraddle 
temporality and modality, and it is this fact, we surmise, that allows for his usage with 
the French future tenses. In English, the fact that will is a modal marker in its own 
right probably explains why it is used for expressing epistemic stances. Both will – 
assumptive will – and the French simple future – the futur épistémique – rely on 
prediction and especially predictability to make capable the type of usages we have 
just seen.  
With the most objective predictions, both languages function very similarly, if 
not identically:  
(234) Le soleil se lèvera à l’est. 
(234’) The sun will rise in the east. 
Here, no meaning other than one of an objective, almost certain, prediction with these 
two examples. Likewise with the following pair: 
(236) Le soleil asséchera les rivières et les lacs. 
(236’) The sun will dry up the rivers and lakes. 
In the context of a discussion or debate about global warming, both utterances 
function the same, though the prediction is less close to certain than in (231-231’). In 
fact, for most of our examples here, there is no real difficulty for the English 
assumptive will utterances to be directly translated into the French futur épistémique. 
Only a few utterances meet any resistance, with be going to in English, which works 
fine in the French futur périphrastique: 
(222) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] ?That’s going to be the mailman. 
(222’) [the doorbell rang/is ringing] Ça va être le facteur. 
We saw that with other contexts however be going to worked – namely where 
evidence for what was about to transpire was visible, as in (226), which also works 
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with the French periphrastic aller + verb: 
(226) You’re not going to like this review of your book. 
(226’) Tu ne vas pas aimer la critique de ton livre. 
The fact that it is acceptable in French is significant, since in past research (Morency & 
Saussure 2006: 64) we thought the futur périphrastique épistémique to be mostly 
restricted to être and avoir. Then, we noted that there was a need of a progressive 
aspect (which English be going to has by definition) and that one had to use être en 
train de + verb for this to work (ibid). In fact, it seems that with aimer (‘like’) and a 
few other verbs, there is no need for the être en train de phrase. As with English be 
going to, if there is visible evidence in the present for the immediate future 
eventuality, the epistemic usage works with the futur périphrastique. For instance, 
(237’) and (237’’): 
(237’) Le toast va tomber du côté beurré.  
(237’’) The toast is going/gonna fall on the buttered side.  
Both work so long as the speaker has direct evidence for the eventuality, and is not 
merely making a prediction based on what they believe happens to buttered toast. We 
will stop here, but it is clear that there may be much more to epistemic usages using 
progressive markers. To sum up, the epistemic usages of assumptive will and be going 
to and French futur simple and futur périphrastique correspond quite nicely for the 
most part. Of course here we are dealing with tense and modal markers rather than 
adverbs and connectives, but still it is interesting to note. Further research on this 
phenomenon is required to get a more complete picture of these usages. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Discussion 
That temporal expressions – adverbs, connectives, tenses or auxiliary verbs – can be 
used to express something other than temporal relations or to refer to things having 
little to nothing to do with time is a fact. This dissertation was not needed to prove 
that, nor was this its intent. Why temporal expressions can be used in this way 
however was the initial question, and throughout this dissertation several expressions 
have been looked at a little more closely and many such “non-standard” usages have 
been described. The basic hypothesis was that temporal expressions (like other 
pragmatic markers) are procedural, and as such, serve the specific purpose of guiding 
interlocutors in utterance production and interpretation. This, it was claimed, is 
achieved through inferences prompted by the expressions themselves, and possible 
because of the mind’s general cognitive ability to perform inferences.  
 In the introduction I asked three questions, which we can now answer here. 
Recall: 
1. why and how is it that temporal expressions do not necessarily yield a 
temporal interpretation? 
2. how do hearers arrive at an understanding of this sort, and be reasonably 
confident that this interpretation is what was actually intended by the 
speaker? 
3. what specific conditions must exist, or, in what context(s) do these temporal 
expressions function in this way? 
The answer to the first question is twofold: first of all temporal expressions may yield 
interpretations other than temporal ones because, whatever concepts of time and 
temporal relations are contained within them, they are procedural expressions, and 
are thus, I claim, actually quite versatile despite their encoding rules of use; these 
rules in fact only marginally apply to them, they are rather for establishing relations 
for the other expressions in the utterance, the conceptual ones. In addition, if their 
core sense is simple and ‘primitive’ enough, they can more easily be enriched to 
propose instructions for relations that are close in meaning but with the element of 
temporality or aspectuality being absent – for instance the scalar usages obtained with 
already or déjà.   Secondly, how it is that these expressions are used this way, depends 
upon the previously stated pragmatic ability of interlocutors to adapt language 
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according to their intentions and conventions. Furthermore, and this is also part of 
the answer to the second question, speakers and hearers’ general language processing 
– in particular inferential – abilities are responsible for producing and interpreting 
utterances and discourse; from there, it is natural for interlocutors to use temporal 
expressions in any way they allow – if an expression can mean several things 
according to context of use, then the interlocutors know these uses or else understand 
them instantly upon processing them. Finally, the specific conditions for temporal 
expressions to function in this way are contexts where a temporal interpretation is 
irrelevant, not at all salient, or even logically odd. These conditions range from specific 
syntactical features (e.g. expression X is always sentence-initial with a temporal sense, 
but when it appears elsewhere it has other meanings), unusual semantic associations 
which prompt for further processing, to intonation (e.g. putting more stress on the 
expression, or an accompanying expression).  When interlocutors (with all their lexical 
and encyclopedic knowledge) encounter such contexts, they immediately process the 
expressions in such a way that the final output of the utterance makes some kind of 
sense. That, in brief, is the why and how of temporal expressions used non-temporally. 
And the basic hypothesis proposed in the introduction – that temporal expressions are 
procedural and encode both temporal and non-temporal instructions – seems to be 
correct. As we have seen throughout chapter 4, these expressions all contain 
instructions for processing utterances where they appear; in the appropriate contexts, 
the instructions activated are temporal, in other contexts, the instructions activated 
are argumentative or discursive. 
With regards to the more developed hypotheses and their corollaries, the picture 
is a little more complex, but not unduly so. These hypotheses (from chapter 3) are 
rewritten below, with a brief discussion for each: 
Hypothesis 1. temporal expressions, when used descriptively, are used to 
establish temporal relations between eventualities or situate an eventuality 
temporally.  
Nothing in particular needs to be said here, the hypothesis is correct concerning 
temporal expressions used descriptively. Thus ‘standard’ or ‘default’ usages do indeed 
pertain to time and temporality. 
Hypothesis 2. temporal expressions, when used non-descriptively, are used to 
establish relations other than temporal relations, for instance argumentative or 
discursive ones. 
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As we have seen, and given that, as many examples attest, temporal expressions do 
actually mean something when not used to describe time or temporal relations, then 
they can and are used to express relations of a different sort. This hypothesis pans out 
as well. 
Hypothesis 3. temporal expressions – adverbs, connectives, indexicals and verb 
tenses – are procedural expressions, as such they encode procedures for their 
usage. 
Finally, this hypothesis is much more difficult to prove, since it depends mainly on the 
basic premise that such a thing as procedural expressions exist. For pragmatic 
theories like Relevance Theory, this is not a problem, and seeing temporal adverbs, 
connectives and indexicals as procedural items is even considered standard. But what 
advantage does considering temporal expressions as procedural grant us? For a start, 
this conception of temporal expressions allows a more straightforward treatment of 
the many potential interpretations these expressions help the hearer to choose from. 
Instead of multiplying the (already enormous) amount of lexical entries that can be 
called upon in language users’ minds, procedural expressions encode a core meaning 
of a type that is easy to restrict or expand to generate potentially many outcomes with 
lower mental processing cost. This is possible because procedural expressions make 
use of general mental inferential processes that can be used for a multitude of very 
different purposes – language processing being only one among many (and one 
among those we can be consciously aware of). This seems much more plausible than 
the notion that expressions all encode representations, with the theoretically infinite 
entries all indexed in the mind and being accessed by a series of purely linguistic 
decoding and selection processes. To consider temporal expressions as being 
procedural is to avoid unnecessary complication in an already complex mind. But 
more to the point, the claim that temporal expressions are procedural is a sound way 
to modelize how language processing works. Another interesting point is the question 
posed by the two sub-hypotheses: 
Sub-hypothesis 1. temporal expressions encode both temporal procedures and 
non-temporal (i.e. argumentative or discursive) procedures – and thus, temporal 
expressions, though they may be used non-temporally, are, by default, temporal. 
Sub-hypothesis 2. temporal expressions encode instructions that are 
interpretable in context as temporal, argumentative or discursive – and thus 
such expressions are not temporal by default (time is not inherent to their core 
sense). 
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On the surface these two sub-hypotheses are almost identical – both argue for 
temporal expressions encoding procedures – but differ as to what the default sense of 
these expressions is. In fact, it may be incorrect to call all of the expressions looked at 
here ‘temporal’. Instead, we can easily expand the third hypothesis to: 
Hypothesis 4. Certain types of expressions – call them pragmatic markers – are 
procedural expressions which encode instructions that are interpretable in 
context as temporal, argumentative, discursive, serial or spatial – the core sense 
of each being only a strong indication of the specific expression’s actualized in-
context meaning. 
This hypothesis expands to include all procedural expressions, and thus is plausible 
insofar as one accept the conceptual/procedural distinction – whether it be a 
dichotomy or a continuum, though the latter offers more malleability. Given some of 
the expressions examined here, it is safe to say that not all are in fact inherently 
temporal expressions – despite how they may commonly be perceived (or how they 
are defined in dictionaries). Wilson & Sperber (1993) make the case that “not 
everything that is linguistically communicated is linguistically encoded” (98), and this 
insight proves useful in relation to Hypothesis 4. Indeed, the instructions alluded to 
above could in fact be quite bare, needing salient and relevant contextual elements to 
fully develop utterances they appear in. If we recall the proposal of core meaning for 
now (section 4.2.1), the only information encoded in the expression may well be 
indexical information and the notion of contrast. The understanding that now is 
temporal, argumentative or discursive could in fact just be a result derived from 
contextual cues that develop the encoded meaning into the full-fledged interpretation. 
Further research on all types of pragmatic markers would help to further refine this 
hypothesis, and better explain some of the many functions these types of versatile 
expressions may have. 
 This brings us back to our discussion on Kaplan’s meaning and rules of use, 
which initially were used to describe demonstratives. As stated previously, these two 
notions function well within the procedural pragmatic framework. After all, one could 
easily equate meaning with the semantic sense of expressions, and rules of use with 
their pragmatic sense, or even to say that conceptual expressions encode meaning 
while procedural expressions encode rules of use. The picture is somewhat more 
complex than this. In section 3.1.4. we touched upon these two terms and how they 
were understood here. I stated that rules of use did not mean that linguistic 
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expressions described by this term were devoid of meaning; instead, rules of use do 
have some basic level of meaning, otherwise they could not of course be rules for 
anything. Seen this way, rules of use or procedural expressions are extra-
propositional operators that have scope over the conceptual parts of the utterances 
where they appear. Thus in a given utterance those parts that are conceptual refer to 
real or abstract things, actions or events while the procedural parts of the utterance – 
rules of use – either hint at or tell the hearer outright what types of relations must be 
established between the concepts represented in the proposition.  
If we look at this in terms of indexes, such that a conceptual expression like 
“tree” indexes a representation (in the mind) of /tree/, and such that a procedural 
expression like “now” indexes a relation to be established between the eventuality 
described and the moment of speech, then we can easily construe both types of 
expression as encoding instructions of some kind. Now, these instructions are aimed 
at the cognitive ability of general utterance processing, and thus semantic instructions 
could well be: when you hear or see the word “tree” look for a salient representation of 
/tree/ or else create one. This, if true, happens at a level of which we are unaware, and 
when brought to the fore, seems evident and not very interesting; if pressed for a 
definition, we might say something like “a tree is a plant with a trunk, branches and 
leaves” or “a tree is a type of diagram with a central part and lines branching off” or 
else just end up pointing at an example if there is one to be seen. For procedural 
expressions, we cannot so easily point out or define what the term means, and 
paradoxically, we are more aware that we  are processing the instructions they encode 
than with conceptual expressions. This I would argue, is because procedural 
expressions appeal to or sometimes even force the mind to undertake cognitive 
operations which require some level of effort, like making an inference. In a sense, 
these expressions grab our attention and say “set up a contrast between these two 
clauses” – for but or yet – or else “the correct temporal relation is a time previous to 
the present” – for before or yesterday. Of course, we are not greatly aware of all this, 
or rather, the mind makes these calculations so quickly that we need not necessarily 
even realize that we are establishing these relations; but when called upon to explain 
our understanding of an utterance these procedural expressions and the rules of use 
they encode jump to the fore – even despite the difficulty we may have to actually 
define them.  
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This type of mental indexing, for both types of expressions, can exist because of 
the cognitive architecture we have. To hazard a guess, such expressions arose because 
the mind could use them (not the other way around), that is, our cognitive abilities for 
drawing inferences and setting up specific types of relations between representations 
pre-existed  language and when language came to be, it was only natural for a 
specialized class of expressions to arise that would make use of these capabilities. The 
expressions described herein are of this type; they exist to make descriptions of the 
world more precise, more salient, more relevant. They may have appeared with a 
conceptual representation attached, or may have arisen directly as procedural 
expressions. 
A few interesting observations arose from the research and writing of this 
dissertation. The first is the notion of scalarity, namely that some of the expressions 
described herein function along a scale of some sort. Thus, those expressions which 
are scalar have a meaning which is relatively mobile, moving up or down a continuum 
of values – temporal, spatial or argumentative for the most part. This first became 
clear when looking at French déjà and encore followed by English already and still 
(and from what I know of Spanish ya and Italian già this also applies to them). What 
came as a surprise was that this notion of scalarity also cropped up in a few other 
expressions – and arguably, could even be part of the meaning of many if not most of 
the expressions described (though this may be somewhat forced for a few). Of course 
the notion of ‘scale’ is nothing new to linguistics, and especially semantics and 
pragmatics, one need only think of expressions like some, many, most and all, and all 
the literature devoted to their function. Yet, that they would prove essential 
components of meaning for some of the temporal adverbs and connectives is a novel 
way of looking at these expressions.  
The second realization that came about when writing this dissertation was the 
notion of polarity; this idea may seem and outgrowth from scalarity, and in a way it is, 
but it became obvious that it was an important factor especially when looking at 
after/before and après/avant. As seen in a few example one could easily use either 
before or after when listing military ranks in an ascending order – depending on the 
polarity. This kind of orientation depends almost exclusively on pragmatic factors, 
e.g., on speaker’s intentions, and on context.  
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5.2. General comparative review 
In this section, we will broadly review our analyses of English and French temporal 
expressions and discuss them cross-linguistically. There are both differences and 
similarities for all of the expressions we have looked at, and this section shall provide a 
preliminary explanation of why this is the case and what it may mean for a theory of 
language universals, for translation studies and for second language acquisition. 
Cross-linguistically – between English and French – some of these expressions 
adopt roles that are different, though sometimes still indirectly related, as we shall see. 
For instance now can be used to express maintenant of course, both temporally and in 
what we have called the ‘contrastive’ usage, but now can also mean puisque – a 
meaning also covered by the non-temporal ‘argumentative’ usage of since in English 
or analog usages of puis, après, or d’abord in French. It is interesting to note that a 
very small subset of these expressions correspond quite closely, only differing in the 
odd non-descriptive usage or two – such as then and alors, whose only real difference 
is alors’s argumentative usage that presents a logical, and subjective, deduction while 
then requires the addition of a sentence-initial if-clause to do the same (see p126 
above). Or else the expressions after/before and après/avant who match up quite well 
except for a discursive usage absent in each French expression – resemblance for 
après, and preference for avant (see p160). Likewise the French futur simple and 
English will function almost identically – the main difference being the ease with 
which will can be used epistemically is greater than for the futur simple; although the 
two languages’ tense systems will have greater variations in meaning than temporal 
adverbs or connectives. Finally, there are a few cases where there are no direct 
equivalents across both English and French. On one end of the scale there is again, for 
which one must use several different expressions to convey a similar sense – à 
nouveau or encore for temporal readings, encore for the attitudinal discursive 
meaning, or non-temporal de plus for additive usages (see p181); there is since, for 
which one must use puisque or depuis que to access the same type of non-temporal 
usages possible with since (see pp163-164); and on the other end of the scale  there is 
also soon/sooner, whose counterpart bientôt does not have any non-temporal usages 
of note (see pp176-177). 
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From the observations made in the preceding chapters we can see that some 
expressions are almost completely equivalent, others only approximately so, and a few 
“pairs” not at all alike. But meanings or functions such as expectation, scalarity, 
contrast, or seriality are found in both English and French, and coincide for the most 
part with the expressions in each language. That all these functions are present in both 
languages (and I speculate in all natural languages) points again at language 
universals, and to Hypothesis 4. One thing all these expressions have in common 
(besides our regrouping them as procedural expressions) is that they all affect the 
focus of utterances’ perspectives – the speaker’s actual perspective, their projected or 
remembered perspective, the perspective of a third party and so on. The importance of 
this observation is crucial: temporal expressions used non-descriptively often affect 
the attitudes conveyed in the utterances where they appear. 
As we have seen previously, already and déjà function quite similarly except in 
one instance: the “reminder” usage uses again in English, and déjà in French (see p 
135). On a different note however, we can see that those expressions which allow for 
scalar usages are the same type in both languages – aspectual adverbs (already-still-
yet and déjà-encore). As mentioned above, this aspectual element (e.g. duration, 
progression) is very likely the reason the scalar usages can be derived. There are many 
(mostly small) differences among the English and French versions of these 
expressions. Undoubtedly, this is also the case between any two languages; and in all 
likelihood languages from different families will prove to have greater differences in 
non-standard usages for temporal (or spatial) expressions; this does not however 
mean that the meanings and contexts for argumentative, discursive or other usages 
are absent… To us these variations are merely a further indication that such usages – 
on an abstract or metalinguistic level at least – are all-pervasive in natural languages. 
The table on the next page recapitulates the English and French expressions treated in 
Chapter 4; in it we can see that all the expressions have a counterpart (for encore there 
are three) in their temporal/aspectual usages, but for the various non-descriptive 
usages the picture is quite different – sometimes the same expression that was used 
for the temporal usage is the same for other usages, but frequently one or more of the 
non-descriptive usages either require a different temporal expression, or else have no 
direct analog. There are some instances where there are no possibilities for a specific 
usage, and some others where this is still an open question. 
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SUMMARY OF CROSS-LANGUAGE USAGES – 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEMPORAL EXPRESSIONS 
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5.3. Prospective research 
This study is situated more on the theoretical and descriptive side of linguistic inquiry, 
as such actual empirical trials and experiments represent further work to be carried 
out in this field. Further research would serve two purposes. First, a more thorough 
and formal approach would ideally flesh out the outline procedures into full-fledged 
algorithms. Then, a more computational linguistic orientation could serve the twofold 
purpose of testing the outline procedures – developed into full algorithms – proposed 
here, and further improving them should they prove usable; or else point out where 
they do not work and why. Second, research in a similarly theoretical general 
linguistic vein could expand the procedural pragmatic take to other expressions of 
similar categories – for instance adverbs and conjunctions – but which are considered 
as fulfilling other roles, such as spatial expressions, or hearsay markers. 
I had hoped to show that an integrated pragma-semantic model coupled with 
tools from various approaches or theories would bring out a new and enlightening 
understanding of these phenomena. For much of the time spent researching this 
subject, I hesitated between considering that there was indeed a default temporal 
reading for these expressions and considering that there was no such default meaning. 
It turns out that for a few of the expressions – next and d’abord, ensuite & enfin – the 
default reading is indeed something other than time. For the majority of these 
expressions however the temporal readings do seem to be the default. The temptation 
would perhaps be to separate them into distinct classes, as well they could be. Then 
again, most of these expressions have very specific and rich variations in meaning 
which could lead one to put each expression into a class of its own. Conversely, one 
could lump them all together into one great category of pragmatic markers, which is in 
itself correct, though not very helpful. Perhaps a better way to split these expressions 
up into different categories would be to do so according to their functions – something 
that came to mind late in the research, and bears some thought for further work on 
such expressions. In such future research, adverbials and connectives other than 
temporal ones would also have to be included. 
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